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FOREWORD
This final report presents the results of a literature survey and study effort performed by
Vought Systems Division (VSD) of the Vought Corporation to determine the hazards of Shuttle
payload propulsion systems. This report contains a discussion of the methods and purpose of
hazard classification for transportation and storage, handling/safety procedures and requirements,
quantitative hazard assessment techniques of solid and liquid rocket systems, a preliminary
hazard analysis of rocket systems for Shuttle payload, and a hazard comparison of solid and
liquid systems. The study was cor,ducted under NASA Contract NAS1-12500, Task R-150.
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DEFINITIONS
BASIC EXPLOSIVE TERMS RELATED TO ROCKET PROPELLANTS
Explosive Any material which decomposes exothermically over a short time
period to yield high gas pressure or shocks (impulse) in the
immediate vicinity.
Propellants High energy materials which are employed in such an environment
that they react (sometimes at a high rate) but without the destruc-
tive forces of an explosive. Under certain conditions these materials
will also function as explosives.
Explosive
Decomposition
A chemical reaction or change of state occurring in a material which,
at a given time, may exist in one of four stages; i.e., initiation, de-
flagration, transition or detonation•
Initiation That stage in an explosive decomposition in which a stimulus (i.e.,
heat, shock, etc.) has initiated a decomposition but the decomposing
substance has not released sufficient energy to proceed beyond the
burning stage.
Deflagration The second stage of the explosive decomposition process in which a
self-sustaining reaction is being carried out. Heat is transferred from
the reacted to the unreacted material, causing further reaction. Generally
deflagration is a very slow process and dependent on ambient pressure.
XVl
Transition
Detonation
Explosion
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONTINUED)
The 3rd stage of an explosive decomposition in which rate increases
from deflagration to a high velocity reaction usually called detonation.
A steady high-stage rate consumption of the explosive in which energy
liberated is transmitted to the unburned layers of explosive by means
of shock waves. In most condensed explosions the rate at which the
detonation passes through the explosive is 5-8 mm//_sec.
(A more generalized term than explosive decomposition)
The sudden release of energy usually in the form of large volumes of
gas which exert pressure on the surrounding medium. Depending on
the rate at which energy is released, an explosion can be categorized
as a deflagration, detonation, or the rupture of a pressure vessel.
GENERAL EXPLOSIVE TERMS
Air Blast The destructive energy imparted to the atmosphere surrounding an
explosion.
Blast Yield Energy release in an explosion inferred from measurements of the
characteristics of blast waves generated by the explosion.
CBGS Confined by Ground Surface. A liquid propellant explosion occurr-
ing on the ground after spill and mixing.
CBM Confined by Missile. An explosion within the tankage of a liquid
propellant vessel or rocket.
Critical Diameter
(DC)
Explosive Yield
The minimum diameter for solid propellant which will sustain
detonation when configured as a solid right cylinder.
Energy released in an explosion, often expressed as a percent or
fraction of energy which would be released by the same mass of a
standard high explosive such as TNT.
Fallback An accident in which a launch vehicle settles or falls back to earth
in initial stages of launch.
Hazard A situation which may result in death or injury to personnel, or in
damage to property. Includes effect of fire, flash, explosion, shock,
concussion, fragmentation, corrosion and toxicity.
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GLOSSARYOF TERMS (CONCLUDED)
HVI High Velocity Impact. A liquid propellant explosion occurring after
a vehicle with unburned propellant impacts the earth at relatively
high velocity.
Ignition Time Time after beginning of an accident involving liquid propellants at
which initiation of an explosion occurs.
Overpressu re The transient pressure exceeding the ambient pressure, manifested
in the shock (or blast) wave from an explosion. The variation of
the overpressure with time depends on the energy yield of the
explosion and the distance from the point of burst. The peak over-
pressure is the maximum value of the overpressure at a given
location and is generally experienced at the instant the shock (or
blast) wave reaches that location.
Pseudo-critical
Geometry (a C)
An empirical relationship for hollow-core non-solid circular shapes
which is defined as four times the ratio of the cross-sectional area
to total perimeter for the smallest sample size that can sustain
detonation.
Safe and Arm
Device (S&A)
An electro-mechanical device used to insure initiation of pyrotechnic
train on proper command and to prohibit initiation of the train by
an inadvertent firing signal.
Side-on Impulse Integral of time history of side-on overpressure
Side-on Overpressure Blast wave overpressure in an undisturbed blast wave.
Standoff Distance Distance from center of an explosion.
Sub-critical Diameter Diameter smaller than the critical diameter.
Super-critical
Diameter
Diameter greater than the critical diameter.
Terminal Yield Blast yield from measurements made far enough from an explosion
that the waves are similar to those generated by a specified mass of
TNT.
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1.0 SUMMARY
Thefederal,state,andmunicipalgovernmentsregulatethe transportationandstorageof
explosivesby law. The Departmentof Transportation(DOT) andthe Departmentof Defense(DOD)
arethe federal regulatoryagencies.The DOTclassificationfor transportation,the military classifi-
cation for quantity-distance,and hazardcompatibility groupingusedarepresented;however,the
testsrequiredto establishthe hazardclassificationdo not showthis total responseof a solid propellant
motor underthe influenceof a largeexplosivedonor. Therearesomeindustry developedtestswhich
arepossiblymore relevantin determiningsensitivityof propellantsto an impact/shockenvironment
in the absenceof a largeexplosivedonorandthesearealsodiscussed.
The safetyproceduresandrequirementsof aScout launchvehicle,Westernand EasternTest
Rangeandthe Minuteman,Delta, andPoseidonProgramsarereviewedandsummarized. In reviewing
the safetyrequirementsandpracticesof theseprograms,it wasdeterminedthat the basichazardous
situationsguardedagainstwerecommonto all solidrocket programs.
Hazardousenvironmentsof majorconcernare impact,shock,friction, radiofrequency,static
or stray electricalenergyand excessivetemperatures.Handlingsafetyrequirementsarenot generally
basedon the hazardof explosionor detonationof the solidrocket but the primaryconcernisprema-
ture ignition. Impactand shockenvironmentsareprimarily aconcernfrom the standpointof damage
which will causesystemfailure uponnormal ignition. The staticelectricity or stray electricalenergy
hazardisreducedby usingpropergroundingof systems,personnelgrounddevices,terminatingopera-
tions duringelectricalstorms,reducingor eliminatingRFI during launch,usingsafe/armdevicesand
other shuntingandshieldingtechniques.Requirementsof theSpaceTransportationSystemsafety
programincludesafety reviewsfrom the subsystemlevelto the completedpayload.The Scoutsafety
procedureswill satisfya portion of theserequirementsbut additionalproceduresneedto be imple-
mentedto comply with the systemsafetyrequirementsfor Shuttle operationfrom the EasternTest
Range.
To determinethe hazardsassociatedwith solidand liquid propellantsdueto ignition,explosion
or detonation; impact,donor chargeandmissileaccidentdatawerereviewed.The relativesafetyof
solid rocketmotors isshownfrom thesedata. A reviewof componentand systemaccidentsshowed
that mostwerecausedby proceduralor designdeficiencies.Properattention in thesetwo areas
throughoutsystemdesignprovidesfor safevehicleprocessing.
Impactvelocity testinganddatashowthat the inert-explosive/burnregionsfor composite
andcomposite-modifieddouble-basepropellantsareabout the samebut the composite-modified
double-basepropellanthada lower impactvelocity for possibledetonation than the composite
propellants.An impactvelocity isexcessof about 52 ft/sec (15.8m/sec)and 59 ft/sec (17.9m/sec)
would be requiredfor the AntaresII X259 andthe Altair II IA, respectively,to causea hazardous
condition.
Datashowthat compositepropellantsarerelativelysafefrom donorchargedetonationwhena
sub-criticaldiameter,below64.2 inches,for a PBANcompositepropellant isused. However,double-
basepropellantsandcompositepropellantswith highenergyadditivesin the rangeof 10percent
or moreby weight havecritical diametersof two inchesor lower.
The characteristicsof anexplosionor detonationof solidand liquid propellantsystemscanbe
cletermined from the figures presented in the text. Parameters such as TNT equivalency, overpressure,
fragmentation, fireball size and duration are shown.
A preliminary hazard analysis approach was used to analyze the hazardous situations of liquid
and solid rocket propulsion systems and their interface with the Orbiter vehicle. The third and fourth
stage solid rocket motors of the Scout launch vehicle were used as typical propulsion systems. It was
determined that safety procedures, qualification tests, payload pallet design, thermal insulation, and
electrical system design consideration can be used to provide hazard reduction or elimination.
Liquid systems normally contain inherent hazards in at least three areas: high pressure gas
systems, ordnance devices and propellants. The main concern related to liquid systems is to provide
an environment such as temperature, shock, vibration, impact or tank pressures which will prevent
the fuel and oxidizer from mixing, in any form, inadvertently.
A comparison of preliminary hazard analyses of the liquid and solid propellant systems show
that liquids inherently have more hazardous situations or conditions which could be catastrophic or
critical to the Shuttle system than solid propellant systems. From a system's viewpoint the solid
system should be considered much safer than a liquid system and more desirable for use as a Shuttle
payload system.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
Liquid rocket propulsion systems have been used extensively in previous manned spaceflight
programs with high success. With the advent of the Space Transportation System, many types of
vehicles were and are considered candidates as payloads in this system. Shuttle payloads proposed
included a number of the upper stage vehicles, such as Agena, Centaur, Transtage, Burner II and
upper stages of Scout and Delta which could be used to deliver payloads to orbits beyond the
Orbiter vehicle operating mode or the basic launch vehicle orbit capabilities. Most of the systems
under consideration in the early 1970's utilized liquid cryogenic or storable propellant systems.
Safety/hazard studies were performed on these liquid systems to determine the hazardous situations
or effects that could occur by using payloads that contained liquid propellant as payloads in the
Orbiter. It was determined that many safety features were required, such as inert gas purge bags,
dual propellant isolation solenoid or squib valves, dual electrical systems, special design considerations
for dumping propellants and special safety/operating procedures. The solid propellant safety question
came to the forefront because of the inherent design simplicity of the solid propellant rocket system.
In fact, the Shuttle strap on booster system was changed from a liquid to a solid propellant system in
the early 70's. In view of this, the present study was undertaken to address the hazard of solid, rocket
motors as a payload in the Shuttle Orbiter vehicle. In this report the U. S. Customary Units are used
and SI Units follow in parentheses or conversion factors are provided. This format is followed through-
out except for temperature which is presented in some cases as °C.
2.1 Scope
The scope of the study was based on the interface of the Space Transportation System
Orbiter vehicle and the Scout launch vehicle third stage, Antares II X259, and the fourth stage,
Altair II IA solid propellant motors. These motors are composite-modified double-base propellant,
Department of Transportation Class A, Department of Defense Class 7; and composite propellant,
Department of Transportation Class B, Department of Defense Class 2, respectively. Even though
the Scout solid motors were used as a baseline, the study is applicable to composite and double-base
rocket motors in general. Also, to enhance the study on solid propellant systems a portion of the
study was delegated to liquid propellant systems.
The liquid propellant portion of the study was based on the Scout launch vehicle hydrogen
peroxide (H202), monopropellant, reaction control system and the Agena unsymmetrical Dimethyl-
hydrazine (UDMH) - high density acid (HDA), bipropellant system. The liquid study portion can
also be considered applicable to liquids in general except in those cases where the type of fuel or
oxidizer present a unique situation, such as the low temperatures of liquid oxygen and liquid hydro-
gen. In these unique situations special considerations must be addressed in order to ascertain the
hazardous situations and develop resolution criteria.
3
2.2 StudyObjectives
Thestudy involvedthe considerationof fivedifferent but relatedsubjectitems.
andtheir objectivesare:
Theseitems
.
1
.
.
Hazard Classification For Rocket Propellants - The objective was to review the solid
propellant explosive classification methodology and criteria used by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Defense (DOD) and determine if the
classification is applicable to the Shuttle program solid rocket system payloads.
Rocket Safety Requirements and Experience - The objective was to identify hazards
associated with the handling of solid rocket motors by reviewing the handling procedures
and hazardous incidents of other programs.
Assessment Techniques-Solid and Liquid Propulsion Systems - The objective was to
develop a quantitative assessment technique which would establish the threshold
required to create a hazardous situation and the possible consequences of the situation.
The technique was to be developed from data obtained from literature on controlled
tests.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Rocket Systems for Shuttle Payload - The objective
was to review the Shuttle operating environment and determine incidents which could
lead to a hazardous situation when considering a solid or liquid propellant system
as a payload and to evaluate and compare the hazards involving liquids and solid propul-
sion systems based on the shuttle flight operating modes and hazardous conditions.
3.0 HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONFORROCKETPROPELLANTS
3.1 Introduction
Accidentalignition of combustiblesor explosivescancauseextensivematerialdamageto
facilities,humaninjury, andfatalities. Table3-1presentsdataon vaporcloudexplosionsandgives
the monetarylossin millionsof dollars,aswell asthe numberof fatalities. Damageby anexplosion
iscausedby the heatand/or detonationeffectswhich arecausedby the tremendousreleaseof energy
whicharesufficient to causeblastwavesand heatradiation. Figure3-11showsthe blastdamagethat
occursdueto overpressureasafunction of scaleddistance.From thisdata, it canbedeterminedthat
3000poundsof TNT givesanoverpressureof about .006psiat approximately5 milesandrepresents
the limit for glassbreakage.Overpressureof about0.1 psicausesabout 50 percentglassbreakageat
2800feet andprobabletotal destructionof areinforcedconcretebuildingat 10psioverpressureat
140feet. If the explosiveweight is reducedto 2.0 poundsof TNT and .5 psi overpressure, it can be
determined that this blast effect would be noted at 95 feet. This would represent the distance and
overpressure for minor structural damage. To protect life and property, safety precautions must be
provided to preclude inadvertent exposure of facilities and personnel to such hazards. The method
used by the governments -- federal, state, municipal, for this purpose is regulation by laws.
3.2 Responsible Federal Agencies
3.2.1 Department of Transportation (DOT). - Section 833, Title 18 of the United States
Code provides that:
Any person who knowingly delivers to any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce by land or water, and any person who knowingly carries on or in any car
or vehicle of any description operated in the transportation of passengers or property
by any carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by land, any explosive, or
other dangerous article, specified in or designated by the Department of Transportation
pursuant to Section 834 of this chapter, under any false or deceptive marking, descrip-
tion, invoice, shipping order, or other declaration or any person who so delivers any
such article without informing such carrier in writing of the true character thereof,
at the time such delivery is made, or without plainly marking on the outside of every
package containing explosives or other dangerous articles the content thereof, if
such marking is requ ired by regulations prescribed by the Department of Transportation,
shall be "fined" or imprisoned, as provided in the Act.
Also Section 834 of the Act authorizes the Department of Transportation (DOT) to formulate regu-
lations for the safe transportation of hazardous materials. The DOT regulations formulated and issued
for the transportation of hazardous materials is contained in the Code of Federal Regulations - Title
49 (49CFR), reference 1. In accordance with 49CFR, no explosive (except properly packaged
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TABLE 3- I. - A FEW RECENT VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS WHICH PRODUCED BLAST DAMAGE
Location
and
state
Berlin, N.Y.
July 26, 1962
Lake Charles, LA
August 6, 1967
Pernis,
The Netherlands
Jan. 20, 1968
Franklin Co., MO
Dec. 9, 1970
East St. Louis, I L
Dec. 22, 1972
Elixbourough,
England
June 1, 1974
Decatur, I L
July 19, 1974
Fuel
and
quantity
LPG
1,500 kg
Butane
Butylene
9,000 kg
H.C. Slops
Propane
30,000 kg
Propylene
65,000 kg
Hot
Cyclohexane
50,000 kg
Propane
65,000 kg
Delay
time to
ignition
M inutes
Unknown
> 13 min.
13 min.
> 5 min.
> 1 min.
> 5 min.
Loss
dollars
&
fatal ities
$200,000
10
$35 M
7
$46 M
2
$1.5 M
0
$7.6 M
>$100 M
$15M
TNT
yield
based on
overpressu re
Unknown
9,000 to
11,000 kg
(10%)
18,000 kg
(-)
45,000 kg
(10%)
1,000 to
- 2,500 kg
(.3%)
18,000 to
27,000 kg
(5%)
5,000 to
10,000 kg
(2%)
Evidence
for
detonation
Dwelling exploded
Not reported
F ire before
severe explosion
Pump house de-
stroyed by internal
explosion
Box car destroyed
by internal
explosion
Fire before severe
explosion
Fire before
explosion. Box car
destroyed by
internal explosion
(REF. 2)
References
Walls '63
Goforth '69
MSAPH '68*
Fontein '70
Burgess and
Zabatakis '73
NTSB '72at
Strehlow '73a
NTSB '73a
Kletz '75
Kinnersly '75
Slater '74
Benner'75
* MSAPH = Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health
t NTSB = National Transportation Safety Board
test samples)canbetransportedby commoncarrier,whethermilitary or civilian, if it hasnot been
classifiedby similarity or testingby the Departmentof Defenseor the Bureauof Explosivesand
approvedby DOT. Therefore,it is the responsibilityof DOTto provideregulationfor the proper
protectionof the publicduringtransportationof hazardousmaterialsby commoncarriers.Rules
areformulatedby the DOTHazardousMaterialsRegulationsBoardwhich iscomposedof the
AssistantSecretaryof SafetyandConsumerAffairs, CommandantU.S.CoastGuard,Federal
AviationAdministration,FederalHighwayAdministration,and FederalRailroadAdministration.
Thesignatureof the Boardmemberadoptingaregulationfor a modeof transportationdetermines
theapplicability of that noticeor ruleto that modeof transportation. Wheremorethanonemode
is involved,the requisitenumberof authorizedsignaturesis involved.Any personmaypetition the
boardto issue,amend,or repealarule. Also,apetition canbefiled to obtaina specialpermit for a
waiveror exemptionfrom the provisionsin49CFRpertainingto explosives.
3.2.2 Department of Defense (DOD). - The Department of Defense through the activity of
the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB or ESB) sets forth joint regulations for
explosive hazard classification procedures. Specifically, their interest lies in manufacturing, testing,
handling, reworking, disposal, transportation, storage, and siting to prevent hazardous conditions
from occurring which could endanger life and property inside and outside DOD installations. The
DDESB is composed of a chairman and a member from each of the Military Departments. It is
required by DOD Directive 5154.4, reference 3, that the Secretaries of Military Departments and
Directors of the Defense Agencies, or their designees, must perform evaluation and tests to assign
hazard classifications for military handling, storage, group compatibility, and transportation of
explosives.
The transportation classification is required to meet the DOT regulations. Hence, a complete
hazards classification consists of quantity-distance class, storage compatibility group, DOT class, and
DOT marking. These requirements are outlined in the DOD Document DOD4145.26M, reference 4.
3.3 Classification
In 49CF R (paragraph) 173.50, "an explosive is defined as any chemical compound, mixture,
or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion, i.e., with substan-
tially instantaneous release of gas and heat, unless such compound, mixture, or device is otherwise
specifically classified..." Explosives which are acceptable for transportation are classified by the
DOT into three (3) classes.
(a) Class A-- detonates or is of maximum hazard
(b) Class B - flammable or fire hazard
(c) ClassC- minimum hazard
These three classes are aids in helping the DOT to formulate regulations for proper separation
and packaging of hazardous items during freight transportation. When shippers abide by the regula-
tions the extent of damage can be minimized in case of accident.
3.3.1Testing. - Classification testing can be performed by either the Bureau of Explosives
or DOD, 49CFR 173.86. Since the DOT accepts the testing provided by either of these agencies, it
basically shows DOT recognition of the DOD Technical Bulletin, DSAR8220.1, reference 5, also
known as TB70_2, NAVORDINST8020.3,TO 11A-1-47. TB700-2 specifies testing to be performed
to classify bulk explosive and solid propellant compositions to meet DOT regulations and testing of
assembled rocket motors for quantity-distance criteria determinations.
3.3.1.1 Bulk solid propellant: Figure 3-1 gives an outline of the tests to be performed for
DOT requirements. Tests include the following:
(a) Detonation Test - A solid lead cylinder 11/=-inch diameter by 4 inches high is placed
upon a mild steel plate, SAE1010 to 1030, ½-inch by 12 inches. A 2-inch cube of
propellant is placed on top of the lead cylinder and a No. 8 blasting cap is positioned
on top centerline of the propellant cube and fired. Deformation of the lead cylinder
is evidence of detonation. This test is performed a minimum of five times. If this
test is positive, the Bureau of Explosives requires the impact sensitivity test.
(b) Impact Sensitivity Test - A propellant sample 0.20-inch diameter by 0.10-inch long
is placed in the cup assembly of the Bureau of Explosives impact apparatus and the
weight is dropped on the sample from 3-3/4 inches or 10 inches, 10 trials, resl_ectively.
The reaction is tabulated under the heading of explosion, flame and noise, decomposi-
tion, no reaction, etc.
(c) Ignition and Unconfined Burning Test - The 2-inch propellant cubes are placed 1)
singularly, 2) in line in a group of four, on a bed of kerosine-soaked sawdust and the
sawdust ignited with an electric match-head. The results are recorded under the
headings of "exploded" or "average burning time".
(d) Thermal Stability - A 2-inch propellant cube is placed in a constant temperature
explosion-proof oven. The temperature of the oven is held at 75°C for a period of
48 hours. The results are recorded as explosion, ignition and change in configuration.
(e) Card Gap Test - This test is not performed by the Bureau of Explosives unless
required by the user. DOD requires this test as part of TB700-2. A 6-inch square by
3/8-inch thick mild steel plate, SAE1010-1030, is supported above the ground.
Resting on top of the steel plate is a cardboard tube which contains a steel, cold-drawn
seamless tube, SAE1050, 1-7/8-inch-OD by 0.219-inch wall by 5½ inches long and
containing the cast propellant sample. This steel-sample tube is placed above the
witness plate with an air gap of 1/16 inch. Two pentolite pellets, 2-inch diameter by
1-inch long are placed above the steel tube-sample and one engineer's special blasting
cap J-2 is placed at top centerline of the pentolite pellets. The test samples and
apparatus are controlled to 25°C + 5°, and a firing test is performed. If the propel-
lant sample detonates without a cellulose acetate card between it and the pentolite
boosters, a series of tests are performed with a given number of cellulose acetate
cards. Cellulose acetate cards 2-inches in diameter by 0.01 inch thick, are placed
between the charge and test sample based on the "detonation - no detonation"
situation. A series of tests are performed until the number of cards is obtained to
give a 50 percent probability of detonation.
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Sponsoring Agency
Date
Contract No.
Propellant Identity (Type No.)
Propellant Spec.
Mfg. Date
Batch
Detonation Test
No. 8 Blasting Cap Test I
Test II
Test III
Test IV
Test V
Samples: Five 2-inch cubes.
Exploded
Yes No
Burned Fragmented
Yes No Yes No
Test: One blasting cap per sample.
Ignition & Unconfined Burning Test
One 2-inch cube
One 2-inch cube
Four 2-inch cubes
Samples: Six 2-inch cubes.
Exploded
Yes No
Average Burning Time
Seconds
Test: Ignite & burn unconfined.
Thermal Stability Test
One 2-inch cube
Samples: One 2-inch cube
Explosion
Yes No
Ignition Change in Configuration
Yes No Yes No
Test: 48 hours at 75 ° C. in vented oven.
Card Gap Test 50% Value (No. of Cards)
Impact Sensitivity Test
Ten 3_" (± 1/16") Drop Test
10 Trials
No. of Trials Exhibiting
Explosion
Flame and
Noise
Decomposition
Smoke
No Noise
Approved :
Test Director
Bureau of Explosives Impact Apparatus
Ten 10" (± 1/16") Drop Test
10 Trials
I No. of Trials Exhibiting
No Reaction Explosion Decomposition
No Smoke Flame and Smoke
No Noise Noise No Noise
No Reaction
No Smoke
No Noise
Test Department Head
DOD Approval
Assigned Classification
ICC Forbidden __
ICC Restricted*
ICC Class A
ICC Class B
Signature
Title
Organization
*Shipping Instructions are to be requested from ICC (para 3-13a(2).
FIGURE 3-1. - SAMPLE SUMMARY DATA SHEET, TB700-2
AGO 7931A
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3.3.1.2 Assembled motors: Figure 3-2 presents an outline of the minimum testing which
may be performed on assembled solid rocket motors to determine the effect of an explosion on like
items and mixed classes, on a remaining assembled vehicle and the firing of a destruct system relative
to the individual motor and the assembled vehicle. The results of these types of tests may be used
for siting flight test stands or tactical siting of assembled missiles. Limited quantity research items
not used as standard military items are exempt from performing these types of tests if the DOT
Class A and the appropriate military hazard class are acceptable. Generally the tests outlined in
TB70(_2 Chapter 3 are not performed by non-military organizations on launch vehicles.
3.3.2 Assignment of Classifications. - For DOT and military purposes, the above testing
results are interpreted and classified as follows:
(a) DOT "Forbidden" if the following occurs (see also 49CFR 173.51):
Thermal stability test results in either an explosion, burning, or marked
decomposition of the sample.
(b) DOT Restricted. Compositions with an explosive impact sensitivity of less
than 4 inches of drop height will not be shipped until shipping instructions
have been requested and received from the Department of Transportation.
(c) DOT Class A - (Military Class 7) (see also 49CFR 173.53) if one or more
of the following occur:
1. Detonation and card gap tests have determined a detonation sensitivity
value of 70 or more cards.
2. Impact sensitivity test produces an explosion above 4-inches of drop height.
3. Ignition and unconfined burning test produces a detonation.
(d) DOT Class B - (Military Class2)(seealso49CFR 173.88)ifallofthe
following occur:
1. The ignition and unconfined burning test did not result in an explosion.
2. The Thermal Stability Test did not result in an explosion, burning, or
marked decomposition.
3. Detonation and card gap tests have indicated a detonation sensitivity value
of less than 70 cards or no reaction at zero cards.
(e) DOT Class C - (Military Class 1) - Those explosives not in the above
Class (A) or (B) and considered a minimum hazard.
3.3.3 Quantity-Distance Standards. - As shown in paragraph 3.3.2, when a propellant is
classified for DOT transportation requirements, a DOD military class is also assigned by correlation
for quantity-distance purposes, DOD 4145.26M, reference 4, Part 7 outlines the DOD standards
for quantity-distance storage of solids type explosives and Part 8 covers liquid propellants.
3.3.3.1 Solid propellant classes: The DOD classes for solid propellants are described as follows:
(a) Class 1 (Fire Hazards) are "Items which present a high fire hazard with no blast
hazard and virtually no fragmentation or toxic hazard beyond the fire hazard
clearance ordinarily specified for high-risk material." Items in this class consist of
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NIndividual item
on like items
stored in quantity
i-7
Propagation test
Required if change of
reclassification
to lower than class 7;
may result in reclass, to 3-6
5-9
Detonation test of mixed
class motors in
storage
(class 2 and class 7)
Required only if class 2
and class 7 items are
to be stored together
5-8
*To prove effect of
Individual motor
on
remaining assembly
vehicle
Detonation test
of multi-stage without
warhead and one
stage class 7
Required only if quantity
distance requirements
of less than class 7 desired
5-10
Detonation test
of single or multiple
stage vehicle with
warhead
Ind icate safe distance
required
5-11
Detonation tests
of
multi-systems
Indicate safe distance
required between complete
systems
5-12
Destruct system
on motor
at ambient
or during firing
Destruct test
using destruct
system
Effects of destruct system
on vehicle
* Ref: TB-700-2 (DSAR8220-1)
** Paragraph numbers in TB-700-2
FIGURE 3-2. - MINIMUM TEST CRITERIA FOR DOD ROCKET MOTORS OR
DEVICES CONTAINING SOLID PROPELLANT
smallarmsammunitionwithout explosive projectiles, fuse lighters and squibs.
(b) Class 2 (Fire Hazards) are "Items which burn vigorously with little or no possibility
of extinguishment in storage situations. Explosions normally will be confined to
pressure ruptures of containers and will not produce propagating shock waves or
damaging blast pressure beyond the magazine distances...". Items in this class
are military pyrotechnics, solid propellants in bulk and in containers (composite
p_opellants such as used in the Scout launch vehicle Castor II rocket motor are Class 2).
(c) Class 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Combined Hazards) are items "which the principal hazards may
be fragments, toxicity, or blast, either individually or in combination...". Items in
this class are small arms ammunition with explosive bullets and hand grenades. These
classes are not of interest for the Scout vehicle.
(d) Class 7 (Mass Detonating Hazards) are items "most of the entire quantity of which
will explode virtually instantaneously when a portion is subject to fire, to severe
concussion or impact, to the impulse of an initiating agent, or to the effect of a
considerable discharge of energy from without". Items in this class are bombs,
detonators, demolition explosives, missile war-heads, rockets and components having
mass-detonating characteristics. Rocket motors, such as the Antares X-259, which
contain double base propellants are considered in this class.
There are other military classes rated higher than 7 by the different military branches but are
of no interest for this study.
3.3.3.2 Liquid propellant classes: Liquid propellants also constitute types and degrees of
hazards and are separated into hazard groups and storage compatibility for quantity-distance storage
rather than the class separation of solids. These hazard groups are as follows:
(a) Group I are liquids which are considered the least hazardous. There is a
fire hazard potential and some degree of separation distance is required. Items
such as alcohols, hydrocarbon fuels and nitrogen tetroxide are in this group.
(b) Group II are liquids which are strong oxidizers and cause vigorous oxidation
which results in serious fires. Items such as 52% hydrogen peroxide, liquid
fluorine, liquid oxygen and oxygen difluoride are in this group.
(c) Group III are liquids which present a hazard from pressure rupture of the storage
container because of fire or deflagration, and vapor phase explosions which result
in fragmentation of container or adjacent material. Items such as hydrazine,
hydrazine-UDMH, liquid hydrogen and monomethylhydrazine are in this group.
(d) Group IV are liquids which, like the mass-detonating solid explosives, cause
blast overpressures as well as severe fragment hazards from containers and
surrounding material. Items such as nitromethane and tetranitromethane are in
this group and under certain conditions 52% hydrogen peroxide is included in
this group.
It is of interest to note at this time that the Space Transportation System uses a Class II solid
propellant for the two (2) main boosters and liquid oxygen (Group II) and liquid hydrogen (Group
II I) for the main liquid boost propulsion system. The Orbiter reaction control system uses mono-
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methylhydrazine(Group II I) asthe fuelandnitrogentetroxide (Group I) asthe oxidizer. The
ScoutvehiclecontainsClass2 and7 solidpropellantrocketboostermotorsand90%hydrogen
peroxide(GroupII or Group IV) liquid propellantin thereactioncontrol system.
3.3.4 Compatibility Groups. - Solid and liquid propellants are both separated into compati-
bility groups using an alphabetical title, such as, Group A, Group B, etc. Even though both types of
propellant use the same grouping title they are not comparable. The purpose of the classification is
to separate the different explosives into groups which can safely be stored together. Additional
and specific information should be obtained from reference 4 or the appropriate volumes of manual
CPIA/194, reference 6.
3.4 Validity of Classifications
The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board, the Department of Transportation and
the Bureau of Explosives were contacted to discuss the testing requirements for the classification of
rocket propellants as explosives. The consensus received from these contacts is that the testing
required for transportation classification and the established quantity-distance requirements with the
grouping for compatibility storage has performed and still performs satisfactorily to protect public
and private property. The tests required provide an indicator of what to expect of large batches of
propellants under various environments as a minimum. Those showirig unsatisfactory results are
forbidden or restricted. However, the DDESB is a proponent for the utilization of the card gap test
on all explosives tested so that relative sensitivity can be determined, The Bureau of Explosives does
not require the card gap test and does not require the impact sensitivity test unless positive response
is obtained on the detonation test.
Some in industry, reference 7, do not believe that the mandatory tests of TB700-2 are
totally relevant and that as the ingredients of Class 2 propellants are modified with high energy
ingredients to increase performance the characteristics of a Class 7 propellant are soon reached. It is
recommended in reference 7 that relevant tests must be used to determine the proper hazard
classification. Three tests indicated to have been used during the last decade and determined to be
relevant are the Shotgun, Susan and Flying Plate tests. Characteristics of these tests are as_follows:
(a) Shotgun Test - A sample of propellant is fired from a shotgun against a flat plate
with a velocity between 100 and 2700 feet per second. There are at least two areas
where data can be obtained from this type testing. The first data represents the
velocity at which ignition of the sample occurs upon impact and then the higher
velocity where detonation occurs. A series of tests can be performed on various
types of compositions or propellants at the same critical dimension to obtain an impact
velocity map. Results of various full scale tests (ref. paragraph 5.3.1) can also be located
on the velocity-critical dimension plot to show the scaling from sub-scale to full-scale
tests. The second data is obtained from the propellant particles. The propellant parti-
cles obtained from impacts below the ignition threshold are placed into a pressure bomb
and ignited. The pressure rise vs time is measured. The measured response is rated
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to levelof quickness(psiper sec).This test isdesignedto indicatequicknessbetween
different propellanttypesor compositionsif the propellantshattersuponimpactand
an initiation stimulusisreceivedat the sametime. Thegreaterthe quickness,the
greaterthe susceptibilityto detonation.
(b) Susan Test - A propellant sample of one pound or less is mounted in the front surface
of a 10-12 pound projectile and fired from a converted naval gun at velocities from
100 to 1200 fps onto a solid steel target. The blast overpressure, emitted light and
the time between impact and blast wave observation are measured. An energy of
reaction is determined and noted on a scale up to 100 as a function of impact velocity.
This test is designed to assess the relative behavior (sensitivity) of the propellant to
impacts during operation usage. The energy of reaction can be plotted as a function
of impact velocity. Hercules, Magna, Utah,has found that this test is not very useful
in separating the various propellants but it does help separate the propellants from
the high explosives such as TNT and RDX.
(c) Flying Plate Tests - A flat plate is propelled at samples of propellant. Based on the
thickness of the flat plate the weight and velocity of the plate can be varied. In this
method the pulse width of the shock pressure imparted to the propellant sample can
be varied. Knowing the flying-plate velocity, the shock pressure generated on impact
at the plate-propellant interface can be determined by the Hugonist reflection method.
3.5 Conclusion
Solid and liquid propellant motors in the passive state contain a large amount of potential
energy. The release of this energy in an uncontrolled situation can cause extensive damage to
facilities and personnel. The federal, state and municipal governments regulate the transportation
and storage of explosives by laws. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department
of Defense (DOD) are the federal regulatory agencies. They require that explosives be tested for
hazard classification. The testing is performed by the Bureau of Explosives or the Department of
Defense. The hazard testing requirements for solid explosives (propellants) for both civilian and
military applications are basically outlined in DOD Technical Bulletin, DSAR8220.1. The liquid
explosives (propellants) are also tested in similar fashion for hazard classification.
The DOT classification for transportation, the military classification for quantity-distance
and the hazard compatibility grouping used at present are believed to be satisfactory for the purpose
intended. However, these tests do not show the total response of a complete, assembled solid pro-
pellant rocket or vehicle on the launch pad under the influence of a large explosive donor, motor
dropping during build-up and a fallback during launch.
In the last few years industry has used some additional tests which they feel are more relevant
in determining sensitivity of propellants to an impact/shock environment in the absence of the huge
donor explosion. These tests are the shotgun, susan and flying plate. The other alternatives are full
scale drop tests of the actual motors to be considered for use and testing for shock sensitivity with
large donor explosions. Further characterization of solid propellant rockets should require full scale
temperature sensitivity testing similar to methods outlined in Appendix B.
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4.0 ROCKETSAFETYREQUIREMENTSAND EXPERIENCE
4.1 Introduction
Safetyisof primary concernwhenusinganycomponentwhich hashighpotentialenergythat
canbereadilytransformedto kinetic andthermalenergy. A solidor liquid propellantrocketsystem
containsall the requiredconstituentsto sustainacombustionprocessandundercertainconditions
afire, explosion/deflagrationor detonationcanoccur. The inadvertentreleaseof this energyin either
acontrolledor uncontrolledmodecancauseseverepersonnelinjury or deathandextensivedamage
to facilities. Governmentand industryhavedevelopedsafetyprinciplesovertheyearsthroughthe
processof decision-makingbasedonscientificdataandindustrypracticewith systemfeedbackfor
safetycriteria modification. This methodhasprovidedadatabaseto the extentthat well charac-
terizedpropellantformulationscanbeusedextensivelyandsafely.With the adventof the anticipated
utilization of solidpropellantrocketsasa subsystemof apayloadto becarried intoorbit by the
mannedspaceShuttleOrbiter vehicle,safetyof solidpropellantsin the shuttleenvironmentwasa
logicalconsideration.A naturalapproachto this considerationis to reviewthe safetyandhandling
proceduresof variousexistingprogramsandto collecthistoricalhazardous ituationsor incidents
that haveoccured. This informationcanbeusedin comparisonwith theScout launchvehicle
safetycriteriaand proceduresto determineif presentScoutrequirementscouldresultin a hazardous
situation. Theresultsof this effort arepresentedin this sectionof the report.
4.2 SafetyProcedures
4.2.1Scout.-- TheScout launchvehicleprocessingandsafetyrequirementsarecontrolled
throughtheStandardOperatingProcedure(SOP)manual. However,asoutlined inSOPVolume Ill,
Section1, RocketmotorsandPyrotechnicsManual,thedetailedsafetyprecautionssuchas
smokingrestrictionsandopenflameregulationsarenot coveredby the SOP;but the rangesafety
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requirementsprescribedat eachrangesiterule.
areadheredto areasfollows:
Basicordnanceoperationsafety requirementswhich
(a) Maximumof five (5) personsarepresentduring livemotor processing.
(b) Personnelwearsafetyclothing.
(c) Personneluseonly approvedtoolsandequipment.
(d) Operationsareterminatedwhenelectricalstormsarewithin area.
(e) Propergroundingisusedat all times,especiallyduringopenpropellant
rocketmotor processingor whenthe initiatorsandignitersareinstalled.
(f) Initiator pinsor wiresshortedwith approvedshortingdevices.
(g) Equipmentmaintenanceperformedperrequirements.
(h) Cautioushandlingof explosivesto preventdropping.
(i) Transportingandstorageof rocketmotorsisaccordingto Department
of Transportationclassificationandstorageisperquantity distance
standards,asthey areapplicableto the siteRangeSafety.
(j) Rocketmotorsarestoredwithin certaintemperaturelimits.
Basichydrogenperoxidesafetyrequirementswhich areadheredto areasfollows:
(a) A largequantity of water isavailableduringhandlingof H202 and
spillageisflushedat once.
(b) Useof buddysystemduringH202 drainage,transferandsampling
operations,with onemanassignedto the watersource.
(c) Protectiveclothing isworn to preventclothingfires.
(d) All linesandfittings, whichhavecontainedH202, areflushedwith
waterbeforehandlingandrepairandsubsequentrepassivationperformed.
(e) All materialscombustiblewith H202 arekept awayfrom handling
andstorageareasexceptasrequired.
(f) All opensystemsareprotectedfrom contaminationby compatible
plugsor covers.
(g) All equipmentandcontainersusedwith H202 arecleanandpassivated.
(h) All pressurizationnitrogenusedwith H202 isdry, filtered,andoil free.
(i) Storagecontainersare inspectedperiodicallyfor signsof leakageand
activity. Stepsto control activity aretakenat once.
(j) Goodventilation ismaintainedin storageareas.
(k) ProtectivefaceshieldsareusedduringH202 handling.
(I) Vapor inhalationiscautionedagainst.
Within the contextof the SOP,notes,cautionsandwarningsareoutlinedasnecessarybefore
giventasks. "Notes" specifyto the operatorsthat specialcaremustbetakensothat a taskwill be
performedproperly. The "Caution" notespecifiesto the operatorsthat damageto the equipment
mayresult if proceduresarenot followed. The"Warning" note isthe most importantfrom ahazard
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viewpointbecauseit specifiesto theoperatorsthat proceduralerror cancauselossof life or serious
personnelinjury.
SAMTEC127-1,reference8, RangeSafetyManual,outlinesthe safetyconsiderationsfor
SystemsAnalysis,Flight Analysis,PadSafetyand FlightOperations.TheSAMTECordnancesafety
requirementissummarizedasfollows:
Theaccomplishmentof work involvingordnancematerials,missilefuelsandoxidizers,
highpressures,andnuclearcomponents,will bein accordancewith approveddetailed
procedures.Chronologywill bemaintainedanddeparturesfrom the approvedprocedures
will not beallowedwithout approvalfor thevariance.Theagencyresponsiblefor per-
forming the hazardouswork will preparethe requireddetailedproceduresfor thework
andsecureSAMTEC/SEapprovalprior to work accomplishment.
The approved detail procedures take into consideration the contents of 1STRADM 127-200, reference
9, Missile Mishap Prevention; AFM 127-100, reference 10, Explosive Safety Manual; AFM 127-101,
reference 11 Accident Prevention Handbook.
The Vought field operations are conducted under the "NASA/DOD Scout Launch Complex
Safety Plan". This Safety Plan is approved by Vought Safety; Vought Launch Operations; USAF
Chief, Scout Division 6595th STG and SAMTEC Missile Ground Safety. The Plan requires compliance
with the above referenced documents, as well as other referenced applicable Government documents
issued by the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, Occupational Safety and
Health Act, NASA Safety and Health Clause. The Plan also specifies that the Scout Field Super-
visory Personnel will be responsible for carrying out the duties of the Task Supervisor as outlined
in lSTRADM 127-200, Chapter 7, which states:
"While the requirements contained in this manual are primarily designed for hazardous/
dangerous operations, the basic safety philosophy applies for all operations conducted
atVandenberg. IF YOU ARE THE TASK SUPERVISOR, YOU MUST INSURE THAT
ALL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ARE MET."
In fulfilling this required duty, there are ten basic tasks that must be performed. These are
summarized as follows:
1. Activate control area using barriers and warning devices.
2. Remove non-essential personnel from the control area.
3. Pre-task briefing of special procedures.
4. Verify that communication, safety devices, safety equipment, hazard detection
devices, etc., are available and operable.
5. Verify that all support personnel are standing by and that the support is
maintained during hazardous operation.
17
6. Maintainstrict compliancewith all safetycriteria, procedures,checklistsasrequired
duringthe task. This includesclothingandequipment.
7. Verify that the work areahousekeepingis in order.
8. Verify personnelhaveknowledgeof specificprocedureswhicharerequiredif a
mishapoccurs.
9. Announcethe start/stopof operationsandthe properreleaseof all support
personnel.
10.Calla"Hold" or "No Go" if conditionsexist that areunsafe.
Scoutproceduresandsafetyrequirementshaveprovidedfor ahighlysafeand successfulprogram
overthe past16years.Thesesameproceduresand safetyrequirements,modifiedto meetthe Space
TransportationSystem(STS)Programrequirementsandthe EasternTestRangerequirements hould
performsatisfactorilywhenusingthe Scoutvehicleasapayloadon theSTS.
4.2.2 Minuteman (MM). - The Boeing facility at Hill AFB, Ogden, Utah, was visited to review
the procedures used during processing of the three MM solid rocket motors which are DOT Class B,
Military Class 2. The safety procedures, such as caution and warning notes, are an integral part of
the Boeing procedural type documents. Since the solid rocket motors are delivered fully assembled,
e.g., nozzle and igniter installed, guidance propulsion system installed, safe/arm and arm devices
installed, the safety requirements are minimal except in cases where open grain conditions may be
required. A document which compliments the procedural document is the Integrated Record System
Operation (I RSO) document which is the quality type check-off of the procedural steps.
The main procedural safety consideration is the system "ground" which must be installed
at all times and interconnected between the transporter motor-cradle and assembly building rail.
Other safety requirements take into consideration the proper setting of transporter brakes, maximum
wind allowable for motor transfer and temperature limits. Additional standard ordnance safety
precautions are taken when the ordnance type items are installed in the transition sections. These
requirements are grou nding of components, conductive work surfaces, leg and wrist stats and limited
numbers of personnel in the facility during hazardous operations. All electrical checks of the vehicle
systems are performed remotely from a blockhouse which is integral with the assembly building.
Facility safety items include quick release escape doors, soft panel escape walls and a large
impaler. The impaler is located at the forward dome end of the third stage motor. If the motors
are inadvertently ignited the impaler will penetrate the third stage motor and destroy the forward
propulsive capability. This system was tested during the early stages of the program to demonstrate
safety, reference 12.
The Scout safety requirements must be more severe than those for the Minuteman program
because of an open propellant grain condition when the solid rocket igniters and the Antares II
nozzle are installed. Otherwise, the Minuteman impaler GSE was the only safety device utilized
which is of basic difference from the Scout system. MM test flight operations are performed under
the basic Air Force documents (SAMTECM 127-1, Range Safety Manual), reference 8, and Launch
Complex Safety Operating Procedures, reference 13, used at Vandenberg AFB (VAFB) on the
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Scoutprogram. Whena MMvehicleis launchedfrom VAFB, the MinutemanSystemSafetyoutlined
in lSTRADM 127-200,Amendment1, reference9, isapplicable.Theserequirementsareof similar
natureto the Scout launchvehiclerequirementswhich werediscussedin paragraph4.2.1.
4.2.3 Delta Program. - The Delta launch vehicle is launched from the Western and Eastern Test
Ranges. The Solid Rocket Field Handling Manual, reference 14, and Launch Preparation Document,
reference 15, for the spacecraft solid rocket, TE-M-364-4, were reviewed for safety considerations.
4.2.3.1 Receiving and inspection: The Field Handling Receiving and Inspection Document,
reference 14, is used at the launch site for receiving and inspection. This document was prepared by
the manufacturer, Thiokol Corp., Elkton Division and it contains in Section 3.0 a safety summary.
This summary specifies that the composite propellant solid rocket motor is Department of Trans-
portation, Class B and military class 2. It is noted that there are basically three areas where hazardous
conditions can exist during handling, storage, and inspection of the TE-M-364-4 rocket motor. These
areas are generally common to all solid rocket motors and are as follows: (1) thin sections of
propellant which are friction and impact sensitive, (2) propellant temperature sensitivity and (3)
induced static electricity or stray current.
The basic composite propellant system is classified non-detonatable and insensitive to shock;
however, thin sections of propellant are sensitive to friction and impact. This is especially true
around areas with threaded surfaces such as the igniter port threads.
It is stated that the most likely cause of an accidental ignition is exposure to temperatures
in excess of 250°F. Instantaneous auto-ignition is said to occur at temperatures above 500°F but
propellant decomposition and subsequent auto-ignition may occur at lower temperatures.
To prevent static electricity around the motor special precautions are taken to have the system
always grounded to the surroundings. To prevent stray electrical current in the pyrogen initiators,
shorting plugs are used, and to prevent inadvertent ignition of the pyrogen from the initiators, a safe/
arm unit is utilized. The safe/arm unit is the only safety feature used on this rocket motor which is
different from Scout.
4.2.3.2 Launch preparation document: The Launch Preparation Document, Teference 15,
is a typical document used by McDonnell Douglas for spacecraft upper stage buildup and erection.
This document is similar to the standard operating procedures used on the Scout program. The
procedure is prepared to meet the range requirements as outlined in AFETRM 127-1, reference 16,
and KMI 1710.1B/SF, reference 17, and are supplemented by program safety manuals and plans.
Task 3 of the Launch Preparation Document covers the third stage motor receiving inspection
and leak check before vehicle assembly. In this task a safety requirements checklist, Figure 4-1
is provided to clearly make known the unsafe conditions which occur during the processing per Task
3. The exterior of the procedure package and the applicable tasks are noted on the first page with a
note notifying the operator that the procedure or task contains hazardous operations. The task also
contains a list of safety requirements such as safety hazards, safety equipment, and safety rules/
regulations. Step 1 of Task 3 is safety verification. The check-off is to verify that all safety rules and
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CONDITIONS
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST
I II I
CONDITIONS SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
EXIST REFERENCES & REMARKS
"NO YES-
OXYGEN RICH ATMOSPHERE X
GASEOUS oxYGEN OPERATION 5 X
LIQUID OXYGEN OPERATIONS X
"IANDLING LNzLN 2 FLUORINE OR OT_/4ER HAZARDOUS
GASES OR LIQUIDS X"
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES--HANDLINGo INSTALLING,
CONNECTING. IrTc X
CENTRIFUGE TESTING-HIGH SPEED, LIVE GRAIN,
DIO-TECH IHUMANI X
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PROPELLANTS
14UCLEAR RADIATION MATERIALS OR EQUIPMENT X
TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE X I
ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS X
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SOLID PROPELLANT MOTOR
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NOTE-" NO HAZARDOUS CONDITIO_IS EXCEPT THOSE SPECIFIED ABOVE WILL EXIST IN THIS TEST ACTIVITY.
I
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FIGURE 4-1. -- SAFETY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST
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regulations have been complied with before beginning work on the subsequent steps. Warning and
caution notes are used throughout the procedure to gain the attention of the operator. The basic
safety considerations utilized in the handling of the motor are the assurance of a good ground of all
parts during phases of processing, prevention of static electricity from individuals and protection
against dropping or impacting the motor. Generally the safety precautions utilized by the Scout
program are similar to the Delta program. However, the format and requirements in the Delta
procedures appear to match the requirement in reference 16, where the Scout procedures are designed
to meet the Western Test Range requirements.
4.2.4 Poseidon Program. - The Poseidon first stage solid propellant motor is a DOT Class B,
Military Class 2, and the second stage solid propellant motor is a DOT Class A, Military Class 7. The
solid rocket motors are delivered with the nozzle and igniter installed and open grain configuration is
present only during internal pressure checks or during unusual operations that require removal of the
igniter or nozzle. Since electrical squibs are not installed in the type igniter utilized, there is minimum
hazard from inadvertent igniter activation throughout processing.
The program uses basically two types of procedures for processing the solid rockets, Ordnance
Procedures and Processing Work Segments; however, there are Ordnance Data Procedures used at
dock" side and in the fleet. The Ordnance Procedures (OP), such as NAVORD OP 3667 consist of
Processing Work Sections. These sections contain all the detail procedures, cautions, warnings and
notes which are required to perform a given task on all types of various components which also
includes items other than ordnance. These OPs are used to train personnel in all tasks and safety
requirements for vehicle processing. The Processing Work Segments (PWS) are written to process
the vehicle in task segments. These PWSs are writte n from the information in the OPs but in a manner
which requires that the technician be knowledgeable and well-trained in the Processing Work Section
of the OPs. However, the PWSs include warnings, cautions and notes to draw attention to various
areas of tasks being performed. The PWSs are also written to show that the technician has task buy-
off requirements and also the inspector has audit and buy-off requirements. A good feature of this
system is the requirement for a roving inspector. This inspector checks at random the completed
work task as well as the Processing Completion Report which is the quality type check-off of the
procedural steps.
The main procedural safety consideration is the system 'ground' which is installed at all times
during transportation, storage, receiving and processing. Other safety features include conductive
floors in processing area, leg and wrist stats, soft roof panels, safety warning circuit on the door latches
leading to the radiographic inspection room, insulation links in cranes or hoists to prevent R F I and
EMI transfer, limitation to a single hazard operation in an area at a given time and limited number of
personnel present during a hazardous operation. Additionally a good quality assurance program is
used to provide for regular inspection of test equipment, cranes and hoists.
In comparison with the Scout system, the main difference in the processing lies in the proce-
dures. The Poseidon program has the Processing Work Sections and Processing Work Segments. The
Scout program uses Standard Operating Procedures which combine the two documents of the Poseidon
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program. It shouldbenotedthat the Poseidonprogramis in the processof changingto thesingle
procedureapproach;however,no accidentshaveoccurredto causethis change.Also, the Poseidon
programusespink coloredinsertsto promoteattentionto recentprocedurechanges.
4.2.5 Eastern Test Range Requirements. - Cape Kennedy Air Force Station (CKAFS) has
contained within its confines the launch complexes, explosive safe areas, and missile and spacecraft
assembly and checkout buildings. Therefore, the Air Force has the responsibility for the overall
safety operations and has established safety requirements to be followed at CKAFS. The safety of
NASA operations at the range is ultimately the responsibility of the Director, Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). Safety policies and regulations governing launch operations have been established by KSC.
However, NASA operations in AFETR areas are performed in compliance with the AFETR safety
regulations. Hazardous operations at the range must have prior approval from the KSC and AFETR
safety groups. The basic restraining regulations which the launch vehicle configuration and opera-
tions must meet at the KSC or AFETR are the following, respectively: (a) KSC Safety Program with
Attachments, KSC General Safety Plan, KMI 1710 1B/SF, reference 17; (b) Range Safety Manual,
AFETR Manual (AFETRM) 127-1, reference 16.
4.2.5.1 AFETRM 127-1 Safety requirements: In this document it is specified that all
hazardous missile/space vehicle systems must be designed, tested, operated and approved in accordance
with requirements set forth in chapters 3 and 5. Chapter 3 outlines the prelaunch and abort opera-
tions and the required Range approvals. Chapter 5 outlines the missile operations requirements that
are imposed on the Range User by Range Safety. These two chapters are the most important from
the standpoint of hazardous operations of solid rocket motors, liquid propellants, pressurized systems
and ordnance items.
4.2.5.1.1 AFETRM 127-1 Chapter 3 - A Missile Systems Prelaunch Safety Approval (MSPSA)
document is required before any hazardous missile/space vehicle operations are performed at the
AFETR. Formal approval for operations will not be given until the Missile System Prelaunch Safety
Package is approved. This safety package must contain specified data on propulsion, pressurization,
ordnance, toxic materials, electrical and when used, radioactive materials. When this data on hazardous
systems has been presented and approved by the required launch site Safety organizations, vehicle and
equipment components and their interfaces with other systems will not be modified without prior
approval by the Missile Safety Branch, AFETR Safety Office (AFETR/SEN). All changes to approved
hazardous procedures also require prior approval by AFETR/SEN.
System safety per M IL-STD-882, reference 18, is mandatory for all departments and agencies
of the Department of Defense. This document outlines the concept and defines the System Safety
as "the optimum degree of safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost,
attained through specific application of system safety management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a system's life cycle." This MIL-STD-882 approach to system safety is
recommended to non-military users. Preliminary hazard analyses of the system are performed to
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identify hazardsand inherentrisks. Thissubjectisdiscussedfurther in Section6.0 Prelim!nary
HazardAnalysisof RocketSystemsfor ShuttlePayload.
Systemdesignandrequirementsmustbeconsideredin anyacceptableSystemSafetyPlan.
The referenceddocumentshouldbe reviewedfor further detailson this subject.
4.2.5.1.2AFETRM 127-1Chapter5 - Operationrequirementsareleviedon the RangeUser
by RangeSafety. Specificallyincludedin the requirementsarehazardousoperationsprocedures.
Thoseoperationswhichareclassifiedhazardouspertainto suchitemsasordnancematerials,missile
propellantsandpressuresover500 psi. Proceduresfor hazardousoperationsmustbewritten in a
clearandconcisemannersothat peoplewill understandthem in theclearestandmostlogicalmanner
in orderthat eachstepwill beperformedsafely. Thefollowing information isrequiredin all operating
procedures:
(a)
(b)
Title page with all approval signatures and dates
The purpose with brief discussions of the task, operation, test or
checkout and normal schedule in relation to launch
(c) A short warning or caution note must identify the hazardous item, material and/
or operation. A specific note must appear before the hazardous operation and
general caution and/or warning notes must be included in the preface. Hazardous
configuration of the system before and after the operation must be defined
(d) Listing of reference documents
(e) A list of required tools
(f) The location where the operation or the system is to be performed
and the location of the system at all times
(g) A listing by title of the required personnel for operations
(h) Pad Safety witness requirements must be stated in preface.
Once again the detailed safety requirements to be adhered to during hazardous operations are
numerous. Further information on these requirements can be found in the reference document.
4.2.5.2 KMI 1718.1B/SF KSC General Safety Plan: This document provides guidelines and
assigns the responsibilities for the implementation of the Kennedy Space Center Safety Program and
Safety Plan. Major safety problem areas are defined and the controls, procedures and plans are
specified to minimize safety hazards. The KSC Safety Program requires the following items to be
performed:
(a)
(b)
Develop greater safety controls, procedures, and standards for specific areas
Develop safety operating procedures to be utilized by operational personnel
in hazardous operations
(c) Develop safety standards and criteria for the design and fabrication of
equipment and facilities
(d) Develop accident investigation and reporting procedures
(e) Evaluate accidents and injuries for cause
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(f) Plan,train and promoteactivitiesto improvethe levelof safetyperformance
(g) Createsafetycommitteesto insurethe mosttechnicallyqualifiedpersonnelwill
evaluatehazardsandrecommendcorrectiveaction.
AttachmentA to KMI 1710.1B/SFprovidesthe specificsof the KSCGeneralSafetyPlan,
andNASAcontractorsmustfollow the requirementsof this documentwhenoperatingat the Range.
However,for this study severalchaptersareof specialinterestsincethey pertainto hazardous
operationsasfollows:
(a) Chapter4- PropellantSafety
(b) Chapter5 -- OrdnanceandExplosiveSafety
(c) Chapter6 - PressureSystems
(d) Chapter8 - OperationSafety
Theonecommonfactor underlyingthesafetyoperationsineachof thesechaptersis the
preparationandenforcementof explicit safetyprocedures.This is further statedin Chapter8 as
follows:
Detailedoperatingprocedureswill beusedfor both hazardous
andnon-hazardousoperations.Adequateprocedurespromote
safetyby ensuringthat operationsareperformedcompletely
andin a plannedsequence.Operatingprocedureswill bepro-
cessedin accordancewith KMI 1710.13,
KMI 1710.13,reference19,definesTechnicalOperatingProcedure(TOP)asanydocument
which identifies/authorizeswork to bedoneandprovidesdetailedinstructionsfor itsaccomplishment.
TOP'saredivided into CategoryI or II dependinguponthe type of operationto beperformedas
follows:
Category I TOPs: Documents which provide detailed instructions for
verifying functional operation of Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
and procedures which provide detailed instructions for operational
checkout, servicing, handling, and transporting space vehicle or space
vehicle components during prelaunch,and launch operations. Repetitive
hazardous and nonhazardous operations use Category I TOPs. Test and
Checkout Procedures (TCPs) are examples of Category I TOPs.
Category II TOPs: Documents which authorize work, provide engineering
instructions, establish a method of work control. This type procedure is
usually written for a "one-time" operation to perform special tests or
authorize temporary installations, removals, or replacements. It may be
used for "one-time" hazardous operations and for repetitive nonhazardous
tasks when the work is of a limited scope which does not economically justify
preparation of a Category I TOP.
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EachhazardousCategoryI TOPwill includea safetyrequirementsectionthat meetsthe
following criteria:
1.Thespecifichazardin the proceduremustbe identified
2. Requiredsafetyequipmentfor eachhazardmustbe identified
3. Safetyrulesand regulationsuniquefor eachhazardousoperation
mustbespecified.
EachCategoryI TOPwhich containshazardousoperationsmustbe identifiedon the front
coverwith red lettersat least3/16" highasfollows:
"THIS PROCEDURECONTAINSHAZARDOUSOPERATIONS"
Eachsequence,paragraphor section will be identified by either (a) Letter 'H' in margin;
(b) Stripe through hazardous portions or (c) Warning or caution notes preceding any hazardous
operational step. Category II TOPs must be identified by a statement, "THIS (IS) (IS NOT) A
HAZARDOUS PROCEDURE" with the approving organization signature and date. The processing
channels for Category I and II TOPs, except unmanned launch operation (ULO) TOPs, will be pro-
cessed as shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-3. TOPs for unmanned launch operations (ULO) submit
procedures for approval through a member of the Safety Office Staff Representative (SOSR).
The member is co-located with the ULO. The Scout Program is a ULO and the standard operating
procedures now in use were not required to be processed through the manned launch operation
channels at AFETR or KSC Safety Office.
4.2.6 Space Transportation System (STS)
4.2.6.1 Introduction: NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has prepared a safety document,
Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the National Space Transportation System,
reference 20, whose aim is to establish a set of minimum safety requirements for payload developers.
These safety requirements aid in determining if the payload is safe to carry on the STS but yet
permits flexibility in the verification options and levels. The safety policy for the STS user should
contain those requirements that will logically protect flight and ground personnel, the public
property, environment, elements of the STS and one payload from another.
4.2.6.2
user's program
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Safety requirements: The basic safety requirements that are required in a payload
and for technical design considerations are as follows:
Hazard Analysis
Hazard Classification Levels
Hazard Reduction Procedure and Hazard Control Actions
Safety Assessment Reviews
Safety Compliance Data Packages
Accident/I ncident/Mission Failure Investigation and Reporting
Radioactive Systems Data
Design and Operational Requirements
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4.2.6.2.1Hazardanalysis,classificationandcontrol - At the present, it is a requirement that
the STS User Agency will systematically analyze his payload for hazardous systems. Sources of
hazards may be the environment, personnel error, design characteristics, operational necessity, pro-
cedural deficiencies or hardware malfu nctions. NASA JSC recommends that the analysis of hazard
sources should be conducted early in the payload development phase so that status of corrective
actions to eliminate the hazards can be reviewed at each program design review. The hazard sources
must ultimately be classified into uncontrolled and controlled classes. In the natural course of events,
it is expected that all hazard sources will be eliminated or controlled. The control of hazards will be
provided by the following:
(a) Design Features
(b) Safety Devices
(c) Warning Devices
(d) Special Procedures
Residual hazards shall be identified and justification for acceptance provided, together with proce-
dures to avoid the hazardous conditions. The system safety approach in reference 20, is specifically
outlined in the NASA System Safety Manual, reference 21 ,and is in consonance with the requirements
set forth in Chapter 3 of the NASA Safety Manual, reference 22.
4.2.6.2.2 Safety reviews - The general purpose of the safety review is to assess the compliance
with safety requirements and the elimination and/or prevention of hazardous sources in the system.
With this viewpoint the Safety Policy and Requirements document prepared by NASA JSC presents
requirements which are directed toward a new payload which will be designed and developed from the
beginning. It is believed that this is shown by the requirement that safety reviews will be accomplished
progressively on individual payload elements (black-box level) prior to acceptance by and shipment
to a spacecraft integrator and again on the complete spacecraft prior to acceptance and shipment to
the launch area for integration to the STS. It is required that each level of organization will prepare
and present a Certificate of Safety Compliance and that the responsibility for presenting the Safety
Compliance moves up the approval ladder in the same way that the "next assembly" is moving up.
Since the NASA Scout vehicle is an operational launch system with an extensive history, some
deviation from these requirements will be required. The general approach for obtaining approval of
deviations is through the waiver system. To avoid reversals on granting of waivers by the final payload
acceptance authority, waiver requests should be provided at the time the deviation requirement is
generated.
4.2.6.2.3 Safety Compliance and Range Safety (SCRS) - Items (e) through (h) of the above
paragraph 4,2.6.2, Safety Requirements, are basically those required by the Eastern Test Range as
presented in AFETRM 127-1, reference 16. Therefore, the preparation of the safety compliance
data and range safety package as required by the range will suffice for the STS program. However,
of special importance in the SCRS document is the requirement for procedures covering hazardous
operations. NASA documents, references 19, 23 and 24 must be considered when preparing the
required procedures. Item (h), Design and Operational Requirements, requires special considerations
by the STS user agency.
28
Someof these considerations are summarized as follows:
(a) Payload generated hazards must be minimized at all times, especially
during Orbiter landing and post-landing operations. The design and
operation shall not impose restrictions on normal or contingent Space
Shuttle Operations in which safety of the STS or crew may be affected.
(b) A safe interface between user payload, STS and GSE shall be provided.
A hazard shall not result from any single procedural error and at least
two procedural operations must be performed before initiation of
safety-critical functions.
(c) Payload data which is critical to safety shall be provided by redundant
transmittal. A possible requirement of the system is the provision for
remote safeing commands from the Orbiter. Safety-critical data or
control functions must be capable of being tested from the Orbiter,
Spacelab, or ground where applicable.
(d) Hazardous materials shall not be released into Orbiter payload bay.
All liquid propellants and pressurized systems shall be dumped overboard
during an abort unless proven safe.
(e) Components or substances which are hazardous because of incompatible
materials, electrical potential differences or chemical incompatibility
shall be separated to the maximum extent possible.
(f) Flame propagation paths and ignition sources shall be prevented to the
maximum extent possible where flammable materials are used.
(g) Structural failure of payload mounting or support bracketry due to
stress-corrosion shall be prevented.
(h) Materials which produce significant odors or toxic out-gassing shall be
avoided in manned pressurized compartments. Payload components
carried in the Orbiter cabin shall be designed to NHB 8060.1A.
(i) Pyrotechnic subsystems and devices shall meet safety provisions of JSC
08060, Spaee Shuttle System Pyrotechnic Specification.
(j) Pressure Vessel Safety Standard NSS HP 1740.1 or other approved documents.
(k) Safety equipment shall be designed and safety procedures established to
minimize risk and control hazards on the ground and in flight.
(I) Emergency or backout procedures shall be developed for payloads during
ground and flight anomalies.
(m) Destruct systems shall not be used unless a waiver is granted.
(n) Inadvertent operation of propulsion systems shall be prevented by design.
Main engine firing and stage separation, where inadvertent operation
results in a catastrophic condition, will require three (3) failures or operator
errors for inadvertent operation.
(o) Retrievable payloads shall include provisions to permit preretrieval safeing
to be verified by the Orbiter and Ground Station prior to retrieval.
(p) Safety-critical payload elements shall be designed or protection provided
to preclude hazards to the ground and flight crew in case of lightning strikes.
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4.3 HandlingSpecifications
Aswasnotedin discussingthe safetyprocedures,therearethreeenvironmentsconsidered
to behazardouswhenhandlingsolidrocket motors. It isstandardprocedurefor the handling
specificationsto provideprecautionsto preventinducementof thesehazardousconditions. These
hazardousconditionscoverthe followingenvironments:
(a) Impact,shockandfriction
(b) Staticor strayelectricalenergy
(c) Excessivetemperatures.
Themostcommonapproachto hazardsassessmenthasbeensensitivitytestingof subscalesamples
to establishthetendencyof a materialto initiateor explode. Thedatageneratedby sensitivity
testingareusuallyabstractandthe resultsexpressedin suchtermsasthe 50%probability of initiation
or explosion. From datasuchasthis, oneisableto make aconclusivestatementsuchas, 'A'
is more sensitive than "B'. However, one cannot conclude that 'A' or 'B' constitute a hazard in any
given situation. The historical approach has been that 'A' is some standard explosive such as TNT,
RDX, or PETN and that the sensitivity test results are based on some given uniform specification
sample and test equipment, Subsequently, with historical data on full scale handling, transportation,
field check-out, launch, motor fallback to pad, cook-off test, drop tests, detonation shock sensitivity,
projectile impact, and other similar tests, a historical confidence for 'normal', and to some degree,
'abnormal' rocket motor handling has developed. Since it is too expensive to purchase full scale
solid rockets to perform all these type tests on a new motor design, solid rocket motor users have
had to rely on hazard qualification by subscale tests or similarity to other previous full scale tests.
Due to the lack of knowledge on the full hazard characterization of each unique solid propellant-
liner-motor case-igniter systemthe industry has operated around this deficiency by using safety and
handling criteria to preclude hazardous conditions. Motor testing and classification for transportation
and storage have been presented in Section 3.0.
4.3.1 Impact, Shock and Friction. - If a solid rocket motor is impacted due to being dropped
or projectile impingement-penetration, the kinetic energy must be transformed and transferred in
keeping with the law of conservation of energy. This energy is dissipated through the phenomenon
of shock, friction, and permanent deformation.
Friction can occur in at least two modes, the first mode is the friction generated at the
projectile and propellant interface upon penetration as well as the friction which occurs between the
damaged case (liner)-propellant interface. The second mode is the interface movement between
particles in the propellant due to a shearing motion. As one can readily ascertain, the severity of
these friction modes is different for each unique solid rocket. The propellant modulus of elasticity,
solids loading, particle size, oxidizer type, case liner material and thickness, and case material all have
their effect on the dissipation of the energy. If the magnitude of the energy to be dissipated is of low
order, it will not trigger the release of the propellant potential energy; therefore, a safe condition
exists.
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Shockloadsduringhandlingareinducedinto the rocketmotor inat leasttwo ways. The
first occurswhenthe motor isdroppedandthe secondoccurswhena projectilecontactsthe motor
surface.Shockloadsalsoareinducedfrom onepropellantparticle to the nextwhenthe propellant
isshearedby projectilepenetration.
Frictionandnormally shockarethe resultof someform of impact. Impactdueto dropping
isthe mostprevalentenvironmentduringnormalhandlingandprocessing.Sinceit issodifficult
to quantify the hazardousthresholdOf impact,the handlingmanualsusuallyprovideawarningon
impactsensitivityasfollows:
(a) Thepropellant isclassifiednon-detonatableand insensitiveto shock
(b) Thin sectionsor films of propellantaresensitiveto friction andimpact.
4.3.2Static or Stray Electrical Energy. - When handling or working around electro-explosive
devices, flammables or explosives and solid rocket propellants, precautions are required to prevent
stray electrical currents from entering the system. Electrical current can be induced into the system
by static electricity, electrical equipment, radio frequency energy, lightning, or electrical system mal-
functions. These electrical sources are basically divided into two ignition modes: (a) ignition through
electrical squibs, and (b) ignition of the fuel (solid propellant or atmosphere). During vehicle build-up
and solid rocket motor handling, these two ignition modes are eliminated by the grounding of systems;
personnel wearing conductive shoes, and leg and wrist stats, as required; quality control calibration
and testing of electrical equipment; non-spark producing tools and shorting caps on electrical
squibs; squibs not installed until all vehicle checks completed; no work on hazardous operations in
area during electrical storms; or R F transmitters turned off during hazardous operations. When
required, handling manuals specify various combinations of the above safety procedures.
4.3.3 Temperatures. -- During normal handling operations temperature is generally not a
problem. Auto-ignition temperatures are usually above 250°F (except for long term exposure) and
generally around 400-500°F and are a function of time exposure. Procedures usually give temperature
limits of motors from the standpoint of preventing damage. However, any operation which could
produce a high temperature hot spot would be considered a hazardous operation or condition.
4.4 Hazardous Incidents and Results
It is rather difficult to obtain data on hazardous incidents which have or may have occurred
on various programs. This could be due to the following reasons:
(a) A reportable incident is defined as one which requires a report to be
submitted under DOT regulations that require evacuation of an area
or similar protective measures to be taken. Therefore many incidents
are not of reportable nature.
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(b) Reportsof incidentsarenot commonknowledgeon a programanda request
canbeansweredeasilyby saying"no incidents","I'm not awareof anyproblems",
or "that data issoold I don't know whereit isstored".
4.4.1 General. -- References 25 and 26 present summaries of accidents/incidents which
occurred during the manned space programs from 1963 through 1971. Reference 25 covers
accidents/incidents for the time period of 1961-1969 and represents the review of 10,000 case
documents with the selection of a total of 508 summaries. Reference 26 covers the time period
of 1970-1971 and represents the review of 5000 case documents and the selection of an additional
223 summaries for a total of 732 cases to cover years 1961-1971. Figure 4-4 shows the percentage
distribution of the accidents/incidents by systems. As shown the ordnance systems accounted for
only 2 percent; propulsion systems, 6 percent; fuel/propellant systems, 10 percent; pressure systems,
19 percent; and transport/handling systems, 12 percent. These systems accounted for about 50
percent of all occurrences. Figure 4-5 shows the variation of accidents/incidents by program activity.
As shown, operational test and checkout accounted for the largest percentage, 45% and secondly
manufacturing, 34%. Operational test and checkout includes all tests of assembled vehicles and all
testing at field sites, including integrated tests and pre-launch checkout. Manufacturing is classified
as functional checkout of systems, subsystems or components. These accidents/incidents by causes
are further broken down by software and hardware deficiencies, Figure 4-6. The percentages shown
are based on the total cases represented in each class of accidents/incidents causes in relation to the
total number, 732, of case summaries. As shown, deficiencies in procedures and work control
represented the two highest classes in software, and design deficiencies stand out as the largest contri-
butor by far in hardware.
From these data it can be readily determined that for our consideration in this study accidents/
incidents occurred mostly during operational test and checkout of pressure systems, fuel propellant
systems, transportation/handling systems and propulsion systems which were caused by either
procedural or design deficiencies.
Design deficiency was defined in reference 25 and 26 as any design specification inadequacy,
resulting in deficient hardware which contributed to the occurrence of an accident/incident. Factors
considered were omission of essential information, failure to specify safety devices or warnings,
failure to determine stress/fatigue and other operational/interface factors, errors in material selection,
or clerical errors in drawings and specifications. An example of an accident/incident in this class
was the X-248 solid rocket motor used on the Delta Program which had a design deficiency in the
igniter which permitted firing by static electricity when the non-conductive polyethylene cover was
pulled down over the system.
A procedural deficiency was defined as any case in which formal procedures contributed to
accidents/incidents causes as a result of failure to prepare procedures, failure to follow procedures,
deviations from procedures during a test, failure to coordinate concurrent tests, ommissions of
essential information in procedures, clerical errors in procedures, use of wrong procedures, or failure
to update procedures. An example of this type accident/incident was the blowing of nitrogen and
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fuel residue through a hydrazine engine fuel scrubber, fuel valve, catalyst bed and out the engine
exhaust into the face of a workman. This accident was caused by the failure to follow procedures
and the absence of safety provisions in the procedures to protect operators.
It should be noted that the data presented on propulsion systems in references 25 and 26
represents mostly liquid systems rather than solid propellant systems. The closest system that
relates to solid rocket hazard accidents/incidents is the ordnance system. As shown, this represented
only 3 percent of the distribution. Due to the similarity to the handling and safety requirements of
solid rockets and ordnance items in general, it is believed that the 3 percent distribution is represen-
tative for solid rocket motors. Due to the complexity of liquid systems versus solid rockets, it is
believed that accidents/incidents occurrences are several magnitudes greater than that expected during
solid system operations. However, errors which cause hazardous incidents in solid or liquid systems
can be just as catastrophic in nature.
4.4.2 Liquid System Incident Reports. - A summary of selected hazardous incidents obtained
from Reference 25 and selected from existing documentation of accidents or incidents on Manned
Space Flight programs is presented herein.
Records reviewed in Reference 25 included existing records of NASA Hdgs., NASA field
centers concerned with space programs and 18 contractors, associate contractors and subcontrac-
tors on space programs. The majority of accidents/incidents selected, occurred during various phases
of the Apollo Program with the remainder selected from other manned space programs.
Table 4-1 presents the pertinent data related to these selected events along with the cause.
4.4.3 Solid System Incident Reports. - A review of hazardous incidents or accidents reported
to the DOD Explosive Safety Board (DESB) was conducted at their facility and through the explosives
accident-incident abstracts, references 27 through 31 .'Two-hundred and ten (210) incidents were
reviewed and are categorized as follows:
Type Incident
Propellant Processing
Test Firings
Curing/Temperature Cycling
Transportation
Storage
Other- Not Relevant
Other- Relevant
Number Percent, %
128 61
22 11
16 8
15 7
9 4
11 5
9 4
210 100
As indicated by the table, 61% of the reported incidents occurred during propellant processing
operations including mixing (46), extruding/pressing (40), drying (8), sawing/cutting (22), stripping/
disassembly (5), casting (3), rolling (2), and scrape down (2). These incidents involve conditions
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Category
Pressure
Systems
Propulsion
Systems
Fuel/Propellant
Systems
TABLE 4-1. - SELECTED LIQUID SYSTEM INCIDENT REPORTS (REF. 25)
Accident/Incident Description
Booster stage burst during fuel tank leak check. The tank
was overpressurized because pressure sensors were dis-
connected by first shift and the second shift was not notified.
Stage was destroyed. Seven men injured and minor damage
to the facility.
During development tests, a GH 2 test tank was overpressur-
ized and ruptured, resulting in destruction of the tank dome
and fatal injury to two personnel.
During installation of a low thrust engine for test runs, a
small amount of hydrazine fuel found in the connecting
fuel line was attempted to be purged. Failure to close-off
the engine valve prior to purging the GN2 permitted 30 psig
GN 2 to be forced through the fuel scrubber, the engine valve,
catalyst bed, and out the engine exhaust. Fuel residue and a
mixture of gases was blown into an employee's face causing
considerably injury.
During maintenance engine run-up on a space flight training
vehicle, the fuel tank ruptured during pressurization causing
destruction of the tank, and minor injury to two persons.
An unauthorized high pressure source was used to pressurize
the tank. The procedure being followed was not applicable
to the configuration of the vehicle.
While replacing a faulty valve in a fuel system on a facility
engine test stand being activated, two (2) maintenance
personnel were injured by release of nitrogen tetroxide
under pressure.
A propellant system exploded during a test when N20 4 was
introduced to the system due to residual cleaning fluid
in the system (Halogenated Carbon solvents).
Causes
Failure to transfer information from one shift to another
and lack of overall integrated test procedures for the test.
Contributing causes were use of unqualified vent valves,
overstressing of the stage during test installation and
inadequate training of test conductor and crew.
Pressure relief valves were set too high. Contributing cause
was failure to depressurize tank while working on it, and
failure of the test conductor to be aware of activities in his
scope of responsibility. Procedures for personnel safe
distances during pressure tests were not followed.
Test operator's failure to follow established procedures
which required closure of the engine valve prior to
purging operations. Contributing cause was the absence of
provisions and safeguards in operating procedures to protect
operators during purging.
Overpressurization resulting from erroneous pressure
readings caused by a "sneak circuit" and a lack of pressure
relief devices in the system. Contributing causes were
inadequate test, quality and inspection procedures. Discipline
and control were inadequate as evidenced by use of unauthorized
high pressure equipment on low pressure systems and lack of
certification of equipment operator.
Maintenance crews were not adequately briefed as to hazards
of the operation, exchange of information at shift change
was not affected and supervision failed to ensure that pressure
was released prior to the operation. Contributing causes were
inadequate inspection and work control procedures.
Failure to properly purge the" system after using cleaning
solvents and failure to determine the compatibility of
solvents with N20 4.
which will not be encountered during handling/flight on the Shuttle and hence are not relevant to
this study.
The second most common cause of incidents occurred during static firing. These incidents
involve such things as premature ignition and explosion of the test article. All of the incidents reported
would have presented no problem to the Shuttle provided that:
(a) a well engineered firing circuit had been used
(b) a sufficient distance between the motor and the Shuttle was obtained prior
to ignition.
The third type of incident involved curing and temperature cycling. Incidents reported tend
to be unresolved but appear to be generally:
(a) Experimental propellants which prove to be unstable
(b) Malfunctions of the heating equipment
Since the above incidents are related to processing problems, they do not constitute a threat to the
Shuttle.
The fourth type of incident occurs during transportation. I n general, reported incidents tend
to increase confidence in solid rocket motors.
Case 1423 - Illinois - 28 November 1970 - Baggett Transportation Company
Case 1425 - Charleston -
N.C.
Case 1433 - New
Mexico
Case 1445 - Indiana -
Case 1511 - Mississippi -
Case 1515 - New
Mexico
Case 1518 - Kentucky -
Case 1521 - Texas -
truck collided with a passenger car (icy road). Trailer
overturned. No explosion or fire resulted.
1971 - Driver left highway, ran into fuel tank at service
station. Tank burst into flames causing a rejected Polaris
rocket motor to detonate low order. (Polaris Facility
reports that the motor ignited).
22 July 1970 - American Farmlines Transportation Company
truck left roadway to avoid hitting car, struck culvert. Motor
containers scattered over highway. No explosion or fire resulted.
11 November 1970 - Truck stopped at rail crossing, struck
by car. No explosion or fire resulted.
19 October 1969 - 8 box cars (Class B, 5 rocket motors)
piled up going into siding. No explosion or fire resulted.
4 January 1970 - Driver apparently fell asleep. Truck
overturned. Cargo of 2 MK30 Mod 2 rocket motors spilled.
No explosion or fire.resulted.
23 October 1968 - Train derailment due to brake failure.
Car caught fire, cause unknown, but suspected due to
smoldering of adjacent cars. No explosion resulted but
the motors are assumed to have burned as the result of the fire.
13 February 1970 - Truck tire blew out and overturned
the flatbed trailer carrying a first stage Polaris sol id rocket
in a shipping container. No explosion or fire resulted.
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Severalof theseincidentsinvolvedfatalitiesdueto thecollisionwhichoccurred.Oneof
the incidents(Case1425) involvedlow orderdetonationwhichwascausedby anexternalfire.
Only in the caseof the train wreck (Case1518) is therea remotepossibilitythat arocketmotor
ignitedasa resultof the collision.
Thefifth type of incidentoccursduringStorage- Thecausefor this classof incidentsis
generallyunknown. However,the propellantsin motorsstoredin the Shuttlebayshouldbewell
qualified,sothat no threat of spontaneousignitionwill bepresent.
Thesixth type of incident isnot consideredrelevantto the studyandoccursduringPro-
cessing,groundfiresandvaporincidents.
Theseventhtype of incidentwhich ispotentially relevantincludes:
(a) Radiofrequency/staticelectricity ignition - Generallyspeaking,solidpropellants
will not ignitedueto thesecausesbut someinitiator componentsmay. Good
initiator designandamechanicalsafeandarmwill eliminatethesehazards.
A classicalexampleof an inadvertentignition of a solidrocketmotor from staticelectricity
occurredon April 14, 1964duringcheckoutandassemblyof anAltair X-248at the easterntest
range,Delta Program.It wassubsequentlydeterminedthat staticelectricity couldbe transmitted
from the polyethyleneplasticcoveror the plasticcoverof the nozzleopeningto theforward dome
of the motor and into the suppressorpaddle. Mountedon the suppressorpaddlewasthe igniter
basketwhich containedthe igniterpelletsandthe lowresistancesquibs.Thestaticelectricity provided
sufficientenergyto ignite the squibs.An X-248alsoignitedin Tulsa,Oklahomawhile suspended
from acableon acrane. A redesignof the igniterandthe sprayingof aspecialcoatingon the basket
andpaddleeliminatedthis problem.
(b) Externalfire - Externalfirescanignitesolidmotorsandcanturn aprobleminto a
castastrophy.
A summaryof somemiscellaneousreportsinvolvingsolidrocket motorswhich illustrate
someof the abovetypesof incidentsfollows.
4.4.3.1. PolarisandPoseidonPrograms:Therehavebeena numberof transportationincidents
with the Polarisand Poseidonsolid motors. Oneincidentwasthe fallbackof aPolarismissile100
feetto the waterwith no ignition,explosionor detonation. Alsoaflatbed trailer truck carryingtwo
first stagePolarismotorsturnedoveron the highwaynearFort LeonardWood,Missouri.Thetruck
wastravelingabout65-75MPHandit skiddedon its sidefor about 175feet beforecomingto rest.
Thetwo motorswerein their shippingcontainersandweresupportedinsidethesecontainerswith
air springs.Therewasnoextensivedamageto the containersandno ignition of the motors.
Therehavebeenat leasttwo majortransportationaccidentswith Poseidonmotors. In 1971a
railroadflat carcontainingtwo trailer transportersderailedin EastSt. Louis,Missouri.Thebedcame
loosefrom the wheelsandtilted to onesidewhiletravelingat about 10MPHturningthe vanson their
sideson the rail bed. Onevancontainedafirst stageClassB motor andthe othervancontainedtwo
secondstageClassA motors. Figure4-7showsthe configurationof thesemotorsafter thevanbodies
wereremoved.The motorsreceivedsomedamagebut noexposedpropellantoccurred. In 1975a
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railroadflat carcontainingtwo trailer transporterscarryingfirst stageClassB motorsderailedin the
Hamelet,North Carolinarailyard. Thesetransportersalsofell to their sidesandthemotorsreceived
damagebut the accidentsdid not resultin anyexposedpropellantand no ignition occurred. Another
incidentconsistedof acompletemissilewhichwasbeingremovedfrom acontainerliner in thevertical
position. The missilefell about 12 inchesandcaused amageto the aft supportring. Therewere
other minor incidentswherethe fiberglasscasesreceivedminordamageduringhandling. Indications
arethat it isnot often that amotor rejectionoccurs.A rejectiondid occurasthe resultof an accident
of a motor on a roller cradle which was being rolled from magazine storage. The cradle wheels hit
the rail stops which caused the motor to tip over on the igniter-end causing case damage. No ignition
has occurred during any Poseidon handling or transportation accidents.
4.4.3.2 Minuteman program: A large number of interstate and on-facility shipments of
individual motors and assembled vehicles have been made with only six known accidents. Three
transporter/erectors ran off the road and resulted in solid rocket damage but no ignition, explosion
or detonation. One transporter/erector tipped over during erection with damage to the solid rockets
but no ignition, explosion or detonation. In another case the transporter/erector fell and impacted
on the front retracted parking wheels. Structural damage occurred but no rocket ignition, explosion
or detonation. Also, the brakes locked on a transporter trailer and the resulting accident damaged
two second stage solid rockets but no ignition, explosion or detonation occurred. There have been
at least three aborted Minuteman launches at the Eastern Test Range. The third stage motors on
flights FTM-412 and 418 fell 11600 feet and 1900 feet, respectively, to the water without any
reaction. The third stage of FTM-422 fell 3800 feet to the ground and burned.
4.4.3.3 Scout program: In 1963 vehicle S-110, reference 32, experienced a nozzle failure
on the first stage Algol solid rocket motor.l An altitude of 1260 feet had been obtained when the linear
shape charges of the second and third stages were fired, 4.29 and 4.26 seconds flight time, respective-
ly. The second and first stage motors landed in the marsh about 0.9 miles from the launcher and
the upper three stages landed on or near the launch pad. The first and second stage burned with no
explosion or detonation as did the third and fourth stage motors. The fifth stage motor broke open
but did not ignite, explode or detonate. The first, second and fifth stage motors contained composite
propellants while the third and fourth stage motors contained composite modified double base
propellants.
In July 1967 an Antares II X259 solid rocket motor was static fired in an effort to substan-
tiate failure modes postulated due to the Scout vehicle failure S-152C. At 25 seconds after rocket
motor ignition a linear shape charge was fired. The case was split longitudinally and propellant and
pieces of the case were thrown as far as 300 feet. The propellant and debris continued to burn for
about 30 minutes. This test confirmed that the linear destruct charge (PRDX = 200 grain/ft) would
not detonate the DOT Class A, Military (Class 7) propellant.
4.5 Conclusions
A solid propellant rocket system contains all the required constituents to sustain a combus-
tion process and if certain type damage or critical flaws are present in the system, abnormal motor
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operation,exp4osion/deflagrationor detonationcouldoccurduringmotor operation. Uponreview
of the Scout launchvehiclestandardoperatingproceduresandthe Scout launchcomplexsafety
plan it wasdeterminedthat precautionsandrequirementsaresatisfactoryto preventknownhazar-
doussituationsasoutlined inWesternTestRangedocuments.Therearethreeareasof hazardous
environmentsthat arecoveredby safetyprocedures.
(a) Impact,shockandfriction
(b) Staticor strayelectricalenergy
(c) Excessivetemperatures.
Thebasichandlingconcernisnot generallybasedon the hazardof explosion/deflagrationor detona-
tion of the solidrocketbut the primaryconcernisprematureignition. Impactandshockenviron-
mentsareprimarily a concernfrom the standpointof damagewhichwill subsequentlycausesystem
failureupon normalignition. The hazardof staticor strayelectricalenergyisreducedor eliminated
in anumberof ways. Theseincludethe propergroundingof the systemat all times,personnel
wearinggroundingdevices,terminatingoperationsduring lightning,storms,terminatingor reducing
theoutput of RFI duringthe final launchsequence,usingsafe/armdeviceson the motor igniter
with ashieldedelectricalsystemandthe useof ashuntingdeviceduringthe handlingof all squib
devices.Properlymaintainedtemperaturecontrol of facilitiesusedfor solidrockethandlingcoupled
with establishedsafetyandhazardpreventionprocedures,shouldeliminatetheauto-ignitionconcern.
In reviewingthe safetyrequirementsandpracticesof other programsit wasdetermined_hat
the basichazardous ituationsof concernwerecommonto theScout launchvehicle.Thiswasnot
unexpectedsinceindustrysafetypractices,Departmentof TransportationandDepartmentof Defense
standardsandlaunchcomplexsafetyrequirementsarebasedon the samebasicstandards.When
operatingout of the KennedySpaceCenterthecontractormustuseCategoryI TechnicalOperating
Procedures(TOPs)for repetitivehazardousandnonhazardousoperations.Thehazardousprocedures
mustcontainat least3/16" red letterson thefront coverwhich identifiesthe procedureascontaining
hazardousoperations.Thefirst pageof theprocedurecontainsasafetyrequirementschecklistand
requiredsignatureauthorization. Thesetwo requirementsaremajorsafetyattention featuresandare
not utilized in theScoutstandardoperatingprocedures.
Underthe presentrequirementsof theSpaceTransportationSystema contractormustprovide
a detailedsafetyprogramwhich providesfor detailsafetyreviewsfrom the blackbox levelto the
completedpayload.Thesesafetyreviewswill terminateinaSafetyCompliancedocument. This
documentwith the RangeSafetydocumentissubmittedto the EasternTestRangefor approvalbefore
operationscanbeperformedat NASAor Air Forcefacilitieson the Range.The standardScout
documentscanbeusedto satisfya portion of theserequirementsbut additionaleffort will be
requiredto satisfytheseShuttle requirements.
In reviewingcomponentandsystemincidents/accidentsit wasconcludedthat mostof the
hazardousituationswerecausedby eitherproceduralor designdeficiencies.Properattention to
thesetwo areasthroughoutsystemdesignor modificationwill provideahighconfidencelevelin
systemsafetyandvehicleprocessing.Systemsafetyrequirementsarediscussedfurther in Section6.0.
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5.0 ASSESSMENTECHNIQUES-SOLIDAND LIQUID PROPULSIONSYSTEMS
5.1 Introduction
Safetyisa primaryconcernwhenhandlingor utilizing anysolidor liquid propellantsystem.
Whenconsideringsolidor liquid propellantrocketsaspropulsionsystemsof payloadsfor theSpace
TransportationSystem,it is desirableto havea hazardassessmenttechnique. Thistechniquewould
identify thresholdhazardparameters,suchasimpactvelocity, andtheeffect of the hazardif it
occurred,suchasoverpressure.
A thoroughsurveyof availableliterature,data,test reports,etc.,wasconductedin aneffort
to definethe thresholdsrequiredto createa hazardous ituationaswell asto definethe possible
consequencesof the situation. A reviewof availableliteratureyieldedconsiderableinformationcon-
cerningliquid propulsionsystemhazardsbut somewhatlimited informationconcerningsolidrocket
motor hazards.The mostdefinitivesourceof informationconcerningthesesystemsandthe hazards
associatedwith themarethe test reportson projectsPyroandSophyrespectively.
ProjectSophydealtexclusivelywith compositepropellants.Dataoncomposite-modifieddou-
ble basepropellantsisavailablein the form of test reportsperformedon missilesystemsand motorsas
weii-asprivat_e_ndustryesearchanddevelopmentreports.This dataisnot aswell definedin termsof
varyingparametersasthecompositedata. The literaturesurveyfailedto discloseanyconclusive
hazardevaluationmethodwhich isapplicableto bothcompositeandcompositemodifieddouble
base(CMDB)solidpropellantsystems.In aneffort to evaluatethe effectsandhazardsof CMDB
propellants,muchreliancehasbeenplacedon pooledtestdataandresults.
Severalvaluablesourcesareavailableto aid in theassessmentof hazardsof liquid propellants.
Theseworkscontainstudies,theoreticalanalyses,anddetailedgraphsandchartspertainingto the
variousparametersinvolved.A discussionof techniquesanda list of thesereferencesisprovided.
Therefore,this taskprovidesgeneralizedboundarylimits for specifichazardthresholdand
effect parametersratherthan providingspecificmethodsof analysis.
Thethresholdhazardparametersinvestigatedare:
• Impact Velocity
• Critical Diameter
® Pseudocritical Geometry
• Initiation Criterion
The hazards effects are:
• Peak side-on Overpressure
• Positive Phase Impulse
• TNT Equivalency/Terminal Yield
• Fireball/F irebrand Effects
• Fragmentation
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5.2 Findingsfrom PropellantTestPrograms
Asidefrom solidmotor hazardclassificationtestson specificmotorsasperformedfor the
DefenseExplosiveSafetyBoard(DESB),therewaslittle dataobtainedundercontrolledconditions
prior to 1965. Sincethat time severaltest programshavebeenconductedin orderto obtain
experimentaldatawhichcouldbeusedindeterminingthe credibledamagefrom assembledpropul-
sionsystems.Thetwo mostextensiveprogramsperformed,(ProjectSOPHYandPYRO)are
summarizedhere.
5.2.1 Project Sophy. - This project was performed for the purpose of evaluating the
explosive hazard characteristics of solid propellant rocket motors. Tests were performed at the Air
Force Rocket Propulsion Lab in two phases - Sophy I and Sophy I1. The details of these tests are
reported in two summary reports, references 33 and 34.
These tests were conducted with standard ANB-3226 PBAN propellant, RDX adulterated
and unadulterated. The tests were identified in general terms as:
1. Critical diameter
2. Pseudocritical geometry
3. Sensitivity tests
4. Propellant defects study
Critical diameter testing of typical Military Class 2 (composite) propellant was performed and the
critical diameter concept extended to include several propellant grain configurations. Pseudocritical
geometry testing included solid right circular cylinders and modified cylinders approximating various
grain patterns typical of solid motors. An empirical relationship between the cross-sectional area and
total perimeter was identified to define critical pseudocritical geometry characteristics.
In the tests, a degree of enrichment with RDX was used to assure mass detonation of the test
sample. To assure detonation, the initial test specimens were detonated with an excessively large
quantity of TNT which was much greater than the threshold for reaction. By gradual reduction of
RDX enrichment and increasing test specimen diameter, it was possible to identify a critical diameter
of approximately 64 inches for a composite propellant right solid circular cylinder. Additional tests
were performed to determine the minimum shock pressure required to initiate detonation as a func-
tion of propellant diameter. Results obtained from RDX adulterated propellants and extrapolated
to unadulterated propellants indicated that Class 2 solid motors near their critical diameter would
mass detonate when exposed to an overpressure of 25 kilobars (263,593 psi) or greater.
5.2.2 Project Pyro. - Project Pyro was initiated to examine the explosive characteristics of
hypergolic and cryogenic propellants for the purpose of predicting the credible damage potential
which can be realized from an accidental explosion. The propellants investigated were nitrogen
tetroxide and Aerozine 50 (hypergolic), LOX/RP-1 and LOX/LH 2 (cryogenic). Propellant weights
up to about 100,000 pounds were used for the cryogenic combinations and up to 1000 pounds for
the hypergolic combination. The two major boundary conditions selected for testing were confine-
ment-by-missile (CBM) and confinement-by-the ground (CBGS). These were considered to be the
two major classes of propellant interaction resulting from accidental mixing due to a failure. The
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basicdataobtainedfrom thesetestswerepeak-overpressureandpositive-phaseimpulse,both asa
function of distancefrom the propellantexplosion. Equivalentexplosiveweights(determined
separatelyfor peak-overpressureandthe positive-phaseimpulse)andthermaldata includingtotal
heatflux, gastemperatures,and radiantheatflux werealsoobtained. Additionally, the influence
of vehicle(or propellanttank) impactvelocity on fallback,missileor vehiclegeometry,tank ullage
volume,total quantity of propellantsandother factorswereexaminedin the programandare
discussedin detail in the final report, reference35.
5.3 Solid PropellantSystems
Therearetwo generaltypesof solidchemicalpropellantspresentlyin use;compositeand
compositemodifieddouble-basepropellants(hereafterreferredto asdoublebasepropellantsor by
abbreviatedform CMDB).
Thecompositepropellantshavetwo important ingredients,a fuel andanoxidizer,neither
of whichwould burn satisfactorilywithout the presenceof the other. Often theseconsistof
crystalline,finely groundoxidizersdispersedin afuel binderpolymermatrix. Typical existing
rocketmotor propellantcompositionscontain(%weight)AmmoniumPerchlorate(60-75%),
aluminum(15-22%),andabindersystem(12-35%).
Doublebasepropellantsareessentiallyhigherenergypropellantscontainingunstablechemi-
calcompounds,suchasnitrocelluloseor nitroglycerin,whicharecapableof combustionin the
absenceof all othermaterial. Thesepropellantshavethe oxidizerandfuel presentin a single
(colloidal) phaseof plasticizednitrocellulosewith the addition of variousstabilizers.
Typical existingrocket motor propellantscontainblendsof nitrocellulose(14-32%)and
nitroglycerin(10-33%)andareoften mixedwith ammoniumperchlorate(5-20%)andaluminum
powder(17-28%)to form higherperformancedoublebasecompositepropellants.Additionally,
manyhighperformancedoublebasepropellantscontainhighenergyadditivessuchasHMX
(20-26%)which increasethe motor performanceaswell asits sensitivity. In establishinganassess-
ment techniqueof the hazardof thesemotors,greatdependencehasbeenplacedon published
testdatarelatingto explosionsanddetonationsof compositeanddouble-basepropellants. Data
of this type isscatteredandoften relatedto unpredicted(andthereforenot instrumented)missile
systemfailures. Controlledtestsof rocketmotor propellantsarevery expensivedueto the
destructivenatureof the testaswell asthe costof the motors. Thedatapresentedin the following
sectionsisbasedon informationderivedfrom controlledtestsperformedby military agencies,
accidentreports,aswell asinformationobtainedfrom rocketmotor manufacturers.
Dueto the limited sourceof experimentaldata, it is the objectiveof this sectionto provide
anindicationof the boundaryconditionsandtrendspertainingto hazardparameters,ratherthan
specificallypresentingananalysistechnique.
An attemptwill bemadeto treat first the environmentalparameterswhichcanconstitute
amotor hazard,andthen the parameterswhichcanresultfrom the consequencesof amotor
explosion/detonation.
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5.3.1 HazardThresholds
5.3.1.1 Impactvelocity: In additionto the usualenvironmentsarisingfrom handling
andstorageof solidrocketmotors,the possibilityof inadvertentearth impactduringSpace
Shuttle loadingoperationsmustbeconsidered.This situationcanarisefrom anequipmentand/or
operatormalfunctionduringthe hoistingof a solidrocketmotoronto the Shuttle. In aneffort to
determinethe thresholdsof motor ignition,explosion,or detonationresultingfrom an impact,data
hasbeencompiledon variousimpacttests,accidents,missilefallbackdata,shotguntests,andflying
platetests,references7, 12,36, 37, and38.
Figures5-1and5-2showthe datacompilationof impactvelocity (Vi) asafunction of scaled
weight_pl/3 for compositeanddoublebasepropellants,respectively,(Wp)is propellantweight
in Ibm. A subjectiveextrapolationbetweenexistingdatapointshasbeenattempted. The lower
line in eachfigure representsthe boundarybetweenan "inert" regionwhereimpactof a masspro-
pellantwill not resultin areaction,andan"explosion/burn" regionwhereimpactcouldresultin
propellantburningand/or propellantbreak-upwith propellantparticlesandfragmentsejected.
Theupperboundaryline in eachfigurerepresentsthe transitionregionwherefull reaction
of the impactingpropellantcouldtake placeresultingin adetonation.
Theregionof mostinterestfor rocketmotor handlingisthe inert regionwhereno reaction
will take place.Thisregionappearsto be identicalfor both compositesanddoublebasepropellants.
It shouldbenotedthat the compilationof impactdatadid not accountfor anyattenuation
which mightbepresent.SmallscaletestssuchastheShotgunTestsandsomeFlyingPlateTestsare
for unrestrainedsamplesof propellant. In largemissilefallbackdata,drop tests,etc., the rocket
motorpropellant isencasedandadegreeof attenuationis presentdueto the caseandvehicleinter-
stagestructure.
Fromthefigures,it ispossibleto estimatethe marginalcondition at which the impactvelocity
for a specificmassof propellantbecomes"critical".
Forexample,from Figure5-1 aScout4th stagecompositerocketmotor weighingapproxi-
mately600 poundsisestimatedto achievea critical velocityof 59 ft/sec. Thisvelocity isequivalent
to afree-fallheightof 54 feet. Likewise,aScout3rdstage,composite-modifieddoublebaserocket
motor, weighingapproximately2560pounds,isestimatedto achieveacritical velocity of 53 ft/sec,
equivalentto a drop heightof 44 feet.
Thesecurvesareagain,intendedonly to showgeneralizedhazardregionsandarelimited by
the smalldatasamplesthat comprisethem. Asanextensionof Figures5-1and5-2 the available
kinetic energy(1/2 MVi2) of the impactingpropellantmasshasbeenplotted on Figure5-3asa
function of the propellantweightfor both compositeanddoublebasepropellants.Thegeneralized
regionsof detonation,explosion/burn,andno reactionareagainshownseparatedby extrapolated
linesbetweenexistingdatapoints.
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5.3.1.2 Detonation sustainment-composite propellants: The ability of a solid propellant
grain to sustain detonation has been established for composites by the testing performed by the
Sophy project, references 33 and 34. Although the test program was limited to composites with
PBAN binder, the concepts of critical diameter pseudocritical geometry and minimum shock
pressure were evaluated and provide great insight as to the hazardous potential of composite
motors in general. The findings of project Sophy can be applied to composite propellant motors
with constituents having approximately the following compositions: 69% weight ammonium
perchlorate (AP), 15% weight aluminum (AL), and 16% weight polybutadiene acrylic and acry-
Ionitrile binder (PBAN). The above ratios are representative of many Class 2 composite pro-
pellants in use today.
5.3.1.2.1 Critical diameter (D c) - This parameter is defined as the minimum diameter for
solid propellant configured as a solid right cylinder which will sustain detonation. Project Sophy
critical diameter tests were performed selecting logical configurations of solid right cylinders varying
in diameter from 4 to 72 inches. The length to diameter ratios for all samples was four. Initially, a
degree of enrichment with RDX was used to assure mass detonation of the sample. These initial
detonations were accomplished by an over-charge of TNT which was much greater than the threshold
for reaction; thus assuring detonation if the test specimen was greater than critical diameter. By
gradually reducing the RDX enrichment and increasing the sample diameter, it was possible to identify
a critical diameter of approximately 64.2 inches for a composite solid cylinder near the above chemi-
cal composition. For grains adulterated with RDX, the critical diameter relationship is shown in
Figure 5-4 as a function of the weight fraction of RDX in the propellant.
5.3.1.2.2 Pseudocritical geometry (o c) - The pseudocritical geometry (o c) of a non-solid
circular shape is defined as four times the ratio of the cross-sectional area to the total perimeter, for
the smallest sample size that can sustain detonation. Critical geometry testing performed under
project Sophy included solid right circular cylinders and modified cylinders approximating various
grain patterns typical of solid motors. Internal grain configurations included circular, square, rectan-
gular, triangular and cross-core patterns. Analysis of the experimental evidence showed that the
pseudocritical geometry (o c) is approximately equal to 92% of the critical diameter (D c) of the
material.
4 Acr" sect
= .92 D co c = p
Figure 5-5 shows the pseudocritical dimensions for various shapes obtained from reference 33.
An example of calculation of the pseudocritical geometry of a composite propellant rocket
motor is given:
Motor: Scout 4th stage- Altair Ilia
Motor Outer Diameter (Do): Approx. 19 inches
Motor Core Diameter (Di): Approx. 4.1 inches
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Pseudocritical Geometry:
°c- P _r(D o+D i)
(192 - 4.12)
= 14.9 in.
°c = (19 + 4.1)
For PBAN propellant D c = 64.2 (ref. 34)
oc PBAN = .92 D c = .92 (64.2) = 59.1 in.
Therefore the Altair II IA has a pseudocritical geometry of 14.9 inches which is less than the
minimum 59.1 inches required to sustain detonation.
Since the critical diameter for sustainment of detonation of a composite propellant motor
has been found (Project Sophy) to be in the order of 64 inches, the majority of composite solid
rocket motors which are candidates for Space Shuttle use are relatively safe for use due to their
subcritical size.
This conclusion must be justified by the realization that given sufficient donor charge, a
subcritical size rocket motor will react to the explosion with large pieces of propellant and fragments
being ejected in the reaction.
It should also be noted that if a composite propellant composition is adulterated with high
energy constituents, the critical diameter will be reduced thus increasing the propellant's susceptibility
to detonation.
However, even though a given solid propellant motor configuration is capable of sustaining
detonation, this does not mean that the motor will detonate. A second condition must be present,
namely; sufficient stimulus from a given donor charge.
5.3.1.2.3 Initiation criterion - The tests performed during Project Sophy included the deter-
mination of overpressures required to detonate a composite solid rocket motor. Having determined
the threshold overpressure for detonation, a method would then exist for determining the donor
size. The following was concluded in Project Sophy:
The minimum shock pressure required to initiate detonation was determined as a
function of charge diameter for three (3) RDX-adulterated propellants, using the
card-gap test technique. These data were extrapolated to unadulterated propellant
by comparing the trends, with respect to RDX content, of the minimum shock pressure
required near the critical diameter and the minimum pressure required in the ideal-
diameter region. From the data near the critical diameters, it is estimated that for
unadulterated propellant the minimum shock pressure required at the critical
diameter is 25 to 30 kbar. This estimate would be greatly improved by acquisition
of additional data from adulterated propellants near their critical diameters. In the
ideal-diameter region, the data indicate that the minimum initiating pressure required
for ANB-3226 is 8 to 10 kbar.
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The idealdiameter(for massdetonation)wasdescribedasapproximately4 to 5 timesthe
critical diameterthusrequiringvery largemotordiametersto meetthe condition of lower initiating
pressure.
Dataobtainedfrom NOL card-gaptests,reference39,of other conventionalcomposite
propellants(polyurethane,polyvinyl chloride,or polysulfiderubberbinder) indicatedthat these
propellantscouldnot bedetonatedin the subcriticaldiameterstested. The incidentpressurein
thesetestswasin the orderof 100 kbars.
5.3.1.3Detonationsustainment- CMBDpropellants:Publisheddataon doublebasepro-
pellantsisnot asreadilyavailableascompositepropellants.Therehasnot beenanymajorfull scale
testingeffort of the magnitudeof ProjectSophyconductedto definepropellantcharacteristics.The
Navyhasnot releasedthe latestresultsof testingon thecross-linkeddoublebasepropellantdevelop-
mentfor the C4. Existingdatausedin this taskhasbeenobtainedmainly throughdiscussionswith
propellantmanufacturersandpublishedreportsof knowncharacteristicsof CMDBpropellantsand
on military test reports. In aneffort to catagorizethe parametersapplicableto doublebasepro-
pellantsa comparisonhasbeenmadeof thesepropellantsto compositepropellantsbasedon availa-
bility of data.
5.3.1.3.1Critical Diameter- Dueto the natureof doublebasepropellants,highenergy
additivesareoften usedin their formulationsto providehigherperformances.Cyclotetramethylene
Tetranitramine(HMX) isoften usedashighenergyadditivefor doublebasepropellantsaswell as
nitroglycerin(NG)and nitrocellulose(NC). Manymilitary solidrocketmotorsandsomeNASA
solid launchvehiclesmotorsuseHMX. TheScoutthird stagerocketmotor (AntaresliB) contains
19.5%HMX in its formulation (CYI propellant). Figure5-6, reference7, showsthe effectof high
energyingredientsoncritical diameteraswell asexplosiveboostersizerequiredto detonatesolid
propellants.Although the datapointsfor donorsizeandcritical diameterhavenot beenverified
in this studythe curvedoesshowthe generalrelationshipfor critical diameterwith increasing
weight fractionsof highenergyingredients.The NOLcard-gaptest (paragraph3.3.1.1e)isshown
superimposedon Figure5-6. The locationcorrespondswith the Tetryl donor weightusedto deto-
natethe cylindricalpropellantspecimentested.
Figure5-7 isapresentationof the critical diameter-weightfractiondataandbettershows
this relationship.
Thedatapresentedin thesefiguresgivesan indicationof the relativesensitivityof double
basepropellantsto anexplosivedonor.
5.3.1.3.2Shotgunquicknesstest- Datageneratedfrom theTrident Motor Detonation
InvestigationProgramshowthat the mostprobablecauseof propellantdetonationduringamotor
test isfrom severepropellantbreakupcombinedwith a confiningenvironmentthat allowssufficient
heatimpulseandpressureincreaseto causerunupfrom deflagrationto detonation,reference40.
A testpresentlyusedto indicatethe susceptibilityof the propellantto fracture into smallfragments
underhighshearloadsisthe shotgun/relativequicknesstest. The shotgunquicknesstest (paragraph
3.4a) isa measureof the breakupcharacteristicsof solid propellantby determiningthoseeffects
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which occur as a function of impingement velocity such as sample breakup and initiation, burning,
or explosion. The pressure rise rate in a closed bomb is a function of surface area (and therefore
breakup), burning rate, flame temperature and gas production. However, for similar propellants,
differences in pressure rise rate are almost entirely due to surface area (breakup). The propellant
resistance to breakup, thus the susceptibility to conditions which may result in propellant detona-
tion, can be compared among propellants by comparing the sample quickness as a function of impact
velocity.
Figure 5-8 shows a quickness-impact velocity comparison for various propellants, reference
41 and 47. CYI and FKM are composite-modified double base (CMDB) propellants containing 19.5%
and 26% HMX respectively. VOP, VLZ, and VPT are cross-linked double base (XLDB) propellants.
TP-H-1123 and TP-H-1016 are composite propellants containing approximately 70% and 77% am-
monium perchlorate respectively. A comparison of these curves shows that CMDB propellants which
have been used over the last 10-15 years, experience considerably less damage at any given impact
velocity than the composite or XLDB propellants formulations shown.
5.3.1.3.3 NOL Card Gap Test - Additional Data on propellant shock sensitivity, reference 39
has been obtained on different types of composite and double base propellants. These results have
also been compared with better known military explosives. The testing that was conducted is based
on the NOL card-gap tests. Although, in these tests, conventional composites (polyurethane, poly-
vinyl chloride, or polysulfide rubber binder) could not be detonated in the diameters tested (diameter
tested was below critical diameter) double base propellants did detonate readily. Figure 5-9 shows the
relative shock sensitivity (defined in terms of the number of sensitivity cards at the 50% probability
of detonation) vs. the effects of temperature. Marked changes in temperature do not appear to induce
comparable changes in sensitivity and such changes as do occur are generally in the expected direction,
i.e., rising temperatures increase detonatability. Figure 5-10 taken from reference 39 and 44 shows the
pressure pulse vs. the attenuator thickness (corresponding to the number of cards required to obtain
50% detonation probability). Although the actual pressure required to detail a response in a given
solid rocket configuration may varysomewhat from the indicated value, the relative sensitivity of
various propellants can be seen.
Superimposed on Figure 5-10 are the detonating pressure valuesfor CYI (used on Scout 3rd
stage Antares liB) CYH, and EJC CMDB propellants, TP-H-3335 high energy composite propellant
(21.6% HMX), and TP-H-3062 composite propellant (used on Scout 4th stage Altair II IA). The data
for the above propellants was obtained from published NO L card-gap test reports, reference 45, 46,
and 43 and gives an indication of the relative sensitivity of these propellants. As can be seen, the
detonation thresholds for these present day CMBD propellants is in the order of 30 to 44 kbars.
It should be noted that since the NOL card gap test is conducted with subscale samples which
are subcritical for composite propellants and super-critical or near critical for CMDB propellants, the
incident pressures reflect the higher sensitivity of CMDB propellants.
When comparing the incident pressure of full-scale motors, the composite propellant incident
pressure (Project SOPHY) is lower than that of CMDB propellants. However, it should be recognized
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that the criticaldiameter of the composite propellants tested is very large (62.4 in.)arid that smaller
diameter motors will not detonate; that is to say that full-scale composite propellants appear to be
less sensitive than full-scale CMDB propellants as long as their diameters are less than critical.
5.3.2 Hazard Effects. - Most of the material damage caused by detonation or explosion is
due mainly-directly or indirectly-to the shock (or blast) wave which accompanies the explosion.
Structures will suffer some damage from air blast when the overpressure in the blast wave, i.e., the
excess over the atmospheric pressure (14.7 pounds per square inch at standard sea level conditions),
is about 0.5 pound per square inch or more. The distance to which this overpressure level will extend
depends on the yield or size of the explosion, and on the height of the burst. In considering the
destructive effect of a blast wave, one of its important characteristics is the overpressure. Classically,
the properties which are usually defined and measured are those of the undisturbed or side-on wave
as it propagates through the air. The peak side-on overpressure is the maximum value of the over-
pressure at a given location generated by the undisturbed shock wave.
5.3.2.1 General scaling laws: Scaling laws, reference 47 used to calculate the characteristic
properties of the blast wave from an explosion of any given energy if those for another energy are
known. With the aid of such laws, it is possible to present data for a large range of weights in a simple
form.
Theoretically, a given pressure will occur at a distance from an explosion that is proportional
to the cube root of the energy yield. , Full-scale tests have shown this relationship between distance
and energy yield to hold over a wide range of explosive weights (up to and including a megaton).
According to this law, if d 1 is the distance (or slant range) from a reference explosion of W 1 pounds
at which a specified hydrostatic overpressure or dynamic pressure is found, then for any explosion of
W pounds, these same pressures will occur at a distance d given by:
d/d 1 = (W/W 1) 1/3
Cube root scaling can also be applied to arrival time of the shock front, positive phase
duration, and impulse, with the understand ing that the distances concerned are themselves scaled
according to the cube root law. The relationships may be expressed in the form
t d _W _1/3 I d /. W t 1/3
t1=_1=_'_1] and i1 - el = [--_-1]
where t 1 represents arrival time or positive phase duration an d 11 is the impulse for a reference
explosion Wl, as before, d 1 and d are distances from ground zero. If W 1 is taken as 1 pound, then
the various quantities are related as follows:
t = t 1 X W 1/3 at a distance d = d 1X W 1/3
and
I =11Xwl/3atadistanced=dlxw 1/3
Throughout the Sophy and Pyro works blast yield is expressed as percent yield, based on
an average of pressures and impulses measured at the farthest distance from the source when compared
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to standard reference curves, reference 48, for TNT surface bursts (terminal yield). Hopkinson's
blast scaling is used when comparing blast data for tests with the same propellants and failure condi-
tions, but different mass of propellant. So, the blest i)_l'l_eters P (peak side-on overpressure) and
I/W 1/3 (scaled impulse) are plotted as functions of R/W i (scaled distance X), after being normalized
by the fractional yield.
Figure 5-11 shows the peak-overpressure as a function of ground range scale factor (X) for
TNT as normally presented in literature, reference 2. The usa of this data can be simplified by
using the run-around chart in Figure 5-12.
TNT is the base or standard to which other explosives and propellants are normally referenced,
however, some use PETN or Tetryl as a reference.
5.3.2.2 Peak side-on overpressure: The characteristics of pressure waves, particularly peak
side-on overpressure and specific impulse, are used extensively on developing damage estimates from
propellant explosion&
A review of available overpressure data related to solid rocket motor explosions/detonations
shows considerable scatter of data. This can generally be attributed to variable conditions leading to
the explosion, i.e., if the motor detonated or exploded, the location of donor charge relative to the
acceptor, configuration of rocket motors, interstage structure spacing, type of test, impact or donor
charge.
Figure 5.13 shows the peak side-on overpreaure vs` ground range scale factor, X, for several
tests. X is defined as the ground raiSLe- (R) from the reference explosion divided by the cube root of
the reference propellant weight (W 113). The data shown by Figure 5-13 indicates the peak side-on
overpressure upper limits that can be expected for typical composite or double bass propellants. In
caseswhere a motor detonated, such as the project Sophy adulterated composite propellant motor,
the overpressure recorded is the greatest.
Rocket motors which exhibited deflegretion or explosion with large pieces of burning pro-
pellant (firebrands) and case scatter, the recorded overpressure is much less. The curve for TNT is
shown for reference.
5.3.2.3 Positive overpresmre impulse: F igure 5-14 gives the scaled positive overpressure
impulse (W--_) as a function of ground range scale factor, X, for several solid propellant rocket
motor¢ It represents the area under the positive pham of the pressure time curve. The scatter of
data, as for overpressure, can be attributed to variable conditions, Oeflagretion/axpiosion resulting
in propellant scatter generally resulte in lower impulse than a detonation. Figure 5-14 gives an
indication of the upper limits that can be expected for typical composite or double base propellants.
A reference curve for TNT is shown for eomparleon.
5.3.2.4 TNT Equivalenw: The free-air equivalent weight of a particular propellant or
explosive is the weight of a rwnclerd explolive, e._, TNT, required to produce a selected shock wave
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parameter of equal magnitude to that produced by a unit weight of the propellant or explosive in
question.
A given explosive may have several equivalent weights, depending on the shock wave parameter
selected, i.e., it can be based on peak overpressure or positive impulse. Propellant TNT-equivalence
can be obtained by cubing the ratio of the ;k for propellant to the X for TNT at any given overpressure
level, reference 34.
(_PTNT)3 X 100=%TNTEq uivalence
Figure 5-13 shows the solid propellant rocket explosive overpressure to be on either side of
the TNT curve, thus indicating TNT equivalencies above and below 100%. Since the propellant curves
do not parallel the TNT curve, it can be seen that TNT equivalency is not constant but varies as a
function of range. Explosive donor type tests conducted by the Naval Weapons Center on explosive
equivalency of Class 2 (composite type) and Class 7 (composite modified double base type) motors,
reference 49, showed the explosive behavior to take two forms. For higher yield tests (> 100%)
the peak overpressure yield tends to decrease with increasing range. In the lower yield tests (< 100%)
the peak overpressure yield tended to increase with increasing range, the yields tending toward a
constant value (terminal yield) at long distances. The results of these tests indicated that class 7
motors (CMDB) tested were capable of producing yields averaging 130% of TNT, and Class 2 motors
(composite) produced yields as large as 40%. Combined tests of composite and double base motors
resulted in yields from 105 to 123%.
Data from Project Sophy, reference 34 obtained from RDX adulterated composite propellant
tests indicated an average (over range measured) peak side-on overpressure TNT equivalence of
approximately 197%. Similar data on impulse-TNT equivalence indicated values which varied
substantially both with range and weight with an average of approximately 114%.
It is brought forth from Project Sophy that terminal yield is defined as the average of the TNT
equivalences based on both peak overpressure and impulse over the ranges that these tests included.
The terminal yield of detonating adulterated and unadulterated propellant is 168%. The terminal
yield for the nondetonating propellant is 156%.
It should be noted that the pature of these tests biases these data because all samples are nearly
critical and those that failed to detonate still contributed most of their energy to the fading detonation.
Much smaller samples certainly would have correspondingly lower TNT equivalents and terminal
yields.
Shown in parenthesis on each curve of Figure 5-13 is the reported value of terminal TNT
equivalency for various tests. Although there exists considerable difference in terminal yield equiva-
lency data, it can be seen from the Minuteman 3rd stage data that the TNT equivalency can be con-
siderably higher at close range approaching a lesser value at larger distances.
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Figure5-15showsthe reportedTNT equivalency(terminalyield) asafunction of total
weight (propellantweightplusdonor chargeweight)for severalcompositeanddoublebasepropellant
explosivedonor tests,references47 and37. Combinedtestsinwhichadoublebasepropellantmotor
wasdetonatedandusedasa donorchargefor acompositemotorarealsoshown.
Theupper limit of terminalyield (basedonavailabledata)hasbeenindicatedon Figure5-15
for eachpropellanttype andfor combinedtestssothat acomparisoncanbemadewith theProject
Sophy limits.
As canbeseen,actuattestdatafrom compositepropellantrocketmotor testsdoesnot
approachthe limits establishedby Sophy. Thismaybedueto the sub-criticalsizeof -themotors
testedwhereonly a "partial'" detonationor explosionwasachieved.Terminalyield TNT equivalency
for compositemodifieddoublebasepropellantmotorsof 130-140%shownon Figure5-15 is in
agreementwith the reportedequivalencyof 130%reportedby HerculesIncorporated,reference46.
5.3.2.5 Fireballeffects: Themostextensivesourceof fireball dataresultingfrom solid
propellantmotor detonationo_explosionhasbeenobtainedfrom ProjectSophy, reference34
Fireballdatawererecordedandreducedfrom atotal of 16atmosphericgroundtestsmadeusingright
circularcylindersof propellantva_vingfrom 11 to 72 inchesin diameterandlength4 timesthe di-
ameter. Thepropellantwasinitiatedby aTNF Honorchargeconstitutingapproximately1/5 of the
total testweight. Fireballdiameterwastakento bethe maximumhorizontaldimensionof the fireball,
not the heightof the fireball abovethe ground..Whiletheexactshapesof theseplotsdiffered con-
siderablyfrom testto test tner,_werecertainsimilarities. In everycase,both the heightanddiameter
of the fireball increasedrapidly to a maximumvalue,or plateau.The fireball decaypatterndiffered
markedlyfrom testto test
Figure5-16summarizesthe mainfireball characteristicsasafunction of total propellant
weight°Total sampleexplosiveweight.(propellantplusTNT donorweight)hadto beusedsinceit
wasimpossibleto isolatethat portion,of thefireball causedby theTNT donor. Typical solidrocket
motorsareshownsuperimposedon the curvesat their appropriateweight.
It mustbe rernemberedthat the SophyTestswerebasicallyatmosphericpropellantcritical
diametergroundtestsandthat the fireball characteristicsof the detonatingand non-detonating
propellantarefor acompositeformulationwith aweightfraction of 69%total oxidizerand15%
aluminurn. This is,howeverarepresentativeformulationof manycompositepropellantsin use. The
SophyTestswereconductedwith samplesthat werenearlycritical or supercriticaloSincethe litera-
turesurveydid not revealanypublishedfireball dataonsubcriticaldiametersolidrocketmotorsor
onexoatmospherictests,careshouldbeexercisedin usingthesecorrelationssinceverysubcritical
samplesandvacuumtestingcannotbeexpectedto produceequivalentdata.
5.3°2.6 Firebrandeffects: Collecteddataon variouscompositeanddoublebasepropellants
showthat both typesexhibit an ignitiontype reactionat nearidenticalvelocity/mass-testconditions,
referenceFigures5-1and5-2.Thedifferencein responseto impact variesfrom burningto explo-
sion. Explosionsor incompletedetonationsareoften characterizedby showersof burningpropellant
fragmentsor "firebrands" overawidearea.Althoughdataof this natureis limiteddueto the un-
expectednatureof rocket rnotor impactoccurrences,sometimiteddatahasbeencompiled,reference
7, andispresentedin Figure5-t7.
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5.3.2.7 Fragmentation: Existing available fragmentation data, references 7 and 49, resulting
from solid rocket motor explosions/detonations has been compiled and is presented in Figure 5-18.
These data were obtained from explosive donor tests and from impact tests performed by military
agencies.
In general, the majority of data obtained is from composite propellant rocket.motors. Data
from composite modified double base propellants is limited. A maximum fragment radius limit
line has been superimposed on the figure to designate the maximum limit observed from available
data. A second curve obtained from reference 51 shows the limits established by the U. S. Air Force
Eastern Test Range based on actual Polaris and Minuteman Missile Explosions/Detonations. The
fragment range data is plotted as a function of total weight (propellant plus explosive donor) for
donor tests and as a function of propellant weight for impact tests.
Fragment studies performed on Minuteman and Polaris Motors, reference 49, indicated that
only those tests involving motors with metal casings resulted in significant fragment debris. A typical
fragment density/ground range relationship is shown in Figure 5-19 for a Polaris detonation test
involving a 8,870 lb. CMDB second stage and a 15,200 lb. composite first stage. In this test, the motors
were placed vertically and a 96 lb. explosive booster was used to initiate the 2nd stage. The estimated
terminal yield based on total propellant weight was 73 percent. Pieces of burning propellant were
widely scattered with pieces of unburned propellant found propelled to 1800 ft. and motor parts
found at distances out to 2500 ft.
Although this example is shown for a moderate yield explosion, it is probably representative
of the yields expected for composite propellant rocket motor explosions. Higher yields, representa-
tiveof CMDB propellant motors, may or may not generate fragments over a wider range depending
on whether the motor case material is metal or fiberglass.
5.4 Liquid Propellant Systems
One extremely important fundamental fact concerning liquid propellants is that their
potential explosive yield is very high, but their actual yield is much lower. This situation occurs
because the propellant and oxidizer are never intimately mixed in the proper proportions before
ignition.
The explosive potential of a given liquid propellant combination in accidental failure is not
a unique value, but depends on the manner in which propellants are brought together during the
failure process and on the time of ignition.
Presently, there are at least four methods for estimating yield of liquid propellant explosions
which, unfortunately, do not necessarily give the same predictions: One method is based on Project
Pyro results, reference 35, and two of the others are the "Seven Chart Approach" and the
"Mathematical Model" of Farber and Deese, reference 52. The fourth approach, which is really
based on the previous three methods, was developed by Baker, et al., reference 53, and is easy to
use and readily adaptable to the calculation of explosive yield.
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The data presented in this Section is based on project Pyro results and has been taken from
reference 54 which was based on reference 53.
In this section, three types of fuel and oxidizer combinations and three different modes of
mixing will be considered. The three types of propellants are:
1. Hypergolic Propellant- Which is in widest use. A fuel of 50% N2H 4- 50%
UDMH and an oxidizer of N20 4 in a mass ratio of 1:2.
2. Liquid Oxygen - Hydrocarbon - This propellant uses kerosene (RP-1) as a
fueland liquid oxygen (LO2) as the oxidizer in stoichiometric mass ratio
of 1:2.25.
3. Liquid Oxygen - Liquid Hydrogen -- This propellant is an entirely cryogenic
combination of liquid hydrogen (LH 2) fuel and liquid oxygen (LO 2) oxidizer
in stoichiometric mass ratio of 1:5.
The _hree modes of mixing (failure modes) discussed are:
1. Confinement by Missile (CBM) - This type of accident consists of failure
of an interior bulkhead separating fuel and oxidizer and all propellant
mixing is confined within the tankage.
2. Confinement by Ground Surface (CBGS) - This type of accident includes
impacts at various velocities on the ground, with all tankage ruptured, and
subsequent ignition resulting from propellant mixing on the ground surface.
3. High Velocity Impact (HVI) - This type of accident involves high velocity
impact of a missile after launch.
5.4.1 Explosive Yield. - From the test results reported in references 35, 55
through 57 and presented by reference 54, a number of observations were made regarding
blast yields from liquid propellant explosions.
1. Yield is quite dependent on the particular fuel and oxidizer being mixed.
2. The yield is very dependent on the mode of mixing of fuel and oxidizer,
i.e., on the type of accident which is simulated. Maximum yields are experienced
when intimate mixing is accomplished before ignition.
3. On many of the liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen (LH2/LO 2) tests
(regardless of investigators), spontaneous ignition occurred very early
in the mixing process, resulting in very low percentage yields.
4. Yield is very dependent on time of ignition, even ignoring the possibility
of spontaneous ignition.
5. Blast yield per unit mass of propellant decreases as total propellant
mass increases.
6. Variability in yields for supposedly identical tests was great, compared
to variability in blast measurements of conventional explosives.
Table 5-1 provides a sequence to be used in determining the explosive yield of various propel-
lant/oxidizer combinations and failure modes. To use the table, identify the type of propellant and
type of accident. Then the proper sequence in"Part 1" should be followed after making the necessary
assumptions (e.g., ignition time or impact velocity and type of surface impacted) to arrive at a value
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{or explosive yield. Explosive yield should then be determined by using the method depicted in
"Part 2" which involves the use of Figure 5-20 and multiplier factors. The smaller value for explosive
yield determined in "Part 1" and "Part 2" is the correct value. Thisvalue can then be used to
determine an effective weight of propellant, and pressure and impulse at scaled distances.
All of the Pyro experiments, on which the prediction curves in this section are based, were
conducted on the ground surface, with no cratering. When the curves are used to predict blast yields
for explosions occurring in flight or far enough above the ground that the shock wave reflection does
not occur, one must account for the absence of the "perfect" reflecting surface. This is done by
dividing the blast yields calculated from curves in this section by a factor of two.
Figure 5-20 is a normalized plot for all propellants and should be used as an upper limit
for explosive yield. It should be used to obtain the normalized explosive yield (Y) which is then
multiplied by the multiplier factor for the specific propellant used. The explosive yield obtained
is the terminal yield (based on TNT equivalence) and can be greater than 100%. Whenever the value
of percent explosive (terminal) yield, determined by using Table 5-1, exceeds the value of Figure
5-20, the value from Figure 5-20 is the correct choice.
5.4.1.1 Hypergolic (50% N2H 4- 50% UDMH fuel and N20 4 oxidizer in massratio of 1:2):
Hypergolic meterials, by definition, ignite spontaneously on contact, so it is not possible to obtain
appreciable mixing before ignition unless the fuel and oxidizer are thrown violently together. Ignition
time is therefore not an important determinant of blast yield for hypergolics, but impact velocity and
degree of confinement after impact are important factors. If a CBM or CBGS failure mode is being
considered, percent explosive yield can be acquired from Table 5-11. If a HVI failure mode is
assumed, then percent explosive yield can be determined from Figure 5-21. The percent yield
determined by any one of these methods must then be compared to the percent yield determined
from the weight of the propellant, Figure 5-20. The smaller of the two is the correct choice.
5.4.1.2 Liquid oxygen- hydrocarbon (RP-1 fuel LO 2 oxidizer in mass ratio of 1:2.25):
Because liquid oxygen/hydrocarbonpropellants are not hypergolic, considerable mixing can occur
in various types of accidents, and time of ignition after onset of mixing is an important determinant
of blast yield. For the case of mixing and an explosion within the missile tankage (CBM), percent
explosive yield can be determined by assuming an ignition time and then examining Figure 5-22.
In using Figure 5-22 and subsequent similar ,shaded" graphs, the shaded portion represents
an area in which data from actual propellant blasts was found. The central solid line is an estimate
of the most likely occurrence and, for most cases, is the recommended choice. Conservative estimates
of explosive yield can be made by choosing the uppermost boundary of the shaded area.
The vertical depth Of the shaded area at any abscissa indicates the total range of data, and
therefore the total uncertainty in the estimate. For simulated fallback on the launch pad (CBGS),
impact velocity as well as ignition time are important parameters in estimating blast yield. A two-step
approach has been developed to calculate blast yield. After assuming an impact velocity, maximum
percent yield (Ym) can be determined from Equation 5-1 :
Ym = 5%+ (6.82%) Vi__ - , 0_< V i _< = 55.12172 ft/sec
(3.28106) ft/sec
(5-1)
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TABLE 5-1. -- SEQUENCE FOR DETERMINATION OF EXPLOSIVE YIELD *
Type of
propellant
& oxidizer
Hypergolic
(50% N2H 2 -
50% UDMH/N20 4)
Liquid Oxygen -
Hydrocarbon
(LO2/RP-1)
Liquid Oxygen --
Liquid Hydrogen
(LO2/LH 2)
Type of
accident
failure mode
CBM
CBGS
HVI
CBM
CBGS
HVI
Part 1
Table 5-2
Table 5-2
Figure 5-21
Figure 5-22
Equation (5-1)
Figure 5-23
F igu re 5-24
F igu re 5-25CBM
CBGS
HVI
Sequence **
Equation (5-2)
F igu re 5-26
Figure 5-27
Part 2 (check)
F igu re 5-20
F igure 5-20
Figure 5-20
F igu re 5-20
Figure 5-20
F igu re 5-20
F igu re 5-20
Figure 5-20
F igu re 5-20
* For explosions occurring far above the ground (H/W 1/3 > 10 m/kg 1/3,
where H is height above the ground), blast yields calculated from curves in
this section should be divided by two.
** Correct choice is the smaller of Part 1 and Part 2.
TABLE 5-11. -- ESTIMATE OF TERMINAL YIELD FOR HYPERGOLIC CBM
AND CBGS (REFERENCE 54)
Failure mode
Diaphragm rupture (CBM)
Spill (CBGS)
Small explosive donor
Large explosive donor
Command destruct
310- ft drop (CBGS)
(m - .370478 ft)
Terminal yield range
(%)
0.01 - 0.8
0.02 - 0.8
0.8 - 1.2
3.4 - 3.7
0.3 - 0.35
1.5
Estimated
upper limit
1.5
0.5
2
5
0.5
3
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Where Ym is expressed in percent and V i is in feet per second. Percent explosive yield can then be
determined from Ym and an estimate of ignition time by using Figure 5-23. The determination of
explosive yield for the HVl failure mode is somewhat simpler because there is little ignition delay
and therefore only the impact velocity affects yield. Thus, blast yield can be acquired by using
Figure 5-24 directly. The percent yield determined by any one of these methods must then be
compared to the percent yield determined from the weight of the propellant, Figure 5-20. The
smaller of the two values is the correct choice.
5.4.1.3
The determination of explosive yield, for the entirely cryogenic combination of liquid hydrogen
(LH 2) fuel and liquid oxygen (LO 2) oxidizer is similar to that of liquid oxygen-hydrocarbon pro-
pellants. For the CBM case, it is necessary for one to assume an ignition time and then use Figure
5-25 to find the explosive yield. For the CBGS case, an impact velocity is assumed and maximum
percent yield (Ym) can be determined from Equation (5-2):
Ym = 10% + (4.43%) V i , O <_ V i _< 80.0577 ft/sec
13.28106 ft/sec
Where Ym is expressed in percent and V i is in feet per second. Percent explosive yield can be
determined from Ym and an estimate of ignition time by using Figure 5-26. For high velocity
impact (HVI), the blast yield is dependent only on the impact velocity and can be acquired from
Figure 5-27 directly. The percent yield determined by any one of these methods must then be
compared to the percent yield determined from the weight of the propellant, Figure 5-20. The
smaller of the two values is the correct choice.
Liquid oxygen - liquid hydrogen (LH 2 fuel and LO 2 oxidizer in mass ratio of 1:5):
(5-2)
Examples for determining explosive yield taken from reference 54 are shown in Appendix A.
5.4.2 Peak Side-On Over Pressure and Impulse (Reference 54). -Throughout the Pyro
work, reference 30, blast yield is expressed as percent yield, based on an average of pressures and
impulses measured at the farthest distance from the source when compared to standard reference
curves for TNT surface bursts (terminal yield). Hopkinson's blast scaling is used when comparing
blast data for tests with the same propellants and failure conditions, but different mass of propellant.
Therefore the blast parameters, peak side-on overDressure (P) and scaled impulse (I/wl/3)
are plotted as functions of scaled distance (R/W 1/3) after being normalized by the fractional
yield. This procedure is equivalent to determining an effective mass of propellant (W) for the blast
from the following equation:
Y
W = WT x 10-'-'O (5-3)
Where WT is total mass of propellant and oxidizer, and Y is terminal blast yield in percent. Because
the data are normalized by comparing to TNT blast data, the effective blast energy (E) can be ob-
tained by multiplying W by the specific detonation energy of TNT,
1.4 x 106 ft Ibf/Ibm (4.18 x 106 J/kg).
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Table 5-111 contains the different propellant failure mode combinations under consideration
and the figure numbers of the graphs needed to determine peak side-on overpressure and scaled
specific impulse as a function of scaled distance for each accident situation. The procedure for finding
peak side-on overpressure and specific impulse are as follows:
1. Calculate terminal yield (Y) using methods discussed in Paragraph 5.4.1
2. Determine the effective mass of propellant and oxidizer (W) from Equation (5-3).
3. Choose a specific standoff distance (R) from the center of the anticipated
blast and calculate scaled distance (R/W1/3).
4. Examine Table 5-111 and acquire the proper figure numbers for finding peak
side-on overpressure (P) and scaled impulse (I/W 1/3) for the particular
propellant/oxidizer and failure mode under consideration.
5. Determine peak side-on overpressure (P) from the appropriate Pressure versus
Scaled Distance curve and the predetermined scaled distance (R/W 1/3).
6. Determine scaled impulse (I/W 1/3) from the appropriate scaled positive
impulse versus scaled distance curve and the predetermined scaled distance (R/W1/3).
7. Calculate specific impulse (I) from scaled positive impulse (I/wl/3).
That is
I= wl/3' (W (5-4)
Examples for determining peak side-on overpressure and impulse taken from reference 54
are shown in Appendix A.
TABLE 5-111. - GUIDE TO SELECTION OF PROPER GRAPHS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
PRESSURE AND SPECIFIC IMPULSE (REF. 54)
Type of
propellant & oxidizer
Hypergolic
(50% N2H 4
50% UDMH/N20 4)
Type of accident
(failure mode)
CBM
CBGS
Peak side-on
overpressure (P)
Figure 5-28
Figure 5-28
Liquid Oxygen -
Hydrocarbon
(LO2/R P-1)
Liquid Oxygen -
Liquid Hydrogen
(LO2/LH 2)
HVI
CBM
CBGS
HVI
CBM
CBGS
HVI
F igure 5-29
Figure 5-31
F igure 5-32
F igu re 5-32
Figure
F igu re
Figure
5-35
5,36
5-36
Scaled
impulse
(I/Wl/3)
F igu re 5-30
Figure 5-30
F igu re 5-30
F igure 5-33
Figure 5-34
F igure 5-34
Figure 5-37
Figure 5-38
Figure 5-38
87
102
8
6
4
o.
a.
2
_L
0
01
4
2
m
m
lOo I t t I i I I I I
4 6 8 101 2 4 6 8 102
Scaled distance, ;k, (RP_V1/3) '_ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-28. - PRESSURE VS. SCALED DISTANCE. HYPERGOLIC
PROPELLANT; CMB AND CBGS FAILURE MODES. (REF. 54)
88
6O
40
2O
_ lO
E 8
e_
o
" 4
m
m
m
m
m
m
1 m
• 8 _
2
i I I [ I
4 6 8 101 2 4 6 8 102
Scaled distance, ;k, (R/W 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-29. -- PRESSURE VS. SCALED DISTANCE. HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANT;
HVI FAILURE MODE. (REF. 54)
89
E
_Q
I
o.
¢..
_L
E
o
o_
8
09
10--2
8
6
4
2
10-3
8
I
I I I I I I
4 6 8 10 20 40 60 80 100 20U
Scaled distance, ;k, (R/W 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m2/kg 1/3 = psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 x 8.9766 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-30. - SCALED POSITIVE IMPULSE VS. SCALED DISTANCE.
HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANT; CBM, CBGS AND HVI FAILURE
MODES. (REF. 54)
9O
6102
8
101
4
I
lO° I I I I I I
100 2 4 6 8 101 2
Scaled distance, X, (R/W 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
4
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 ---ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-31. - PRESSURE VS. SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/RP-1 PROPELLANT;
CBM FAILURE MODE. (REF. 54)
91
4E
O
102
8
6
101
8
100
8
6 8 100
| I I I I
2 4 6 8 101
Scaled distance, ;% (R/W 1/3) _ ft/I bml/3
2 4 6
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kgl/3 = f-t/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-32. - PRESSURE VS. SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/RP-1 PROPELLANT;
CBGS AND HVI FAILURE MODES. (REF. 54)
92
10-1
8
8 100
I . I I I
4 6 8 101 2 4 6
Scaled distance, ;k, (R/W 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m2/kg 1/3 = psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 x 8.9766 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-33. -- SCALED POSITIVE IMPULSE VS. SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/RP-1
PROPELLANT; CBM FAILURE MODE. (REF. 54)
93
210--1
8
6
4
O3
,¢-,
E
.¢:1
"_ 2
I
8
:3
_- 6
E
.m
._>
4
O
-O
to
U'J
10-3 i i I I
4 6 8 101 2
Scaled distance, ;k, (R/W 1/3) "" ft/Ibm 1/3
4 6 8 102
(N/m2/kgl/3 = psi--sec/Ibm 1/3 x 8.9766 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-34. - SCALED POSITIVE IMPULSE VS SCALED DISTANCE.
LO2/RP-1 PROPELLANT; CBGS AND HVI FAILURE MODES.
(REF. 54)
94
Q.
v
,=
t_
:=
O
13.
102
8
101
8
100
8
2 4 6 8 101 2 4 6 8 102
Scaled distance, ;k, (R/_N 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-35. -- PRESSURE VS SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/LH 2 PROPELLANT;
CBM FAILURE MODE (REF. 54)
95
64
102
8
(3.
A
Q.
0
Q-
101
8
6
100
8
6 I
8 100 2
I I i I
4 6 8 101 2 4 6 8
Scaled distance, X, iR/W 1/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m 2 = psi x 6.8947 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-36. -- PRESSURE VS SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/LH 2 PROPELLANT;
CBGS AND HVI FAILURE MODES. (REF. 54)
96
10-1
I I L
8 100 2
I I I I I
4 6 8 101 2
Scaled distance, ;k,(a/wl/3) _ ft/Ibm 1/3
I I I
4 6 8 102
(N/m2/kg 1/3 = psi - sec/Ibm 1/3 x 8.9766 x 103)
(m/kg 1/3 = ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-37. - SCALED POSITIVE IMPULSE VS SCALED DISTANCE.
LO2/LH 2 PROPELLANT; CBM FAILURE MODE (REF. 54)
97
10-1
8
6
10-3
6 8 100
I , I , I I
2 4 6 8 101 2 4 6
Scaled distance, ;k, _-_/ _ ft/Ibm 1/3
(N/m2/kgl/3
(m/kg 1/3
8
= psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 x 8.9766 x 103)
= ft/Ibm 1/3 x .3966)
FIGURE 5-38. -- SCALED POSITIVE IMPULSE VS SCALED DISTANCE. LO2/LH 2
PROPELLANT; CBGS AND HVI FAILURE MODES (REF. 54)
98
5.4.3 Fireball Effects
5.4.3.1 Characteristics: The fireball generated by the explosion of propellant mixtures can
constitute a hazard primarily through heat transfer to an object or structure immersed in it.
Gayle and Bransford, reference 58, have derived empirical expressions for the dimensions
and duration of a fireball associated with an explosion of liquid bi-propellants. Equations 5-5 and
5-6 relate the fireball dimension in terms of equivalent diameter (D), in feet, and the fireball dura-
tion, T, in seconds, to the total propellant (fuel plus oxidizer) weight (W) in pounds, for the propellant
combinations LO2/RP-1 , LO2/LH2, LO2/RP-1 and LH2, and N2D4/N2H4 - UDMH (50:50)
D = 9.56 W 0.325 (5-5)
T = 0.196 W 0.329 (5-6)
The estimated error expected in D is 30% and in r is 84% since some of the fireball observa-
tions used to derive the empirical relations were markedly asymmetrical. The magnitude of the
departure from the diameter given by equation 5-5, is indicated by data from an actual Titan test
that involved 100,000 pounds of LO2/RP-1; wherein the maximum fireball horizontal dimension
was estimated to be from 800 to 1000 feet, while equation 5-5 yields an equivalent diameter of
approximately 400 feet.
Equations 5-5 and 5-6 are shown plotted on Figure 5-39 along with equations 5-7. In a
related Saturn Program investigation of fireball characteristics, J. B. Gayle, reference 59, derived
similar diameter/duration/propellant weight relationships which are shown in Figure 5-40. These
relationships are very similar to Gayle and Bransford's empirical relations and differ by only 3% and
10% for maximum diameter and duration time, respectively, in the range of Space Shuttle application
(100 to 10,000 lb. total propellant weight). In a discussion of Gayle's expressions by R. W. High,
reference 60,the author attributes the scatter of test data (shown on Figures 5-40A and B) to the
difficulty of estimating the end point of incandescent gases in the presence of smoke and water vapor
and from variations in the test failure mode. In his conclusion, however, High considers the equation
to furnish a reasonable estimate of fireball duration.
5.4.3.2 Heat flux density: Heat flux data obtained from the literature survey is based
primarily on information published on project Pyro, reference 35. A discussion of this data taken
from reference 35 follows.
Curves from which the heat flux density versus time within the fireball can be obtained
for a given propellant weight are given on Figures 5-41 and 5-42 for the LO2/RP-1 and LO2/LH 2
propellant combinations, respectively. The time in these figures is given in seconds by,
TO = C W 1/3 (5-7)
The total propellant weight (W) is in pounds, and the value of C is 0.113 for LO2/RP-1,
Figure 5-41 and is 0.077 has LO2/LH 2, Figure 5-42. Two curves are presented in each figure.
One is the "bounding curve", which is an estimate of the upper bound of the heat flux density and
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is primarily based on the analysis of heat flux density data that were obtained from eleven 25,000-1b
propellant tests, five of LO2/RP-1, and six of LO2/LH2.* The remaining curve, designated the
"recommended curve", is superimposed on the bounding curve out to a time, To, given by Equation
5-7, -- where it abruptly decreases to zero. The recommended curve is based primarily on analysis
of the data from the eleven 25,000-1b tests mentioned above, and implicitely contain the constraint
that the probability of exceeding the cumulative heat flux density associated with the recommended
curve (the time integration of the heat flux density from time equal zero to TO) is 1%. The variation
of the heating pulse with propellant weight, that is, the scaling implicitely contained in F igure 5-41
and 5-42 and Equation 5-7, assumes the following:
(a) The duration of the heating pulse will increase with the cube root of the
propellant weight, as implied by the empirical relation Equation 5-6.
(b) The heat flux density at a scaled time, using the above cube root time
scaling, will be invariant with variation in propellant weight.
The second statement is based on the invariance of fireball temperatures (measured) from scale to
scale.
No consideration has been given in the 'bounding' or 'recommended' curves for the emission
of radiant energy from the surface of an immersed object, but this emission can substantially reduce
the transfer rates from those given in the curves as the surface temperature of the object becomes a
significant fraction of the fireball temperature, approximately 3681°F (2027°C). A reduction occurs
similarly for the convective component of transfer. Any other corresponding modifications of heat
transfer from the curves are not considered here.
Several
(a)
other qualifications of the 'bound ing' and 'recommended' curves should be noted.
The heat flux density measurements upon which the curves are primarily based
were obtained from instruments that were fixed in space; thus, a modified heat
flux density may be appropriate for objects which, for example, become prematurely
ejected from the fireball (due, for instance, to blast wave forces). For many cir-
cumstances, the modification would be a reduction of the total heat transfer, first,
due to the tendency to reduce the time that an object is immersed, and second, due
to a reduction in the convective heat transfer component, since the motion imparted
to the object by the blast wave forces would tend to reduce the relative velocity
between the object and the surrounding gas. Rotary motion imparted to the object,
however, would generally result in an increased transfer rate at given locations on the
object.
*Data from which the heat flux density may be evaluated for the N204/50% N2H4-50% UDMH
propellant combination are extremely limited. Examination of these data suggests that the heat
flux density is somewhat less in magnitude than the bounding curves given for LO2/RP-1 and
LO2/LH 2 in Figures 5-41 and 5-42, but that the heating durations are perhaps somewhat larger.
1O4
It canbeseenfrom Equation5-7 that the heatingdurations(TO) of Figure5-41and5-42
(of either the boundingor recommendedcurves)increasewith the cuberoot of propellantweight.
Therefore,for smallpropellantquantities,say1000-1bor less,the fireball duration is insufficientfor
appreciablemotion (rise)of the fireball,andthefireball duration isthenessentiallysynonymouswith
the heatingdurationof anobjectthat isfixed in space.For largerpropellantquantities,25,000-1band
more,significantmotion doesoccurandthe heatingdurationof a fixed object isthereforelessthan
thefireball duration. Thus,the ratioof the heatingdurationof afixed object to the total fireball
duration issomefunction of the propellantweight. The curvesof Figure5-41and5-42arebased
on measurementsfixed in spaceat the 25,000-1blevel,andextrapolationto otherpropellantweight
levelsthrough Equation5--7 inherentlyassumesan invarianceof this ratio of durations. Forapplica-
tion to weightsinexcessof 25,000.1b,it isneverthelessrecommendedthat Equation5-7 beusedin
conjunctionwith thecurvesof Figure5-41and5-42,althoughit isexpectedthat the curveswould
besomewhatconservative.Forextrapolationto significantlylesserweights,TOshouldbe largerthan
givenby Equation5--7; morespecifically,at the 1000-1b(or less)level,TO, asgivenby Equation5-7,
shouldbeincreasedby a multiplyingfactor of approximately1.2and 1.6for LO2/RP-1and L02/
LH2, respectively.
It ispossiblethat the heattransferhazardcanbeintensifiedby the occurrenceof chemical
activity betweenthe fireball constituents- notablythe oxidents- andthe surfaceof anobject
immersedin thefireball. Predictionsof the rates(orexistence)of theassociatedchemicalreactions
arenot includedin this report, in part dueto the heavydependenceof suchreactionson the parti-
cularapplicationthat is,on the molecularconstituentsof the objectandsurfacetemperatureattained.
The latter, in turn, dependson the configurationandthermalpropertiesof theobject. (Thereaction
alsodependscritically, of course,on the concentrationsof variousatomicandmolecularspecies- and
their excitedandionizedstates- presentin thefireball.) Chemicalactivity ismentionedandshould
beconsideredin anyapplication- particularlywhencomparativelylargepropellantquantitiesare
involved- becausethe reactionscanprovideanenergycontribution (not includedin Figure5-41and
5-42)to the object.
The heatflux densitymeasurementsuponwhich thecurvesof Figures5-41and5-42are
basedwereobtainedat locationsnocloserto the "centerof explosion"than aboutone-fifth of the
radiusof the fireball, andit wouldbeexpectedthat the heattransferrates,at leastduringthe initial
"small" fraction of the fireball duration,couldbesomewhatmoresevereat or "very near" thecenter
of explosion. Passivesensorscapableof providingcrudeindicationsof comparativelysevereheat
transferweredeployedin the centralregion(within afew feet of the plannedignition point) through-
out mostof the eleven25,000-1btestsmentionedabove,andasinglepositiveindicationwasobtained.
Specifically,from 0.1to 0,2 in.wasablatedfrom the surfaceof a solidaluminumstructureinsucha
wayasto suggestcomparativelylargeheatflux densitiesover limitedtimes,for instance,of the order
of 1000watt/cm2 for 2 sec.(A thoroughanalyticevaluationof the possiblerangesof heattransfer
parametersresultingin the aboveablationhasnot beenperformed;for detailsof the aluminumstruc-
tureand itsablation, seereference35, AppendixCof Volume1.) It isnot clearif chemicalactivity,
asmentionedin the previousparagraph,wasanenergycontributor.
105
5.4.4 Fragmentation. - Space vehicle fragments generated during accidental explosions can
come from several sources. They can be pieces of the exploding vessels/tanks, or pieces of wreckage
from an impact which also results in an explosion, or nearby objects accelerated by the blast waves
from the explosion.
The methods for estimating initial fragment velocities for various types of accident and
geometry, fragment ranges, fragment mass distributions, depths of penetration, striking velocities
have been treated at depth by various authors and will not be presented here. The reader is referred
to reference 54 and 61 for detailed discussion.
An indication of the fragment propagation range taken from reference 61 is shown in Figure
5-43. The maximum fragment range units as a function of TNT equivalence are given based on
available fragment data points from launch vehicle incidents with the upper boundary considered
applicable to high order explosive reactions of propellants and the lower boundary applicable to
widely distributed and low order reactions (deflagration/Iow order explosion).
Figures E_44 and 5-45 show the total weight and number of fragments for the specific
tests shown in Figure 5-45. Table 5-IV summarizes the fragment data used in the curves.
5.5 Gas Pressure Vessel Hazards
When a pressurized gas-filled vessel bursts it generates a shock wave which is in many ways
similar to the one generated from a TNT explosion. The overpressure behind this shock wave may
be quite large and capable of causing damage.
The TNT equivalency of compressed gas obtained from reference 62 is shown in Figure 5-46.
The equivalency is shown for gas (3' = 1.4) expansion to one atmosphere pressure. The figure is based
on the gas behaving like a perfect gas over the range Of pressures and temperatures involved. It is also
assumed that the gas expands adiabatically (no heat transfer) and isentropically (maximum energy
release). The results should be very good for the one atmosphere case, but some errors can be expected
at the highest pressure shown for this case, and for the full range for the vacuum case, because of
liquefaction and solidification of the gas at the extremely low temperatures to which it expands.
To obtain peak side-on overpressure and positive phase impulse for a pressure vessel burst,
Figure 5-46 can be used to obtain TNT equivalency and Figure 5-47 can then be entered by
converting the distances involved to scaled distances X =/.Ground Distan______cel.
\ WeightTNT 1/3 J
Peak overpressure can alternately be obtained by using Figure 5-12 directly.
Fragmentation parameters are covered at great length by several publications and the reader
is referred to references 54 and 61 for a detailed discussion.
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TABLE 5-IV. - FRAGMENT DATA FROM SELECTED SPACE VEHICLE EXPLOSIONS (REF. 61)
Vehicle
site/date
S-I V-ASTV
Douglas-Sacramente
1-24-64
Atlas Centaur
KSC
3-2-65
S-IV-EAFB
Edwards
7-14-65
Test Vehicle
Run 062
S-IVB-503
Douglas-Sacramento
1-20-67
PYRO-275
(Test Tanks)
AFRPL Edwards
3-22-67
Propellant/
Ib
I LO2/LH 2
100,000
LO2/LH 2
30,000
LO2/RP-1
172,000
Total
284,000
LO2/LH 2
91,000
LO2/LH 2
231,000
LO2/RP-1
25,000
Yield
TNT
(%)/Ib
(1%)
1,000
(0.75%)
1,930
(3.5%)
3,200
(1%)
2,300
(4%)
1,000
Incident
Explosion
Overpressurization of
LOX tank to 100 psia
Launch
At 1- 1.1 sec. the
booster engine cut-
off at T 1.63 vertical
vel. = 0.
Vehicle fell back
bursting the booster
tanks
Induced failure
18 in. ram on inter-
tank bu Ikhead
Explosion
On repressurization.
Wrong type welding
rod, titanium spheres
Tank rupture
Self-ignition after
500 milliseconds
of mixing
Number of
fragments/
weight, Ib
262 Total
44 Wt'd
1,882
40
9,085
412
3,125
166
1,426
60
1,628
Source
Investigation of S-IV
Vehicle explosion by
J. B. Gayle
Investigation of
the Atlas Centaur
Vehicle explosion
by S. S. Perlman
Project PYRO
Quarterly Progress
Report 9/65
Report of
I nvestigation
S-IVB-503
Incident 1-20-67 by
Kurt B. Debus, KSC
Project PYRO
Reports
3-67, 6-67
Major
fragment
radius, ft
4O0
400
500
600
50O
Average fragment
density/10,000 ft 2
outside fragment
radius
.31
.29
.5
.81
.30
(kg = Ib x .454)
(m = ft x .3048)
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The largest anticipated usage of compressed gas for Space Shuttle payloads is expected to be
associated with upper stage vehicles requiring propellant system pressurization gases, and with Space
Station modules which require atmospheric pressurization and re-pressurization gases. Scout, for
example, requires a nitrogen oressurization source for the reaction control system. A "B" stage
nitrogen tank pressurized to 3000 psi (2.1x107 N/m2), with an internal volume capacity of.223 ft 3'
(.0063 m3), has a TNT equivalency, from Figure 5-46, of.1736 lb. (.0788 kg).
From Figure 5-47, the peak side-on overpressure and positive phase impulse estimated at a
distance of 5 feet would be:
5 ft
(.1736 Ib) 1/3 = 8.963
Therefore P = 125 psi at ;k= 8.963 and
I .95 psi- msec
D ft N/m2_m s )
2.1489 x 104
m
Therefore I = (.95) (5) = 4.75 psi - msec (3.2749 N/m2-ms)
5.6 Summary
A literature review yielded considerable information concerning liquid propulsion system
hazards but somewhat limited information concerning solid rocket motor hazards. The most re-
vealing information was obtained from Projects Pyro (liquid propellants) and Sophy (solid pro-
pellants). However, the results presented were based on a number of other sources.
In an effort to determine the thresholds of a solid propellant motor ignition, explosion, or
detonation resulting from an impact, data were compiled on various impact tests, accidents, missile
fallback data, shotgun tests and flying plate tests. A subjective extrapolation between the data
points was performed so that the interfaces between the inert-explosive/burn and explosive/burn-
detonate regions could be delineated. It was found that the composite and composite-modified
double base (CMDB) propellants had about the same interface between the inert-explosive/burn
regions but the higher energy release interface was lower for the CMDB system.
Critical diameter tests performed by Project Sophy have identified a minimum critical dia-
meter of 64.2 inches for solid cylindrical PBAN composites having a weight composition of 69% AP
and 15% AL. The pseudocritical geometry has been shown to be approximately 92% of the critical
diameter. These relationships indicate that composite solid rocket motors which are candidates for
Space Shuttle use and have similar compositions are relatively safe from donor charge detonation
when they are of subcritical size.
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Doublebasepropellantsinvestigatedandcompositepropellantswith highenergyadditives
havebeenfound to havecritical diameterswhichdecreasewith increasingdegreeof highenergy
enrichment.Thecritical diameteris in the orderof 2.0 inchesor lesswhich issmallcomparedto the
64.2 inchesfor PBANpropellants.
The threshold overpressure for detonation of PBAN composites has been established by Pro-
ject ,Sophy to be 25 to 30 kbars for propellants near their critical diameters (64.2 in.) NOL card-gap
tests of composites have shown that they will not detonate in the subcritical diameter size (less than
2.0 in.) with incident pressures in the order of 100 kbars. Data on double base propellants, based on
NOL card-gap tests (test samples less than 2.0 in. in diameter), indicates detonation thresholds of the
order of 30 to 44 kbars for the propellants investigated.
The effects of solid propellant motor explosion/detonations have been characterized in terms
of resulting near side-on overpressure, impulse, TNT equivalency, fireball/firebrand effects, and frag-
mentation. Data presented provides methods for estimating the required values of these parameters.
TNT equivalencies have been obtained from various test programs and have been defined
in general terms as follows:
Composite propellants near their criticai diameters of the composition used in Project Sophy
are capable of explosive yields of 156% to 168% based on combined overpressure and impulse data.
These propellants can show higher yields (197%) based on peak side-on overpressure only.
Actual tests of smaller rocket motors indicate that these yields are rarely achieved and that
composites achieve yields in the order of 85% TNT equivalency while double base propellants can
achieve yields up to 140% TNT equivalency. Combined tests of double base and composite pro-
pellants in which the former was used as the donor achieved yields in the order of 125% TNT
equivalency.
Liquid propellant system hazards have been evaluated on the basis of three types of fuel and
oxidizer combinations and three different modes of mixing. Hypergolic propellants (50% N2H 4 -
50% UDMH and N204), RP-1-LO2, and LH2-LO 2 were evaluated in the confinement by missile,
confinement by ground surface, and high velocity impact failure modes. Tables and figures are
provided so that calculations of explosive yield, peak side-on overpressure, and impulse can be
performed. Determination of fireball effects, heat flux density and fragmentation based on test
results obtained from Project Pyro and other tests is presented and will provide an insight of the
magnitudes of the parameters involved.
Gas pressurization bottles also can provide an explosive yield, peak side-on overpressure if
ruptured. Figures are also presented so that these parameters can be determined for bottles
pressurized up to 10,000 psi (6.894 x 107 N/m2).
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6.0 PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS OF ROCKET SYSTEMS FOR SHUTTLE PAYLOAD
6.1 Solid Propellants
6.1.1 Introduction. - A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the Scout propulsion system
has been performed in order to determine the possible hazards of utilizing the Scout upper stage solid
Consideration Tree, Figure 6-1. The analysis was based on the upper stage solid rockets of the Scout
vehicle; however, it is applicable to solid rocket propulsion systems in general, except the reaction
control system which is unique to the Scout system.
6.1.2 System Safety Program. - A System Safety Program is required in order to assure
compliance with the requirements outlined in the NASA Headquarters Safety Policy and Require-
ments Document, reference 20.
A hazard analysis as described in NASA System Safety Manual, reference 21, has a logic
sequence of events as follows: (a) General Safety Studies, (b) Preliminary Hazard Analysis, (c) Fault
Hazard Analysis, (d) Logic Diagram Analysis, and (e) Procedures Analysis. In Figure 6-2, these
analyses are shown relative to the program activity phases. DOD components follow a System
Safety Program as outlined in MI L-STD-882, reference 18. These are as follows: (a) Preliminary
Hazard Analysis, (b) Subsystem Hazard Analysis, (c) System Hazard Analysis, and (d) Operating
Hazard Analysis. SAMSO has documented these requirements in reference 63and outlines the
program as consisting of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Operating Hazard Analysis, Fault Hazard
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Software Hazardous Effects Analysis, and Cable Failure Matrix. In
Figure 6-3 the SAMSO approach tosafety analyses events and program milestone coordination are
shown. A Space Transportation System user must have a System Safety Program and plan for per-
forming these analyses in an orderly and timely manner so that hazards will be identified with sub-
sequent elimination, reduction, control, or placarding of each critical and catastrophic hazard. The
approach used by SAMSO, as outlined in reference 63, is the System Safety Program developed for
the Minuteman Program by the Boeing Aerospace Company. The purpose of each of the required
analyses is discussed in the following paragraphs.
6.1.2.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis: This analysis is used by the contractor to identify and
document the system/subsystem hazards recognized in the early conceptual and design phases so that
by process and/or procedural constraints the hazards can be eliminated or minimized to an acceptable
level.
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--' TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM
Hazard
Shuttle or Scout
non-propulsion
system fire
Ultimate
effect
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage or
loss
Safety
tree
number
1.1
1.2
Intermediate effects
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Scout propulsion system
fire
High motor tempera-
atures
Ignition of Scout
propulsion system
materials
Preventive action
Utilize motors of high
auto-ignition tempera-
tures
Thermally insulate the
motors to protect
from max. shuttle bay
temperature of 150°F
(65.5°C) during launch
Utilize motors which
have propellant that is
resistant to detonation
in a fire
Select system materials
that are resistant to
combustion
Scout status of
implementation
Motor auto-ignition
temperatures are as
fol lows:
3rd stage -
392°F (200°C)
12 min.
4th stage -
300°F (149°C)
24 hrs.
no ignition
spin motor-
350°F (177°C)
8 hrs.
OPEN
No known case of
solid motor detonation
during cook-off.
Cook-off can cause an
explosion-deflagration
Because of H20 2
systems
Scout is designed with
low combustion
materials
",4
Hazard
Shuttle or scout
non-propulsion
system fire
(continued)
Scout propulsion
system fire
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
Ultimate
effect
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage or
loss
Preventive actionSafety
tree
number
1.3
1.4
1.1
Intermediate effects
Explosive rupture of
motor case
Shock, fragmentation,
fire, chemical attack of
materials, or toxicity
resulting from RCS
system rupture or
leak
Premature motor
ignition or detonation
High temperature
causing propellant
grain cracks or bond
separation resulting in
I case rupture when
motor is ignited during
normal launch
Thermal over-pressuri-
zation of RCS system
High motor tempera-
tures
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Abort motor ignition
if a fire occurs in the
vicinity of the motor
and propellant flaw is
suspected
Delay first stage ignition
of the payload until
sufficient separation
exists so that shuttle
cannot be damaged by
ignition of flawed
motor
Provide pressure relief to
exterior of the shuttle
Provide warning regarding
personnel hazards to
operating personnel
Utilize motors of high auto-
ignition temperatures
Thermally insulate the
motors to protect from
max. shuttle bay tempera-
ture of 150°F (65.5°C)
during launch
Scout status of-
implementation
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
OPEN
Standard operating
procedures contain
warning, caution,
and notes regarding
RCS system hazards
Motor auto-ignition
temperatures are as
follows:
3rd stage -
392°F (200°C)
12 min.
4th stage -
300°F (149°C)
24 hrs.
no ignition
spin motor-
350°F (177°C)
8 hrs.
OPEN
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
Hazard
Scout Propulsion
system fire
(continued)
Environmental
heating
Ultimate
effect
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Safety
tree
number
1.2
1.1
Preventive actionIntermediate effects
Explosive rupture of
motor case
Premature motor
ignition or detonation
H igh tem peratu re
causing propellant
grain cracks or bond
separation resu Iting
in case rupture when
motor is ignited
during normal launch
High motor temperatures
Utilize motors which have
propellant that is resistant
to detonation in a fire
Abort motor ignition if a
fire occurs in the vicinity of
the motor such that pro-
pellant flaw is suspected
Delay first stage ignition of
the payload until
sufficient separation exists
so that shuttle cannot be
damaged by ignition of
flawed motor
Utilize motors of high
auto-ignition
temperatures
Thermally insulate the
motors to protect from
max. shuttle bay tem-
perature of 150°F (65.5°C)
during launch
Scout status of
implementation
No known case of
solid motor detona-
tion during cook-off.
Cook-off can cause
explosion-deflagra-
tion
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
Motor auto-ign ition
temperatures are
as follows:
3rd stage -
392°F (200°C)
12 min.
4th stage -
300°F (149°C)
24 hrs.
no ignition
spin motor -
350°F (177°C)
8 hrs.
OPEN
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
_o
Ultimate
effect
Explosive rupture of motor
Hazard
Environmental
heating
(continued)
Severe 1.2
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle 1.4
damage or
Safety
tree
number
loss
case
Intermediate effects
Shock, fragmentation,
fire, chemical attack of
materials, or toxicity
resultina from RCS
system rupture or leak
High temperature
causing propellant
grain cracks or bond
separation resulting
in case rupture when
motor is ignited
during normal launch
Thermal overpressur-
ization of RCS system
Preventive action
Utilize motors which
have propellant that is
resistant to detonation
in a fire
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate insensitivity
to expected environmental
temperature extremes
Abort motor ignition if a
fire occurs in the vicinity ofl
the motor and propellant
flaw is suspected
Delay first stage ignition of
the payload until sufficient
separation exists so that
shuttle cannot be damaged
by ignition of most flawed
motor
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate insensitivity
to expected temperature
extremes
Provide pressure relief to
exterior of the shuttle
Provide personnel warning
in procedures regarding
RCS system hazards
Provide adequate safety
margins in nitrogen &
hydrogen peroxide
reservoir design
Scout status of
implementation
No known case of
solid motor detona-
tion during cook-off.
Cook-off can cause
an explosion-deflag-
ration
OPEN
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
OPEN
OPEN
Standard operating
procedures contain
warning, caution, &
notes regarding RCS
system hazards
Reservoir proof
pressure is 1.5 times
operating pressure
and burst pressure is
2.5 times operating
pressure
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
o
Hazard
Environ mental
heating
(continued)
Meteoroid impact
(this hazard exists
only during orbit
phase)
Ultimate
effect
Safety
tree
number
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Energy impacted by
meteoroid causing
propellant i gn ition
Preventive action
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage
or loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
1.1
1.2
1.4
Intermediate effects
Explosive rupture
of motor case
Shock, fragmentation, fire,
chemical attack of mater-
ials, or toxicity resulting
from RCS system rupture
or leak
Energy impacted by
meteoroid causes
propellant grain
crack resulting in
case rupture when
motor is ignited
Meteoroid impact
with RCS system
causing leak or
ru ptu re
Conduct qualification
tests to demonstrate
insensitivity to expected
temperature extremes
Thermally insulate sections
to protect from max.
shuttle bay temperature
of 150°F (65.5°C) during
launch
Minimize exposed vehicle
skin
Minimize exposed vehicle
skin
Abort normal motor
ignition if propellant flaw
is suspected
Delay first stage ignition of
the payload until sufficient
separation exists so that
shuttle cannot be damaged
by ignition of flawed motor
Provide protection of RCS
system from meteoroid
impact
Scout status of
implementation
Some tests performed
OPEN
OPEN
Analyses indicate
that present concept
affords sufficient
protection
Analyses indicate
that present concept
affords sufficient
protection
Appropriate warning
should be included
in deployment
procedures
OPEN
Must be defined
in mission procedures:
OPEN
RCS system is
contained entirely
within airframe
Hazard
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
Fragment impact
from shuttle or
non-propulsion
system rupture or
explosion
Ultimate
effect
Intermediate effects
Environmental
vibration
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage or
loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Safety
tree
number
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.1
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Explosive rupture of motor
case
Shock, fragmentation,
fire, chemical attack of
materials, or toxicity
resulting from RCS
system rupture or leak
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Fragment impact
energy insufficient to
cause severe shuttle
damage may cause
motor ignition or
detonation
Fragment impact
energy insufficient to
cause severe shuttle
damage directly
may cause propellant
grain flaw resulting
in explosive rupture
of motor case when
motor is ignited
Fragment impact
energy insufficient
to cause severe
shuttle damage
directly may cause
rupture or leak of
RCS system
Vibration energy
absorbed by motors
may cause ignition
or detonation.
Considered a very
low probability. No
known occurrence
Preventive action
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate motor
insensitivity to fragment
impact
Abort normal motor ignition
if propellant flaw is suspecte
suspected
Delay first stage ignition of
the payload until sufficient
separation exists so that
shuttle cannot be damaged
by ignition of flawed motor
Provide protection of RCS
system from fragmentation
Provide personnel warning
in procedures regarding
RCS system hazards
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate motor
insensitivity to vibration
Design payload pallet to
attenuate vibration
Scout status of-
implementation
OPEN
Mission procedures:
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures
OPEN
RCS system is
located entirely
within missile
airframe
Standard operating
procedures contain
warning, caution, &
notes regarding RCS
system hazards
Some test performed
OPEN
OPEN
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
t_
Hazard
Environmental
vibration
(continued)
Ultimate
effect
Explosive rupture
of motor case
Intermediate effects
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage or
loss
Safety
tree
number
1.3
1.4
Vibration energy
absorbed by motors
causing cracks in
propellant grain
resulting in case
rupture upon ignition
Shock, fragmentation,
fire, chemical attack of
materials, or toxicity
resulting from RCS
system rupture or leak
Structural failure of
RCS system causing
leak or rupture
Preventive action
Abort normal motor
ignition if propellant
flaw is suspected
Scout status of
implementation
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
Design payload pallet to
attenuate vibration OPEN
Delay first stage ignition
of the payload until
sufficient separation exists
so that shuttle cannot be
damaged by ignition of
flawed motor
Design RCS system to
withstand expected
environment
Conduct qualification
tests to demonstrate
ability to withstand
vibration
Must be defined in
mission procedures:
OPEN
OPEN
Provide personnel warning
in procedures regarding RCS
system hazards
Standard operating
procedures contain
warning, cautions &
notes regarding RCS
system hazards
Design payload pallet to
attenuate vibration OPEN
RCS system
components are
tested to the follow-
ing minimum level:
e time per axis:
(seconds) 80
• frequency (Hz)
20 to 2000
grms 10.55
_o
Hazard
Environmental
shock
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM - Continued
I
Ultimate
effect
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Safety
tree
number
1.1
1.2
1.4
Intermediate effects
Premature motor
ignition or detonation
Explosive rupture
of motor case
Shock energy
absorbed by motors
may cause ignition
or detonation
Shock energy
Shock, fragmentation,
fire, chemical attack of
materials, or toxicity
resulting from RCS
system rupture or leak
absorbed by motors
causing cracks in
propellant grain
resulting in case
rupture upon ignition
Structural failure of
RCS system causing
leak or rupture
Shuttle
damage or
loss
Preventive action
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate motor
insensitivity to shock
Design pallet to attenuate
shock
Abort normal motor ignition
if propellant flaw is
suspected because of
excess shock loads
Delay first stage ignition
of the payload until
sufficient separation exists
so that shuttle cannot be
damaged by ignition of
;flawed motor
Design RCS system to with-
stand expected environment
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate ability to
withstand shock
Design pallet to attenuate
shock
Provide warning regarding
personnel hazards to
operating personnel
Scout status of
implementation
OPEN
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures
OPEN
OPEN
RCS system compo-
nents are tested to
the minimum level
of at least 30g in
any direction
OPEN
OPEN
Standard operating
procedures contain
warning, cautions, &
notes regarding RCS
system hazards
h3
Hazard
Shock from
shuttle or Scout
non-propulsion
system rupture or
explosion
Electrical
fault
TABLE 6-1. - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS--SOLID PROPULSION SYSTEM -Continued
Ultimate
effect
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Intermediate effects
Safety
tree
number
1.1
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Severe
shuttle
damage or
loss
Shuttle
damage or
loss
1.3
1.1
1.2
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Explosive
rupture of motor case
Premature motor ignition
or detonation
Fire
Shock energy insuf-
ficient to cause
severe shuttle damage
may cause motor
ignition or detonation
Energy insufficient to
cause severe shuttle
damage directly may
cause propellant grain
flaw resulting in
explosive rupture of
motor case when
motor is ignited
Spurious electrical
signal in ignition
circuit
Electrical fault
resulting in fire
Preventive action
Conduct qualification tests
to demonstrate motor
insensitivity to shock
Scout status of
implementation
OPEN
_bort normal motor
ignition if propellant flaw
is suspected
Delay first stage ignition
of the payload until
sufficient separation exists
so that shuttle cannot be
damaged by ignition of
flawed motor
Design ignition system to
minimize likelihood of
spurious electrical signal
Utilize electro-mechanical
safe and arm devices to
prot_ectmotors from
spurious electrical signals
including those due to
EMI and RFI
Design electrical circuits
to minimize likelihood of
fire
Select propulsion system
equipment that are resis-
tant to combustion
Must be defined in
mission procedures
OPEN
Must be defined in
mission procedures
OPEN
Shielded twisted
wiring
OPEN
Safe/arm relays in
ignition circuit
OPEN
Fire retarding
cover on wiring
OPEN
Because of H202
system design with
low combustible
materials
t_
ol
Hazard
Electri_cal
fault
(continued)
TABLE 6-1, - PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS-SOLID PROPtJLSION SYSTEM -Concluded
Ultimate Safety Scout status of
effect Intermediate effects Preventive action
implementation
Shock, fragmentation, Thermal overpressur- Provide nitrogen and OPEN
fire, chemical attack of ization of RCS system hydrogen peroxide relief
materials, or toxicity caused by fire in the connections to the
resulting from RCS vicinity of the system exterior of the shuttle
system rupture or leak
Provide warning regarding Standard operating
personnel hazards to procedures contain
operating personnel, warnings, cautions,
and notes regarding
RCS system hazards
Shock, fragmentation, Loss of RCS system System materials are to be Materials selected
fire, chemical attack of structural integrity resistant to corrosion to be compatible with
materials, or toxicity H202
resulting from RCS
system leak Provide warning regarding Standard operating
personnel hazards to procedures contain
operating personnel warnings, cautions,
and notes regarding
RCS system hazards
Corrosion
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Shuttle
damage or
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Shuttle
damage or
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FIGURE 6-1. - SOLID PROPELLANT ROCKET SAFETY CONSIDERATION TREE
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FIGURE 6-2. - SAFETY ANALYSIS - PROGRAM ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIP
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FIGURE 6-3. -- SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSES EVENTS AND MILESTONES
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6.1.2.2 OperatingHazardAnalysis: This analysis us used by the contractor to provide the
basis for the preparation of procedures for:
1. Rendering the subsystem/system safe under normal and emergency conditions
2. Emergency escape or egress and rescue operations
3. Ground handling and transportation operations and environments
4. Operating and maintenance operations, including warning and caution notes
5. Identification of a hazardous period time span and actions required to
control the identified hazard
6. Recovery procedures for potential accidents.
6.1.2.3 Fault Hazard Analysis: This analysis is performed to monitor and control the design
process in therms of system safety. This method/process uses established failure modes, failure rates,
failure effects, and established hazard classifications. On complex systems, this analysis may be made
up of several analyses accomplished on units which make up the configuration item.
6.1.2.4 Cable Failure Matrix: This analysis is a shorthand method used to concisely represent
many of the possible combinations of failures which can occur within the cable assembly. The pre-
dominant failure events depicted from the analysis are added to the Fault Hazard Analysis.
6.1.2.5 Fault Tree Analysis: This analysis provides a means for determining and graphically
presenting the events or combinations of events which will cause a defined, undersired event. It also
provides a basis for assessing the prbability of occurrence of these events, either by statistical or
simulation methods.
6.1.2.6 Software Hazardous Effects Analysis: This analysis is performed on software to ensure
that system interlocks and functional electromechanical controls are incorporated to prevent system
functional hazards from being initiated by the software system.
6.1.3 Scout Vehicle Description. - For the purpose of identifying the possible hazards and
consequences associated with utilizing a solid propulsion system as a Shuttle payload, the upper stage
of the Scout propulsion system were selected as a typical system. The Scout upper stage propulsion
system, shown in Figure 6-4, consists of two solid rocket motor stages and associated attitude control
and stabilization motors. The Antares II X259 is a composite modified double base solid propellant
rocket motor (Department of Transport ation (DOT) Class A, Military Class 7) and is utilized for third
stage propulsion. A hydrogen peroxide propellant reaction control system (RCS) is contained in the
C-section and is used for attitude control. This RCS system uses four 48 Ib thrust motors for pitch
and yaw control during third stage burn. During coast, the 14 Ib motors are throttled to 3 Ibs for yaw
and roll control and two 2 Ib motors provide pitch control. The Altair III is a composite propellant
solid rocket (DOT Class B, Military Class 2) and is used for fourth stage propulsion. This stage is spin-
stabilized by composite solid propellant spin motors whichare located on the D-section between the
third and fourth stages. The vehicle may be configured with a variety of solid propellant spin motors,
depending on the mission payload.
129
o,1
O
Shroud
Lower D
& middle D
section
Upper D
section
Adapter
Payload
\
Lower C
Upper C section
section
..'x_ 3rd Stage./ " Antares II X259
4th Stage
Altair III
Upper Scout stages for
shuttle integration
Upper B "
section
2nd Stage
Castor II
Base A
 unner' 
Lower B
se____ag e
Algol III
FIGURE 6-4. - SCOUT UPPER STAGE PROPULSION SYSTEM
6.1.4 Space Shuttle System Description. - The Space Shuttle system, shown in Figure 6-5, is
comprised of two composite propellant solid rocket boosters (DOT Class B, Military Class 2), the
external propellant tank, and the Orbiter vehicle. The solid rockets are ejected at burn-out and are
retireved by parachute for subsequent refurbishment and reuse. The external propellant tank is eject-
ed before injection into orbit and is not retrieved. The main propulsion system is the three liquid
rocket engines contained in the Orbiter. The solid rocket boosters augment main engine thrust during
lift-off and early boost.
6.1.4.1 Mission Phases: Figure 6-6 shows the typical Orbiter vehicle mission phases examined
in this study. The mission consists of launch pad operations, boost, orbit, payload deployment, de-
orbit, and land or abort phases.
6.1.4.2 Launch Pad Operations: A typical ground flow is shown in Figure 6-7 and the
associated time line is shown in Figure 6-8. As noted in the time line, the last thirty hours are
launch pad operations. Figure 6-9 presents an expanded schedule of the launch pad operations.
It was considered that during this phase, the Scout system would be brought to the pad and hoisted
into the Orbiter in a vertical position. During the launch pad operation, the significant characteristics
of the Shuttle/Scout systemare as follows:
oThere is no propellant in the external tank or the Orbiter until the
final ten hours
• All explosive bolts, separation nuts, spin motors, and main rocket motor initiators
in the Scout vehicle are removed until after the Scout is installed in the Orbiter
• The Scout nitrogen tanks are unpressurized and hydrogen peroxide tanks contain
no fuel until after the Scout is installed in the Orbiter.
6.1.4.3 Boost Phase: The boost phase consists of all operations from launch to Shuttle exter-
nal tank separation. During this phase, the payload is subjected to the environment induced by the
Shuttle, including thermal, pressure, shock, vibration, acceleration, and acoustic noise. During this
phase, the significant configuration features are as follows:
oThe Shuttle's solid rocket boosters burn for approximately two minutes
after launch pad ignition
• The Shuttle's three main rocket engines operate from launch pad ignition
until main engine cut out (MECO) before injection into orbit. At that
time, the external tank is separated from the Orbiter
• The Scout payload separation nuts, explosive bolts, spin motors, and main
rocket initiators are safed through safe-arm latching relays
• All Scout batteries are uncharged
• The Scout RCS fuel tanks contain hydrogen peroxide in expu Ision bladders
but the bladders are not pressurized. Pressure build-up is relieved through a
pressure relief valve, decomposition chamber in the Scout vehicle and a
bleed line in the Shuttle
• The Scout nitrogen system upstream of the regulator is pressurized to 3000 psi
• Orbiter pressure is equalized to ambient pressure through bleed ports
• Orbiter payload bay doors are closed until orbit injection has been established.
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6.1.4.4Orbit Phase:The orbit phasebeginswith orbit injection andis terminatedby de-orbit.
Deploymentof the payloadoccursduring this phaseunlessthe deployment isaborted. The
significantconfigurationcharacteristicsof the orbit phaseareasfollows:
®TheScoutpayloadseparationnuts,explosivebolts, spinmotors,andmain
rocket initiators arenot armeduntil after payloaddeployment
• The Scout batteries are uncharged until all systems are checked and final
count has commenced.
• The hydrogen peroxide bladders are pressurized just prior to removal
from the payload bay.
6.1.4.5 De-Orbit Phase: De-orbit normally occurs after the payload has been deployed. How-
ever, de-orbit may occur after the mission has been aborted during the boost and orbit phases. The
significant characteristics of the configuration are as follows:
• Payload bay doors are closed, containing the Scout
• Payload bay vents are opened after re-entry heating in order to equalize pressure
• Scout nitrogen and hydrogen peroxide systems are dumped prior to de-orbit
• The ignition system and all ordnance items are safed and the ignition batteries
are discharged if they were charged during a deployment attempt.
6.1.4.6 Landing Phase: The landing phase may be necessary at any point in the boost phase
and is necessary after de-orbit. The system is assumed to be in the safe condition as outlined in the
de-orbit phase discussion.
6.1.5 Shuttle/Scout Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). - The Scout propulsion system PHA,
which was conducted to identify hazards associated with the Space Shuttle/Scout concept, was devis-
ed by first constructing a modified Fault Tree which descriptively is called a Safety Consideration
Tree, submitted as Figure 6-1, and then completing the PHA of Table 6-1. The Safety Consideration
Tree was used to effect an orderly examination of the concept so that all possible hazards associated
with assembled solid rocket motors and interfacing hydrogen peroxide fueled reaction control sys-
tems could be considered. Similar to the fault tree technique, the Safety Consideration Tree is
constructed by examining the undersired event and then the causes of each event digressively until
the hazard or intermediate hazard is identified. "OR" gates in the tree are assumed to exist where no
gate is indicated and "AND" gates exist where indicated.
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Table 6-1, is used to describe each of the possible hazards
and the intermediate/ultimate effects identified in the Safety Consideration Tree. Also provided are
safety requirements and Scout implementation techniques, as are available. A numbering system has
also been utilized to simplify cross-reference between the Safety Consideration Tree and the PHA
table.
6.1.5.1 Sources of Shuttle System Damage: The Scout propulsion system PHA addresses
the possible Scout propulsion system hazards that can result in Shuttle damage or loss in the typical
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SpaceShuttle/Scoutmissionprofile. Thehazardsandtheir associatedconsequencesareconsidered
to be thoseof atypical solid propulsionsystem.Shuttlesystemdamageor lossdueto the Scout
propulsionsystemcanoccurasa resultof prematuresolidrocket motor ignition, caserupture,
detonation,fire, and chemicalattack/toXicity; or explosionresultingfrom RCSsystemruptureor
leak. The hazardswhich could causetheseoccurrencesaredesignatedby the boldoutlined blocks
in the SafetyConsiderationTreeandare listedin the "HAZARD" column of the PHA. The number-
ingsystemassistsin cross reference.
6.1.5.2 Shuttle or Scout Non-Propulsion System Fire: A fire of the Shuttle or Scout system
other than propulsion may be of such small magnitude that Shuttle damage does not directly result.
However, it is possible for a fire of that magnitude to cause auto-ignition, explosion or detonation of
a nearby motor which would result in Shuttle loss. A possible exception to that result is the pre-
mature ignition of a spin motor. Spin motor ignition would not cause the pressure limits of the cargo
bay to be exceeded, but Shuttle damage could result. This hazard is minimized byutilizing motors
of high auto-ignition temperatures and also by using propellants that ignite rather than detonate in a
fire. Scout motor auto-ignition temperatures are presented in the PHA.
A fire in the Shuttle or Scout system, other than the propulsion system, which is too small
to cause Shuttle damage directly or ignition of the motors may cause ignition of other materials
thereby creating a fire of larger magnitude. The resulting fire may cause Shuttle system damage or
loss directly and may cause premature motor ignition explosion or detonation. Battery acids from
unsealed batteries can cause fires of this nature, however, this problem is eliminated by using squib
activated-sealed batteries. Also spreading of a fire which is not propulsion system related can be
minimized by using non-combustible materials. It should be noted that the payload bay has an inert
atmosphere purging system to prevent this occurrence during the final stages of launch pad
operation. Furthermore, in orbit the payload bay is in a vacuum so that an oxidizing material must
be present in addition to a combustible material for a fire to propagate.
Although a Shuttle or Scout non-propulsion system fire may not cause severe Shuttle damage
or loss directly, Scout motor ignition or propulsion system fire, it could cause deterioration of the
case or bond system which could result in a failure when the motor is ignited during the normal pay-
load launch sequence. If fire of significant magnitude is detected in the vicinity of the motor prior to
deployment, the launch can be aborted in order to prevent explosive rupture of the motor case. In
any case, one basic requirement of payload launch is that sufficient distance between the payload
and the Orbiter is obtained before any attempt is madeto arm the system and ignite the first solid
rocket motor.
A fire in the Shuttle or Scout system can also cause oVerpressurization due to the temperature
of the RCS system. Such overpressurization can lead to an RCS system leak or rupture resulting in
release of hydrogen peroxide to the confines of the payload bay or the generation of tank fragmenta-
tion and shock. The effects of leakage or tank rupture can cause Shuttle damage directly, may lead
to premature ignition, explosion/deflagration of Scout motors, or cause a propagating fire. Over-
pressurization of the RCS system is prevented by providing pressure relief connections for both
nitrogen and hydrogen peroxide to the Shuttle exterior. In the Scout system, hydrogen peroxide
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relief valvedischargeisthrough a decompositionchamberto assurethat the effluent fluid isnot
chemicallyhazardous.Further protectionfrom hydrogenperoxidechemicalhazardsisaffordedby
includingpersonnelwarningsin the StandardOperatingProceduresalongwith first aid information.
6.1.5.3PayloadPropulsionSystemFire: The effectsof aScoutpropulsionsystemfire are
similar to thoseof aShuttleor Scoutnon-propulsionsystemfire. A fire of the Scoutpropulsion
systemcan result in Shuttle systemdamagedirectly, maycauseprematureignition or motor
explosion/deflagrationor causedamageor bonddegradation.The effectsof aScout propulsion
systemfire, therefore,areminimizedor controlled in the samemannerasthe effectsof aShuttle
or Scout non-propulsionsystemfire explainedin the precedingparagraphs.
6.1.5.4 EnvironmentalTemperature:Thetemperatureenvironmentof the Scoutpropulsion
systemwill beacesultof the cargobaytemperaturein all phasesof the missionexceptorbit phase.
Duringthat phase,the payloadbaydoorsareopenandthe environmentaltemperatureresultsfrom
solarradiation,earthalbedo,earth radiation,andspacesink.
Environmentalheatingof the payloadmaycauseprematuremotor ignition or explosion/
deflagration,bond degradation,or overpressurizationof the RCSsystem. If payloadmotor temper-
aturesriseto the point whereauto-ignitionor motor explosion/deflagrationoccurs,the Shuttle
maybe lost. This eventcanbeavoidedby addinginsulationto the exterior of the motors,selecting
andorbit missionswhich will limit the exposuretime of the motorsto solarheatingor selecting
motorswhoseauto-ignition temperaturesareabovethe maximumexpectedtemperatureenvironment.
Scoutauto-ignition temperaturesarepresentedin the PHA.
Eventhough ignition or explosion/deflagrationareavoidedby selectingmotorswith ahigh
auto-ignition temperature,thetemperatureresultingfrom environmentalheatingmaycausecaseor
bonddegradation.Thisoccurrencecanbeavoidedby_utilizingmotorsthat aredesignedandqualified
for the expectedmaximumtemperatureenvironment. To reduce hazardous conditions the solid
rocket motor ignition should be delayed until sufficient separation exists between the Orbiter and
the payload.
Environmental heating can cause overpressurization of a liquid or gas RCS system resulting in
RCS system leak or rupture. Shock, fragmentation, chemical attack, or toxicity resulting from this
occurrence may cause Shuttle system damage directly or Shuttle loss if premature motor ignition or
explosion/deflagration occurs. RCS system overpressurization due to environmental heating is
prevented by designing RCS system components to withstand the increased pressure resulting from
the most extreme heat environment, providing sufficient insulation to the RCS exterior or selecting
an orbit mission which will limit the exposure time of the system to solar heating. The nitrogen and
hydrogen peroxide storage reservoirs in the Scout vehicle have a proof pressure of 1.5 times operating
pressure and a burst pressure of 2.5 times operating pressure. RCS pressure relief valve connections to
the H20 2 and N 2 systems are provided in the Scout System and must be vented to the Shuttle exterior.
The hydrogen peroxide discharges through a decomposition chamber which minimizes chemical reac-
tion of raw hydrogen peroxide. Furthermore, warning notes should be included in the Standard
Operating Procedures in the event that environmental heat causes release of hydrogen peroxide in the
vicinity of personnel during launch pad operations. Qualification tests of the RCS system should
demonstrate the capability to withstand the expected environment.
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6.1.5.5 Meteoroid Impact: The meteoroid environment represents a projectile impact hazard.
Meteoroid impact with a solid rocket motor may result in premature ignition, explosion, detonation,
or case damage. Also, meteoroid impacts on the RCS system could cause an RCS system rupture
or leak resulting in tank fragmentation, shock, fire, corrosion/reaction, or toxicity. The meteoroid
impact hazard is present only during the orbit phase when the payload bay doors are open. An
analysis, reference 64, has been conducted to determine the probability of meteoroid impact damage
to the cases of the Antares X-259 and Altair III solid propellant motors in this environment. The
analysis considers that only half the motor case area is exposed during the twenty-three hour orbit
period, that the payload bay doors are open and additional deployment time of the vehicle before
the first rocket motor is ignited. With these assumptions, the probability of motor case damage is
.0037; therefore, the probability of premature motor ignition or detonation is small. Although this
case damage probability is considered low, the effects of a case rupture hazard during solid rocket
ignition may be eliminated by delaying ignition until sufficient separation exists between the payload
and the Orbiter or abort the launch.
Meteoroid impact with RCS system components could cause RCS system leak or rupture
resulting in tank fragmentation and shock, fire, corrosion/reaction, or toxicity. Such effects may
cause direct Shuttle damage or may cause Shuttle loss indirectly by the resulting premature motor
ignition or detonation. However, the Scout RCS system is completely enclosed within the transition
section which is relatively invulnerable to meteoroid impact which minimizes this hazard.
6.1.5.6 Fragmentation From Non-Propulsion System Rupture or Explosion: Fragmentation
damage similar to meteoroid impact damage may also be caused by a rupture or explosion of a
Shuttle or payload system such as ignition batteries and oxygen tanks. Although this explosion or
rupture may be of insufficient magnitude to cause significant Shuttle system damage directly, the
fragments produced from this occurrence may cause premature solid rocket motor ignition, explosion/
deflagration or case damage and/or RCS system leaks or rupture. This hazard may be minimized by
using qualification tests to demonstrate that the motors are insensitive to projectile impact.
The solid rocket case or propellant bond damage can result in rupture of the motor case
at ignition. This hazard is eliminated by aborting the mission.
Fragments from an explosion may cause an RCS system rupture or leak resulting in further
fragmentation, shock, fire, corrosion/reaction, or toxicity. In the Scout system, protection is
afforded the RCS by the transition sections skin and other missile equipment.
6.1.5.7 Environmental Vibration: Vibration environment is of concern duringthe boost
and landing phases of the Shuttle mission. The vibration environment produces energy that is
absorbed by the solid propellant rocket motors which could result in propellant cracks or bond
separation of the propellant grain.
This type damage would result in an explosive rupture of the motor case upon ignition.
Qualification tests should be used to demonstrate the motor's resistance to damage by vibration.
Also, rocket motor ignition can be delayed until sufficient separation exists between the
Orbiter and payload so that the Orbiter is not damaged by a rocket motor failure at ignition.
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An RCS system leak or line rupture may result from vibration. Shuttle damage may result
directly or indirectly from fire, corrosion/reaction or toxicity from H20 2. The RCS system should
be designed and tested to the expected flight vibration so that this hazard may be eliminated. The
RCS system components of the Scout vehicle have been qualified by tests and usage t_ demonstrate
acceptance for Scout, however, the Scout environment must be compared to the Shuttle environ-
ment and additional qualification testing may be required.
6.1.5.8 Environmental Shock: As presented in reference 65, the shock induced into the
payload by the Shuttle system is only of major concern during abort landing and aborted-mode
handling. The solid rocket motors should be tested to determine their ability to withstand the
specified shock loads.
Since the RCS system hydrogen peroxide and nitrogen pressure will be dumped for normal
landing or abort landing there is no inherent hazard in this system during the landing phases.
6.1.5.9 Shock From Non-Propulsion System Rupture or Explosion: Mechanical shock or
shock wave phenomena can result from a rupture or explosion in the Shuttle or payload systems
other than the propulsion system. The magnitude of the shock may be insufficient to cause major
Shuttle system damage directly, but it may result in Shuttle system damage indirectly by causing
premature solid rocket motor ignition, explosion, detonation, case/propellant damage and RCS
system rupture or leak. Premature motor ignition, explosion or detonation would result in Shuttle
loss. This hazard can be minimized by demonstrating that the solid rocket motors are insensitive
to shock stimulus. Qualification tests should be conducted to a level beyond the expected shock
resulting from the most severe non-propulsion system rupture or explosion.
To eliminate the hazard which is inherent in motor case or propellant damage, the payload
launch should be aborted or ignition should be delayed until safe separation exists between the
Orbiter and the payload.
An RCS system rupture or leak which is caused by shock may result in additional fragmenta-
tion, shock, fire, corrosion/reaction, or toxicity. Minimization of this occurrence can be accomplished
by qualification tests of RCS system components to the expected shock levels. The RCS system
is normally protected from outside stimulus by the transition section skin, structure and other
components.
6.1.5.10 Electrical Fault: An electrical fault in the payload propulsion system can cause
premature ignition of payload motors, fire, or RCS system rupture or leak resulting from over-
pressurization due to temperature. Since solid rocket motorsare electrically initiated, a spurious
electrical signal can cause premature motor ignition, resu Iting in most cases with Shuttle loss.
Minimization of this hazard is accomplished by system design, operating procedures and pad safety
procedures to ensure that no failure or operating errors will cause premature ignition. An electro-
mechanical Safe and Arm device is the normal design feature which is employed to provide ignition
train interruption. Squib shunts and electrical wiring shielding is also used to reduce or prevent
RF signals from entering the ignition system. These devices prevent ignition due to component
malfunction, radio frequency interference (RFI) and electromagnetic interference (EMB.
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A fire resultingfrom anelectricalfault cancauseShuttle systemdamageand lossif premature
solidrocket motor ignition, explosion/deflagrationoccurs. Minimization of this hazardisaccomplished
by selectingheatresistantandnon-flammablematerialsin andaroundelectriccircuits. Also a
nitrogenpurgesystemisusedin the payloadbay to preventanoxidizing atmosphereduring the final
stagesof launchpadoperations.The systemoperatesin avacuumduring orbit.
A fire resultingfrom anelectricalfault canalsocausethermaloverpressurizationof the RCS
systemresultingin a systemleakor rupture. In addition to the safetyprovisionsdescribedin the
previousparagraph,this hazardis minimizedsincetherearepressurerelief valvesin the H202 and
nitrogensystems.However,elevatedtemperatureof anH202 tank without pressurebuild-uphas
resultedin anexplosionduring testingat the Vought Corporation, reference66.
6.1.5.11Corrosion:Corrosionof the RCSsystemcomponentscan result in anRCSsystem
leakwhich maycausefire, corrosion/reaction,or toxicity. Theseeffectscandamagethe Shuttlesys-
tem directly or they can leadto moreseveredamageby causingaprematuremotor ignition, explo-
sion,or detonationasa resultof fire. Corrosionispreventedin the Scout RCSsystemby using
componentsandtubing that arecompatiblewith H202 and areresistantto corrosion.Also, personnel
warningsareincludedin the ScoutStandardOperatingProceduresto inform personnelof the in-
herenthazardsof the hydrogenperoxidesystemandsafetytraining is providedthe technicians.
6.1.6 RCS Propellant Selection. - Of primary concern in payload propulsion system design is
the selection of the RCS system propellant. Since a variety of thrust magnitudes and burn times are
desirable during a vehicle mission, the most feasible system is one using a liquid propellant. Hydrogen
peroxide is utilized in the Scout Launch Vehicle to perform the "steering" function. Although
hydrogen peroxide is hazardous to personnel and will react with a large variety of materials to gen-
erate sufficient heat for combustion, its monopropellant qualities enhance control of hazards.
Hydrazine is another monopropellant which has been used in upper stage RCS systems.
Hydrazine (N2H 4) vapors are flammable in all concentrations in air above 4.7 percent, reference 31.
and is hypergolic with some oxidants such as hydrogen peroxide and nitric acid. Hydrazine is
normally used as a monopropellant which is decomposed by a catalyst bed. Even though N2H 4 is
considered a storable propellant, precautions on corrosiveness and material compatibility must be
adhered to. Other common RCS systems use bipropellants which are highly combustible and most
frequently are hypergolic. Separate oxidizer and fuel storage is necessary which requires a more
complex propellant system which reduces reliability and safety. These problems exist not only during
flight but also during pre-launch fueling and checkout which requires two different sets of GSE for
handling the fuel and oxidizer but requires additional safety and operating procedures.
Liquid propellant hazards are discussed in detail in Section 6.2.
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6.2 Liquid Propellants
6.2.1 Introduction. - In reference 62, the Space Division of North American Rockwell per-
formed a study for NASA, Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. The study, Safety in Earth
Orbit, examined specific safety issues regarding manned and unmanned payloads delivered to orbit by
the Shuttle. The objective of one task of the study was to identify hazards associated with specific
Orbiter payloads while in earth orbit and to determine safety requirements and guidelines. Orbiter
payloads which were considered in the study are as follows:
• Agena
• Centaur
• Tra nstage
• Apollo Service Module (SM)
• Tug or Orbit-to-Orbit Shuttle (OOS)
In references 67 and 68the Agena/Shuttle and Space Tug Shuttle, respectively, were studied and
specific considerations were given to hazardous situations for normal mission phases. The results
from reference 67 were used as the basis for the liquid system hazard study presented in this section.
6.2.2 Hazardous Elements. - In most upper stage payload propulsion systems, the inherent
safety hazards can be divided into three distinct areas of consideration; (1) high pressure gas systems,
(2) ordnance devices, and (3) propellants. Hazardous elements which are utilized in,various propulsion
systems can be further classified by the type of main propulsion propellant, type of pressurized
container and gas, type of RCS propellants, corrosive fluids and attachment methods and/or pyro-
technics. In reference 62 the six different payloads considered were presented in a comparison tab-
ulation to show the many different hazardous elements that are contained in typical upper stages.
This comparison is shown in Table 6-11. The Agena system uses a bi-propellant storable propulsion
system with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel and high density acid (HDA) as
the oxidizer. HDA is a mixture of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) and nitrogen tetroxide
(N204). The Agena inboard profileis shown in Figure 6-10 and the propulsion system schematic is
presented in Figure 6-11. The main tank pressurization is accomplished by helium gas stored at
approximately 3600 psig.
In reference 62 a hazard analysis of the Agena/Shuttle system was performed to identify the
major hazards associated with each of the normal mission phases.
Mission phases for a typical Tug payload, as given in reference 68, is outlined below.
@
Preflight
C
t = 146 hr
® ® @ ®
Boost Tug free Recovery/ Post-
deploy flight entry flight
0 _ o _ 0 _ o
t = 3.9 hr t = 24 hr t = 7 hr t = 6.5 hr (Safeing)
to 8.2 hr to 30 days t = 112.5 hr (Turnaround)
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TABLE 6-11. - HAZARDOUS ELEMENTS OF UPPER STAGE
Fluid propellants:
Nitrogen tetroxide (0)
Aerozene -50 (0)
Hydrogen peroxide (0)
Liquid oxygen (0)
Liquid hydrogen (F)
Monomethyl hydrazine (F)
Water/glycol
Unsymmetrical dimethyl (F)
hydrazine
nhibited red fuming nitric ,(0)
acid
Pressurized containers and gas:
Helium tanks
Nitrogen tanks
Nitrogen tetroxide tanks
Aerozene -50 tanks
Hydrogen peroxide tanks
Liquid oxygen tanks
Liquid hydrogen tanks
Monomethyl hydrazine tanks
Water/glycol tanks
Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine
Inhibited red fuming nitric acid
g Can cause severe burns and
tissue damage on contact with
skin
Agena
X
X
X
X
X
X
Centaur Transtage
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Burner II SM OOS/Tug
X
X
X
A = Simple asphyxiant
X = Applicable or present
X
X
X X
x X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
(0) = Oxidizer
(F) = Fuel
VEHICLES
Toxicity Fire
X X
C X
X X
B X
B X
C X
X X
C X
Corrosion
X
X
X X X
Explosion
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A
A
See above
,y
Seeabove
C = Extremely toxic when heated to
decomposition
4_
O1
TABLE 6-11.- HAZARDOUS ELEMENTS OF UPPER STAGE VEHICLES -Concluded
RCS propellants:
Aerozene-50 + nitrogen tetroxide
Monomethyl hydrazine +
nitrogen tetroxide
Hydrogen gas + nitrogen tetroxide
Pyrotechnics:
Connections between modules-
cutters
4elium valves
Solid propellant igniters
Turbine start solid propellant
charges
Explosive bolts- payload separation
Linear shaped charge - panel separation
Destruct shaped charges
External extensions -antennae
Rocket engines:
(Qty. indicated)
Main engine
RCS Engine
Attachment methods:
Explosive bolts
Linear shaped charge
Not defined
Agena
X
X
X
X
X
X
B = Can cause severe burns and tissue
damage on contact with skin
Centaur
X
X
X
2
8
X
Transtage
X
X
X
X
2
12
X
Burner II
X
X
X
1
4
X
SM
X
X
X
X
X
X
1
16
X
C = Extremely toxic when heated
OOS/Tug Toxicity
C
C
C
X
X
1-4
2O
X
Fire I Corrosion
X
X
X
Explosion
X X
X X
X X
to decomposition
(0) = Oxidizer
(F) = Fuel
A = Simple asphyxiant
X = Applicable or present
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FIGURE 6-11. - AGENA PROPULSION SCHEMATIC
The missionphasesfor payloadsother than the Tugwill normally involveonly Phase1and 2.
MissionPhase4 could be requiredif the payloadlaunchisabortedandthe payloadis returnedto
earthwith the Orbiter. In the Agenastudy, reference67, the sequenceof eventsfor normalopera-
tion wasdivided into ninesetsof operations.TheseoperationsequencesetsareshowninTable 6-111.
6.2.3 Hazard Analysis
6.2.3.1 Payloads-Hazard Classes: In reference 67 individual hazards from all five payload
systems, shown in Table 6-il,were analyzed. The individual hazards were screened and consolidated
into fifteen classes of hazards. These hazard classes are as follows:
1. Explosive/rupture of a pressurized container inside or near the Orbiter
2. Combination of mutually reactive fluids inside or near the Orbiter
3. Detonation of explosive charge inside or near Orbiter
4. Rapid decomposition of monopropellants inside or near the Orbiter
5. Uncontrolled combustion in an RCS engine inside or near the Orbiter
6. Leakage of corrosive fluids inside the Orbiter
7. Ignition of main rocket engine or RCS engine inside the Orbiter
8. Attachment points of payload breaks inside Orbiter
9. Loss of attitude of payload near Orbiter
10. Hang-up of payload during release from the Orbiter
11. Rupture of common bulkhead tanks of payloads in or near the Orbiter
12. Loss of pressurization in RCS system while in or near the Orbiter
13. Inability to dump propellants or pressurants during orbiter boost phase abort
14. Inability to dump propellants or pressurants of retrieval payloads
15. Inability to close cargo bay doors because of interference with the
payload in the Orbiter bay.
Items 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15, almost 50 percent.of the hazard classes, pertain to problems/failures
which do not pertain directly to the propellants, propellant containers, or engines. However, the
hazards do pertain indirectly to the propulsion system since the occurrence of the listed hazardous
situations could cause damage to the payload/Orbiter which would result in fire, explosion and
corrosive/toxic situations.
The Agena hazard analysis, reference 67, was divided into basically four parts as follows:
1. Hazard Diagrams (Safety Consideration Tree)
2. Hazard Review of Normal Operational Sequence of Events
3. Hazard Review of the Abort Sequence
4. Compilation of Potential Hazards
6.2.3.2 Hazard Diagrams: In the Agena study, as well as the study of reference 62, it was
concluded that the four major categories of hazards which would be detrimental to the payload/
Shuttle system and personnel were:
® Fire/Explosion
• Collision
• Contamination
• Toxicity
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TABLE 6-111.- NORMAL OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE
Event No.
1.0
1.0.1
1.0.2
1.0.3
1.0.4
1.0.5
1.0.6
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
1.2.5
1.2.6
1.2.7
1.3
1.4
1.4.1
2.0
2.0.1
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
Sequence
Readiness area final loading and pressurization
Install pyro devices
Install batteries. Initiate battery monitoring. Do not switch to
battery power
Transfer/load propellants. Activate leakage detection equ ipment
and procedures
Fill He and N 2 bottles to flight pressures
Pressurize fuel and oxidizer tanks in sequence to launch pressures
Maintain safety monitor of temperatures, pressures, leaks, electrical
power circuits, valve positions
Move Agena to Orbiter
Disconnect and cap propellant dump lines
Attach slings, cables, etc., and rotate Agena to horizontal attitude using
overhead crane
Move Agena to transporter and mate in horizontal attitude
Transport Agena to Orbiter site
Mate Agena to Orbiter
Attach hoisting/handling equipment to support cradle
Unlatch and disconnect Agena/cradle from transporter
Hoist Agena/cradle, translate to Orbiter, and insert in payload bay
Secure cradle to Orbiter tiedown fittings
Connect dump lines to Orbiter propellant dump system
Connect power and instrumentation systems to Orbiter
Monitor safety instrumentation systems to Orbiter
Erect Orbiter and move to launch pad
Conduct pre-launch pad activities
Monitor safety and status instrumentation
Launch, ascent, and orbital quiescence
Monitor safety and status instrumentation
Pre-deployment activities
Transfer from Orbiter to internal Agena power
Attach manipulator arm to Agena
Deployment activities
Disconnect umbilicals for electrical power, fuel dump/vent and oxidizer
dump/vent at Agena/cradle interface and retract lines
Unlatch and release Agena from support cradle
Deploy Agena/payload with manipulator
Command Agena telemetry ON via RF command link, and check RF
link and telemetry are GO
Release and withdraw manipulator from Agena/payload
Separation activities
Move Orbiter away from Agena to prescribed distance
Activate Agena attitude control system by command
Arm Agena pyros and engine start cans by command, and start
computer-controlled operational program.
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Each of the major categories was analyzed by Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC) by
preparing hazard diagrams (similar to the so lid rocket Safety Consideration Tree in Section 6.1 ).
These four diagrams are preseated in Figures 6-12 through 6-15. The events shown in these figures
which are not enclosed in blocks were added for the present study. The events which are enclosed
in bold blocks are those hazards that LMSC identified as being of major importance and required
counteraction by design/testing, operation, procedure or equipment. The tabulation of the hazard
analyses is presented in Table 6-IV.
6.2.3.3 Hazard Review - Normal Operational Sequence of Events: The operation sequences,
Table 6-111, were screened to determine the most likely potential hazards. The results of this screen-
ing process are shown in Table 6-V. As shown, there were only ten operational events which
survived the hazard screening process.
6.2.3.4 Hazard Review -- Abort Sequence: Table 6-VI presents the assumed abort sequence
for the sequential dump of oxidizer and then fuel. Presented in Table 6-VII is the hazard analysis
for the abort sequences.
6.2.3.5 Hazard Analysis Summary: A compilation was made by LMSC on their Agena system
based on each of the hazard analyses. The more significant hazards, the potential effects and proposed
control were summarized and are presented in Table 6-VIII. In Table 6-VIII under 'HAZARD
EFFECTS', the likelihood of occurrence is rated as certain, likely, possible, unlikely, and very
unlikely. Those potential hazardous conditions which are classified as certain, likely, and possible
are listed and the likelihood of the condition existing is placed in parentheses.
1. Propellant on-board for landing
2. Oxidizer tank implosion with residuals present
3. Propellant tank rupture/projectile penetration of tank
4. Explosive mixture in dump lines
5. Personnel errors
6. Oxidizer and/or fuel in payload bay
7. Mixing of fuel and oxidizer
8. Agena partially disconnected - deployed or damaged
(unlikely)
(possible)
(unlikely)
(possible)
(prevented by design)
(unlikely)
(unlikely)
(unlikely)
As can be seen from the above listing, only items 2 and 4 are shown as possible residual
hazardous conditions. To reduce all hazardous conditions to this minimum level, the following
preventive actions were outlined by LMSC:
Oxidizer/Fuel Dumping
(a) Redundant electrical system
(b) Leave oxidizer dump valve open following dump
(c) Eliminate bends and risers in dump lines
(d) Use inert gas purge in dump lines
(e) Use check valves on cradle side of dump line interface
(f) Redundant helium valves
(g) System designed to prevent inadvertent valve openings
As can be seen from the above listing, the elimination of hazardous conditions in liquid
systems requires good system design, trained personnel, safe procedures and safe handling equipment.
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TABLE 6-IV. - AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
Intermediate
effect
Hazard
branch
number
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.2
1.1.1.3
1.1.1.4
1.1.1.5
Rupture of common
bulkhead in propellant
tank
Hazard cause
Fuel pressure leak plus oxidizer vent
failure will cause pressure differential
in tanks
Failed open oxidizer pressure
regulator, plus oxidizer vent failure
plus helium valve command failure
will cause overpressurization
Excessive crash landing loads could
cause excess loads on full propellant
tanks
Inadventent fuel dump could cause
bulkhead failure and fire
Fuel tank rupture could result in fire
i
Counteraction
1. Dual failure required
before fire can occur
2. Component qualification
and inspection
3. Safety monitor can
increase fuel tank
pressure by command
1. Triple failure required
2. Component qualification,
inspection and test
1. No hazard unless accel-
eration or shock loads
exceed design
2. Dump propellants
before landing
o Prevented by fail-safe
system design and
personnel training
1. Control acceleration
2. Dump propellant before
landing
3. Component qualification,
inspection and testing
4. Fail-safe procedures
and equipment
O1
03
03O_
Hazard
F ire/explosion
(continued)
TABLE 6-IV. - AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
Intermediate
effect
Oxidizer leak plus
combustibles in payload
bay
Fuel leak in presence of
heated atmosphere,
static discharge, short
circuit, or metal oxide
Battery overtemp
i
Hazard
branch
number
1.2
1.3
1.4
-- Continued
Hazard cause
Oxidizer combined with organic
material may spontaneously ignite
Fuel combined with atmosphere and
ignition may burn
Overheated batteries can explode
ill
Counteraction
1. Provide leak-tight pro-
pellant system
2. Provide helium purge bay.
3. Keep combustible
materials out of
payload bay
4. Dump oxidizer if large
leak occurs.
1. Provide leak-tight pro-
pellant system
2. Provide helium purge bay
3. Keep metal oxides out
of payload bay
4. Purge payload bay with
inert gas while on ground
5. Control payload bay
tem peratu re
6. Eliminate ignition source
7. Dump propellant
1. Use overload devices for
short circuit
2. Design, qualification,
inspection, testing
3. Use current practices to
prevent battery explosior
4. Use debris shield around
battery
Hazard
Fire/
explosion
(continued)
Collision
TABLE 6-IV.- AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS - Continued
Intermediate
effect
Pressure vessel rupture
Residuals in fuel dump
line, plus ignition source
Crack or leak in
common bulkhead
Hazard
branch
number
1.5
1.6
1.7
2.1
Hazard cause
Pressure vessel rupture could be quite
hazardous, damaging propellant tanks,
equipment and shuttle, and injuring
personnel 3.
Fuel trapped in an open dump line
following abort
Counteraction
1. Damage to Agena
or Orbiter
2. Propellant leaks
and fire/explosion
Fuel and oxidizer mix through
cracks causing reaction
1. Ground handling errors or equipment
failure
1. Control temperature
2. Depressurize tanks before
landing
Certify tanks by design/
test
4. Maintain ultimate safety
factor of 2.0
5. PrOtect tanks from impact
or collision
6. Use debris shields
1. Design dump lines for
gravity drain
2. Close dump line exit on
landing
3. Keep ignition sources
away from orbiter
4. Purge dump lines
1. Apply manufacturing,
testing and inspection
techniques that are
proven
2. Maintain tank Ap
within required limits
1. Develop procedures for
equipment and ground
handling
2. Train personnel
03
_J
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TABLE 6-IV.- AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS - Continued
Hazard
Collision
(continued)
Contamination
Intermed iate
effect
1. Ground and streams/
rivers polluted
1. Payload bay-
Agena payload
damaged
2. F ire/explosion
Hazard
branch
number
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
Hazard cause
1. RCS motors fire out of control
or fail during deployment
1. Premature main engine ignition
1. Manipulator failure
2. Operator error
3. Premature release of Agena
1. Failure to dump propellant at
high altitude
1. Propellant leaks in closed
payload bay
Cou nteraction
1. Establish adequate sepa-
ration between Orbiter
and Agena before
activating Agena ACS
2. Redundant ACS compo-
nents prevent loss of
control
° Inhibit engine firing until
arm command is given
following adequate separa-
tion between Orbiter and
Agena
1. Design Agena cradle so
that mission specialist
must command release
2. Manipulator failure and
operator error are the
responsibility of the
shuttle system
1. No dumping below
2000 feet
2. Schedule dump at proper
time
1. Provide leak-tight pro-
pellant system
2. Purge payload bay with
inert gas while on ground -
vent in flight
Hazard
Contamin-
ation
(continued)
Toxicity
TABLE 6-IV.- AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS - Continued
Intermediate
effect
1. Payload bay, Agena
payload, GSE
damaged
1. Orbiter, Agena
payload, GSE, facility
damage
2. Personnel injury or
death
1. Orbiter damage
2. Orbiter, Agena
payload damage or
fire
1. Toxic fumes near
ground
2. See 3.1
1. Toxic environment
in payload bay
2. See 3.2
Hazard
branch
number
3.3
3.4
3.5
4.1
Hazard cause
I. Propellant leaks during ground
handling
1. Propellant spills during fueling
process
1. Propellants contact aft end of
orbiter during dumping process
2. Propellants enter vents during
dumping of propellants
1. Failure to dump propellant at
high altitude
4.2 1. Propellant leaks in closed
payload bay
Counteraction
°
2.
Provide leak-tight pro-
pellant system
Develop ground handling
equipment and procedures
to avoid damage to lines,
fittings and seals.
1. Use fail-safe fill equip-
ment and procedures
2. Provide large quantities
of water to dilute and
wash away propellant
3. Observe safety practices
4. Train personnel
1. Provide safe dump exit
design and location
through development and
test
2. Dump propellants while
vents are closed
1. No dumping of pro-
pellants below 2000 ft
2. Schedule dump at
proper time
1. Provide leak-tight
propellant system
2. Purge payload bay with
inert gas while on ground-
vent in flight
O1
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TABLE 6-IV' - AGENA PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS - Concluded
I ntermed iate
effect
1. Toxic environment
Hazard
branch
number
Hazard
Toxicity 4.3
Hazard cause
1. Propellant leaks during ground
Counteraction
1. Provide leak-tight pro-
in vicinity of Agena handling
2. See 3.3 2.
1. Injury/death to
personnel
1. Injury/death to
(continued)
1. Residuals at dump line exits or
disconnects
1. Propellant spills during fueling
4.4
4.5
personnel process
.
pellant system
Develop ground handling
equipment and procedures
to avoid damage to lines,
fittings and seals
Provide propellant leak
detectors and monitor
1. Design dump lines for
gravity drain following
landing
2. Cover dump exits until
line purge
3. Purge lines before
disconnecting or working
around dump exits
1. Use fail-safe fill equipment
and procedures
2. Provide large quantities of
water to dilute and wash
away spilled propellant
3. Observe safety practices
4. Train personnel
Sequence of events
TABLE 6-V. - OPERATIONS SEQUENCE EVENT SCREENING
Classof ActiviW Possible hazard exposure Endangers
events involves
Error, undesired
event
Control action
Preventive actions
Other
.=_
Ob
1 Load propellant and gas
1.1 Install pyros
1.2 Install batteries
1.3 Load propellants
1.4 Load pressurants
1.5 Pressurize propellants
1.6 Monitor instruments
2 Move Agena
2.1 Disconnect fill lines
2.2 Rotate and move to transporter
2.3 Transport to Orbiter
3 Mate Agena to Orbiter
3.1 Attach hoisting equipment
3,2 Release from transporter
3,3 Move to payload bay
Secure cradle to Orbiter
3.5 Connect dump lines
3,6 Connect power and instrumentation
3,7 Monitor safety via Orbiter
4 Erect and move to pad
5 Prelaunch pad activities
5.1 Monitor safety and status
6 Launch to orbit
6.1 Monitor safety and status
7 Predeploy activities
7.1 Transfer to internal power
7.2 Attach manipulator
Deployment activities
8.1 Disconnect umbilicals
8.2 Release from cradle
8,3 Deploy Agena
8.4 Command TM on and check
8.5 Release Agena
9 Separation activities
9.1 Move Orbiter away
9,2 Activate ACS
9.3 Arm pyros and engine
into dump lines
Arm not released
Shuttle responsibility
Shuttle responsibility
Shuttle responsibiliW
Shuttle responsibility
TABLE 6-VI. - SEQUENTIAL DUMP- OXIDIZER FOLLOWED BY FUEL
Event
number
=
,
3.
4.
J
6.
.
.
=
10.
11.
12.
13.
i
The following actions are taken by the mission specialist after initiation of
shuttle abort
He monitors shuttle acceleration and flight path and when SRM and main engine
thrust is terminated, and the Orbiter is descending through the atmosphere
with drag force resulting in a net propellant settling acceleration of 0.003g
or greater, he arms the abort system and depresses an abort button to initiate the
following programmed sequence
Open He and N 2 control valves to pressurize fuel and oxidizer tanks
Open theoxidizer forward dump valve
When the oxidizer dump valve has been open 90 sec or more and tank pressure
drops below 27 psi, close the He control valve supplying the oxidizer tank
Open the fuel forward dump valve
When the fuel tank dump valve has been open 40 sec or more and pressure
drops below 35 psi, close the fuel forward dump valve
Landing
Land
Post landing
Connect fuel and -oxidizer vent lines to GSE, reduce fuel tank pressure, close
oxidizer dump valve, and purge dump lines
Disconnect dump lines and electrical umbilical at Orbiter interface and
release support cradle from Orbiter tiedowns
Remove Agena/payload and cradle from payload bay and install in transporter
Remove pyros
Purge propellant tanks and lines through GSE
Transport to refurbishment facility
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TABLE 6-VII. -- HAZARDSANALYSIS FORATMOSPHERICABORT
Event
No.
1
4
10
11
12
13
Potential hazard
Abort button pushed before propellants
settled, resulting in possible loss of
pressurant and failure to dump propellant.
No hazard for normal entry and landing,
if fuel tank remains pressurized
a. He and/or N 2 control valves fail to open.
Oxidizer and fuel only partially dump
and tanks will not repressurize
b. Fuel or oxidizer pressure regulator fails
open
Oxidizer forward dump valve fails to open.
Oxidizer does not dump
He control valve to oxidizer tank fails to
close. Pressurant is lost at a rapid rate. Fuel
cannot be dumped
Fuel forward dump valve fails to open.
Fuel does not dump
Fuel dump valve fails to close. Pressurant
is lost at a rapid rate. Tank cannot be
repressurized
No hazard on landing unless design crash
landing loads exceeded, or residuals are
trapped in fuel dump line
Careless handling of propellant systems
after landing could expose personnel
to toxic propellants
No hazard in disconnecting umbilicals if
dump lines properly purged and tanks
vented in previous step
Collision or impact if removal of Agena
to the transporter is not properly handled
No unique hazards during removal of pyros
Toxicity, contamination, fire, if tank and
line purge not properly handled
No hazard if transport is properly handled.
Collision with careless handling
Counteraction
1. Provide accurate acceleration in-
formation to mission specialist.
2. Consider putting an accelerometer
switch in the circuit to inhibit
dump if propellants are not settled
a-1 Parallel redundant valves preclude
single point failure
a-2 Inhibit dump valve until He
valve is open
b-1 Pressure controller modulates the
corresponding fuel or oxidizer
pressure control valve
1.' Mission specialist can command oxi-
dizer aft dump valve open and dump
1/2 of oxidizer load. Mission
specialist must have indication of
valve positions
1. Inhibit fuel dump valve from opening
while He control valve to oxidizer
tank is open. Land with fuel
1. Mission specialist can command aft
dump valve open and dump 1/2 of
fuel load. Mission specialist must
have indication of valve positions
1. Land with both fuel and oxidizer
tanks open to the atmosphere
1. Keep ignition sources away from
fuel dump exit following landing
1. Adequate procedures, equipment,
and training
1. Verify dump lines purged and
tanks depressurized
Adequate procedures, equipment,
and training. Use extra care if tank
partially or fully loaded
1. Use trained personnel and adequate
procedures
1. Adequate procedures, equipment,
and training
1. Adequate procedures, equipment,
and training
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TABLE 6-VIII. - HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Hazardidentification
Error, malfunction; Potentially hazardous Potential
undesired event Cause condition consequences
Human error Pressurant lost; pro- Tank rupture
or indicator _ellant not dumped on-8g crash
Dump initiated with
propellants not
settled, and system
not designed to land
fully loaded
error landing re-
suiting fire
Dump system con-
trol failure and system
not designed to land
fully loaded
Dump system
control failure
Propellant spills
during ground vent
and line purge, tank
drain following
abort landing
Collision during
ground handling
Crash landing plus
depressurized fuel
tank, with full
propellants
Electrical
failure or
component
failure
Oxidizer _
tank closed,
but not
repressur-
izad for
entry and
landing
Human
, error
Equipment
failure or
human
error
Excessive
loads
Propellant on.board
for landing
Oxidizer tank implo-
sion with residuals
present
Presence of toxic
propellants
Propellant tank
ru ptu re
Common bulkhead
rupture
Tank rupture
on-8g,crash
landing re-
sulting in fire.
Propellant in
tanks during
soft landing
Contamination,
toxicity
Toxicity
Fire, toxicity,
contamination,
injury
Fire
(a) Catastrophic; (b) Critical; (c) Controlled
_ Common bulkhead tanks not used on
shuttle payloads
Hazard effects
Hazard *
class
a
Likelihood of occurrence
Condition Consequences
Unlikely Very unlikely
Possible Likely
Possible Very unlikely
b Possible
b Unlikely
a Unlikely
Very unlikely
Possible
Unlikely
Possible
Certain
Control actions
Preventive actions
Provide accurate accel.
eration info to
mission specialist
Put accelerometer
switch in line to
inhibit premature
dump actuation
Redundant electrical
system
Redundant Ha valves
As above
Leave ox dump valve
open following dump.
Parallel redundant
press. Control valves
Procedures, equip-
ment, and training
Fail-safe handling,
equipment safe pro-
cedures, trained
personnel
Special care on landing,
retain pressurization
gasto maintain fuel
tank pressure
Corrective/remedial
actions
iStop dump before
pressurant lost,
and restart
Use special care on
landing
Special care on
landing and post
landing
None
Remove personnel
plus water deluge
Remove personnel
plus water deluge
None
TABLE 6-VII I.- HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY -Continued
O3
O1
Hazard identification
Error, malfunction; Cause Potentially hazardous Potential
undesired event condition consequences
Faulty regu- Fire, contamina-
lator tion
Pressure regulator
fails open during
propellant dump
Residuals remain in
fuel dump line
Fuel pressure leak and
oxidizer vent failure
Fuel tank overpres-
surized or punctured
during abort or
landing
Inadvertent fuel
dump
Oxidizer leak
Dump line
rises and
bends, in-
adequate
purge
Faulty
components
Collision,
excess
loads, or
failure of
both fuel
press, reg.
and He
valve
command
Common
bulkhead
rupture
Fau Ity seal
Tank or common
bulkhead rupture
Explosive mixture in
dump line
Common bulkhead
rupture
Fuel tank ruptured
Personnel error
Oxidizer in payload
Explosion, if
ignition source
is present
Fire
Fire
Fire
Fire, contamina-
tion
(a) Catastrophic; (b) Critical; (c) Controlled
• Common bulkhead tanks not used on
shuttle payloads
Hazard effects
Likelihood of occurrence
Hazard
class Condition Consequences
a Possible Likely
a Possible
Unlikely. Dual
equipment
failure required
Possible
Unlikely. Out-
of spec loads or
dual equipment
failure required
Prevented by
design
Unlikely, based
on Agena
history
Certain
Likely
Possible
Possible
Control actions
Preventive actions
Use high reliability
regulators. High
system cleanliness.
Use materials inert
to propellants
Eliminate bends and
rises in dump line.
Provide reliable
purge with inert gas
High reliability parts
Care in handling. High
rel parts. Fail-safe
design. Dump
propellant before
landing
System design requir-
ing deliberate action
to arm, open He
valves, and open dump
valves, plus fuel dump
inhibit if ox dump
valve is not open
Redundant seals, high
ret parts, inspection,
careful handling,
absence of organic
materials in payload
bay
Corrective/remedial
actions
Pressure controller
modulates pressurant
valve to control pres-
sure. Oxidizer relief
valve opens
automatically
Keep ignition sources
away from fuel dump
exit. Cap exits follow-
ing landing until lines
are purged
Open fuel tank He
valve to maintain
Itank pressure
Command fuel vent
open to reduce
I pressure
Command dump valve
closed
Inert purge of payload
bay while on the
ground. Dump
oxidizer
TABLE 6-VIII. - HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY - Concluded
(33
Hazard identification
Error, malfunction;
undesired event
Fuel leak
Battery explosion
Pressure vessel
rupture
Propellant tank
rupture
Crack in common
bulkhead
Dump lines wet
during disconnect
in orbit
Unsuccessful
deployment in orbit
Cause
Faulty seal
Internal
failure or
short
circuit
Faulty
pressurant
tank
Faulty pro-
pellant
tank
Faulty
tank
Propellant
dump valve
leak or
propellant
vent
Equ ipment
failure or
handling
error
Potentially hazardous
condition
Fuel in payload bay
Propellant tank
_enetrated by debris
Propellant tank
penetrated by debris
Propellant released
Comingling
of fuel and ox
Propellant released
into payload bay
Agena partially
disconnected or de-
ployed, or damaged
(a) Catastrophic; (b) Critical, (c) ;ontrolled
_k Common bulkhead tanks not used on
shuttle payloads
Hazard effects
Likelihood of occurrence
Potential Hazard
consequences class Condition
Fire, contamina- a Unlikely, based
tion on Agena
Explosion and a Unlikely
fire
Fire, contamina, a Unlikely
tion, toxicity
Fire, contamina- a Unlikely
tion, toxicity
Fire a Unlikely
Fire, contamina_ a Possible
tion corrosion
Orbiter-cannot a Unlikely
safely reenter
Consequences
Possible
Unlikely
Possible
Possible
Certain
Possible
Possible
Control actions
Preventive actions
Redundant seals, high
rel parts, inspection,
careful handling,
absence of metal
oxides in payload bay
Fail-safe battery design.
Qual test, short
circuit protection,
Debris shields
Flight qual., factors
of safety 2.0,
inspection
Flight qual., inspec-
tion, factor of
safety 1.4
Manufacturing testing,
and inspection tech-
niques currently used
on Agena, maintain
Ap within specs
Purge lines before
disconnect. Check
valves on cradle side
of line interface
Redundant release
mechanisms and
fail-safe restraints
Corrective/remedial
actions
Inert purge of payload
bay while on the
ground. Dump
_ropellants
Water deluge if
)relaunch
EVA to release or
reconnect
The main concern is to provide an acceptable environment (temperature, shock, vibration, impact,
overpressurization) which will prevent the fuel and oxidizer from leaking or mixing in any form
except in the engine combustion chamber.
Tank Rupture
(a) Redundant electrical system
(b) Use parallel redundant tank pressure control valves
(c) Use fail-safe handling, equipment, procedures, trained personnel
(d) Use high reliability regulators
(e) Dump fuel/oxidizer before landing
(f) System design to prevent inadvertent valve opening
(g) Use high factor of safety on tank design
Propellant Leakage
(a) Use fail-safe handling, equipment, procedures, trained personnel
(b) Use redundant seals in valves and closures
(c) Do not allow metal oxides or organic materials in the payload bay
which react to propellant
(d) System designed to prevent inadvertent valve openings
(e) Use check valves on cradle side of dump line interface
Payload Release
(a) Use redundant release mechanism
6.2.4 Liquid Propellants. -- The hazardous and unique characteristics of liquid oxidizers and
fuels, taken from references 6, 70 and 71 are presented below. A summary of the characteristics are
presented in Table 6-1X.
6.2.4.1 Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH): UDMH is a clear, colorless liquid
with a sharp ammoniacal or fishy odor. It is a fuel which is flammable in air over a very wide range
of concentrations. It is hypergolic with some oxidants, including fuming nitric acids, nitrogen
tetroxide, hydrogen peroxide, chlorine trifloride, and fluorine. Rags, cotton waste, wood scraps,
excelsior, and other materials of large surface area that have absorbed UDMH may cause spon-
taneous ignition. A UDMH fire may be supported freely in air or it may be supported by an oxidizer,
e.g., flare-type combustion. Due to the 3. 1 psia (2.14x104 N/m 2) vapor pressure at 80°F (26.7°C)
and a wide flammability range, the possibility of an explosive mixture forming over the liquid is
very high. Ignition can occur from an open flame or electric spark. UDMH is a convulsant agent,
an irritant to the respiratory tract and eyes, and may irritate the skin. It may be absorbed by the
skin, taken orally, or inhaled. Animal studies indicate that a mild anemia may follow exposure and
that the most serious after-effect is convulsions. Depending on the degree of exposure, these range
from tremors to acute convulsions. Chronic low level exposures may cause anemia. UDMH is
compatible with most common metals. There is no known limitation on the use of UDMH with
nickel, monel or many of the 300 series stainless steels. Aluminum and its alloys are also good for
UDMH service when the water content is low. Usable non-metals include teflon, unplasticized
KeI-F, polyethylene and certain butyl rubbers.
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00 TABLE 6-IX. - LIQUID PROPELLANT CHARACTERISTIC SUMMARY
Propellant
UDMH
Liquid
hydrogen
Monomethyl-
hydrazine
Flash
point
Open cup
5°F (-15°C)
Closed cup_ (TAG)
34°F (1.1°C)
N/A
Open cup (TAG)
63°F (17.2°C)
Open cup
(Cleveland)
70°F (21.1°C)
Auto-ignition
temp.
482°F
(250°C)
1075°F
(579°C)
382°F
(194°C)
Flammability
range
2% (LEL) to
90% by volume
at ambient
temperature
4 to 75%
by volume
at 68°F.
(3.2 to 60 g/m 3
at 20°C)
2.5% (LEL)
to 98% by
volume at 1
ATM.
(1.013x105 N/m 2)
Vapor
pressure
0.3 PSIA at0 ° F
(2.07xl 03 N/m 2
at -- 17.8_C)o
1.0 PSIA at40 F
(6,90x 103 N/m 2
at 4.4°C) o
3.1 PSlA at 80 F
(2.14x104 N/m 2
at 26.7°C) ,_
8.4 PSIA at 120_F
(5.80x 104 N/m 2
at 48.9°C)
1.9 PSIA at --433°F
(1.31 xl 04 N/m 2
at --258°C) o
14.7 PSlA at --423 F
(1.01x105 N/m 2
at --253°C)
23.7 PSlA at --420°F
(1.63x 105 N/m 2
at --251°C) o
120 PSIA at -405 F
(8.27x105 N/m 2
at -243°C) ^
162 PSIA at -402UF
(1.12x106 N/m 2
at --241 °C)
0.31 PSIA at 40°F
(2.14xl 03 N/m 2
at 4.4°C)
1.0 PSlA at 80 u F
(6.9xl 03 N/m 2
at 26.7°C) ^
3.1 PSlA at 120UF
(2o14X104 N/m 2
at 48.9°C) _,
7.9 PSIA at 160VF
(5.45x104 N/m 2
at 71.1°C)
Threshold
limit value
0.5 ppm
(1 mg/m 3)
N/A
0.2 ppm
(.35 mg/m 3)
ceiling value,
skin warning
Material
compatibility
Compatible
with most
common
metals. Unsat.
with copper
& high copper
content
alloys
Compatible
with many
metals except
non-austenitic
ferrous alloys
Compatible
with some
metals
Stability
Not shock
or friction
sensitive.
Good ther-
mal
stability
Chemically
stable when
stored
properly.
Hydrogen-
air mixture
can be
ignited by
heat, spark
or flame.
Stable
except when
influenced
by copper,
copper alloys,
molybdenum
or iron
oxide
catalyst
Remarks
Hypergolic with
some oxidants.
Large flammability
range and high
vapor pressure makes
this fuel very
hazardous
Ignites readily over
a wide range of
mixture with air.
Not toxic but low
temperatures present
personnel hazard.
Highly reliable
refrigeration is required
Flammable over a large
range of concentrations.
Hypergolic with some
oxidants, Causes
spontaneous ignition of
many common materials
Propellent
Hydrogen
perox ide
90%
t Fuming
Flash
point
Is not flammable
but reacts with
flammable
materials
Doesn't burn
nitric acids by itself
Nitrogen
tetroxide
Liquid
oxygen
Doesn't burn
by itself
Doesn't burn
by itself
TABLE 6-IX. - LIQUID PROPELLANT CHARACTERISTIC SUMMARY - Concluded
Auto.ignition
temp
At 285°F
(140.5°C)
rapid boiling
occurs and
results in
pressure
increase in
containers
N/A
N/A
Flammability
range
26 to 100%
by volume in
air
(explosive range)
N/A
Must be
mixed with
fuels
N/A
Must be
mixed with
fuels
N/A
Must be
mixed with
fuels
N/A
Vapor
pressur e
.05 PSIA at 68°F
(3.45xl 02 N/m 2
at 20OC)
.17 PSIA at 104°F
(1.17xl 03 N/m 2
at 40°C) o
.52 PSIA at 140 F
(3.59x103 N/m 2
at 60°C)
1.38 PSIA at 176°F
(9.51x103 N/m 2
at 80°C)
0.2 PSIA_t 0°F 2
(1.38x10 N_m
at -17.8_C)
2.7 PSIA at77°F
(1.86x104 N/m 2
at 25°C)
5.0 PSIA at 100°F
(3.45xl 04 N/m 2
at 37.8°C) ^
15.0 PSIA at 148WF
(I .03x105 N/m 2
at 64.4°C)
4.8 PSIA at30°F
(3.31x104 N/m 2
at 1.1°C)
14.6 PSIA at 70"F
(1.01x105 N/m 2
at 21.1°C) o
38.6 PSIA at 110 F
(2.66x105 N/m 2
at 43.3°C) o
91.0PS1_ at 1520 F
(6.27x10 N/m
at 65.6°C)
37 PSIA at--280°F
(2,55xl 05 N/m 2 .
at --173°C)
167 PSIA at -260°F
(1,15xl 06 N/m 2
at -151°C)
615 PSIA at-190°F
(4,24x 106 N/m 2
at - 123°C)
Threshold
limit value
1 ppm
Aerosal
(1 rag/m3)
Nitric
acid vapor
2 ppm
(5 mg/m 3)
N itrogen
dioxide
5 ppm
(9 mg/m 3)
NO25 ppm
(9 mg/m 3)
N20 4
2.5 ppm
(9 mg/m 3)
N/A
Material
compatibility
Compatible
with some
aluminum
alloys, stainless
steels, plastics,
lubricants.
Specific
materials must
be selected
carefu IIV
Compatible
with many
aluminum and
stainless
steels. U nset.
with many
ferrous and
metals
Compatible
with most
common
metals. Mois-
ture content
is leading
factor
Compatible
with many
aluminum,
steel, copper,
and nickel
alloys
Stability
Stable in
properly
passivated
storage
containers.
Mixture
with con-
taminants
can be shock
sensitive
Stable to
all types
of mechani-
cal shock
and impact
Very
stable at
roo m
tempera-
ture
Chemically
stable. Not
shock
sensitive
but may
form shock
sensitive
mixture
with fuel
Remarks
Reacts very rapidly with
many metals and
organic contaminants
It actively supports
combustion by
liberating oxygen
H ypergolic with
some fuels. Liberated
fumes support com-
bustion. Toxic
properties of nitric
oxides make this
oxidant hazardous to
personnel
Readily supports
combustion. Hyper-
golic with many
fuels Toxic properties
make this oxidant
hazardous to personnel
Vigorously supports
combustion. Not
hypergolic but may
form shock sensitive
mixtures with fuels.
Not toxic but low
temperatures present
personnel hazard.
Highly reliable
refrigeration is required.
6.2.4.2 Inhibited/Red Fuming Nitric Acid (RFNA, IRFNA): Red Fuming Nitric Acid is a
fuming liquid which has the color of reddish brown. It is an oxidizer which will not burn by itself;
however, the fumes liberated by nitric acids support combustion. Spills may ignite materials such
as wood or rope, and the fire will be typical of the materials burning. Aniline and other hypergolic
fuels quickly ignite on contact with this acid. Once ignited, fuels undergo flare burning in contact
with the acids. Although nitric acid is stable to mechanical shock and impact, upon contact with
certain fuels (such as aniline or furfuryl alcohol) it will react violently. It will form explosive mix-
tures with non-hypergolic fuels and with hypergolic fuels. RFNA in contact with any surfaces of
the body destroys tissue by direct action. R FNA vapors are highly irritating and toxic to the
respiratory tract. A fatal pulmonary edema may develop. Many types of aluminum and stainless
steels are compatible with the fuming nitric acids. However, careful material selection is required
because many ferrous and nonferrous metals and their alloys will react with fuming nitric acid,
producing toxic oxides of nitrogen as well as failures from corrosion.
6.2.4.3 Nitrogen Tetroxide (N204): Nitrogen tetroxide is a heavy brown liquid and gives off
yellowish to reddish brown fumes. It is an oxidizer which will not burn by itself, but will support
combustion. When mixed with fuel, it is readily combustible and is hypergolic with a number of
fuels including UDMH, hydrazine, aniline, and furfuryl alcohol. N204 mixed with other combustible
liquids which are not hypergolic presents an explosive hazard, particularly when subjected to elevated
temperatures, pressure, or impact.
N20 4 in liquid form destroys body tissue. Severe burns of the skin and eyes can result
from contact with liquid N204. It volatilizes readily, giving off vapors containing a mixture of N204
and NO 2. Inhalation of the N204 and NO 2 vapors is normally the most serious hazard in handling
N204 due to their low threshold limit values.
N20 4 is not corrosive to most common metals but the selection is governed by the water
content of the N204. Plastics such as teflon, KeI-F and lubricants of the fluorolube family are
all compatible with N204.
6.2.4.4 Liquid Oxygen (LO2): LO 2 is a light-blue transparent liquid which has a boiling
point of --297.4°F (-183°C). It does not burn but vigorously supports combustion. Normally, it
is not hypergolic with fuels. It will cause liquid fuels to cool and freeze if both liquids are brought
together, resulting in a mixture that is shock-sensitive and which can react with the violence of a
detonation. When mixed with LO 2, all fuels that burn represent an explosion hazard. These mix-
tures can be exploded by static electricity, mechanical shock, electrical spark, or other similar
energy sources. When LO 2 is trapped in a closed system and refrigeration is not maintained, pressure
rupture may occur.
The health hazards of LO 2 are associated with its very low temperature. If LO 2 is spilled
on the skin, an injury resembling a burn will occur. Oxygen gas is not toxic when inhaled, but it
can cause some irritation to the upper respiratory tract.
Materials used in LO 2 systems must possess acceptable physical properties at extremely low
temperatures. Metals such as 18-8 stainless steel, monel, aluminum and copper can be used in LO 2
operations. Non-metals usable include teflon, KeI-F, asbestos and special silicone rubbers.
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6.2.4.5 Liquid Hydrogen(LH2): Highpurity LH2 isa transparent,colorlessandodorless
liquid with a boiling point of -423°F (-252.7uC). It is readily ignitedwith air overawide mixture
range.A seriousfire hazardalwaysexistswhenhydrogengasispresent. Hydrogenwill reactviolent-
ly with strongoxidizersandwill igniteeasilywith oxygen. It reactsspontaneouslywith the fluorine
andchlorinetrifluoride. An explosionhazardcanexist if liquid hydrogeniscontaminatedwith
oxygenor oxygemenrichedair.
If liquid hydrogenisspilledon the skin, it cancauseinjury like afrostbite/burn. In the
gaseousform, hydrogenactsasan asphyxiantby reducingthe amountof oxygennormallypresent
in air.
Materialsused in LH 2 systems must possess acceptable physical properties at extremely low
temperatures. Several metals such as 300 and austenitic stainless steel, monel, aluminum and copper
are acceptable for LH 2 application. Non-metals such as dacron, teflon, KeI-F and nylon are also
usable.
6.2.4.6 Monomethylhydrazine (MMH): MMH is a clear, water-white liquid with an odor
similar to that of ammonia. MMH is flammable in a broad range of concentrations in air. It is
hypergolic with some oxidants such as hydrogen peroxide, nitrogen tetroxide, fluorine, haligen
fluoride, and nitric acid. A film of MMH in contact with metal oxides, such as those of iron, copper,
lead, magnesium, and molybdenum may ignite due to the heat of chemical reaction. Materials of
large surface area such as rags, cotton waste, sawdust, excelsior, or other materials that have absorbed
MMH may eventually cause spontaneous ignition. The vapors of MMH in air can be exploded by an
electric spark or open flame. The liquid phase MMH is not sensitive to impact or friction.
MMH is a strong irritant and may damage eyes and cause respiratory tract irritation. It is a
volatile caustic liquid which can cause system toxicity by absorption through the skin as well as by
inhalation.
A few materials are acceptable for use in MMH systems. These materials include some 300
series stainless steels, nickel, and some aluminum alloys.
Non-metals such as teflon, KeI-F and high density polyethylene are also acceptable for MMH
usage.
6.2.4:7 Hydrogen Peroxide (H202): H20 2 is a monopropellant and is an active oxidizing
agent. It does not burn but vigorously supports combustion by oxygen liberation during decompo-
sition. It reacts with many organic materials such as wood, cotton, grass, dirt, cigarette ashes, etc.
It is also hypergolic with hydrazine and when mixed with organic solvents such as ketones, alcohols,
and glycols, the solution becomes shock-sensitive. Materials containing silver, lead, chromium,
mercury, and rust cause immediate decomposition. Explosions will occur from stored H20 2 when
the containers are closed and contaminated. Principal personnel hazards involve contact of the
liquid or vapor with eyes, inhalation of vapors, exposure of the skin to the liquid or high vapor
concentrations and spillage on clothing resulting in fire.
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Properselectionand passivationof materialsfor handlingH202 are required. Aluminum
andaluminum alloys,the 300 seriesstainlesssteels,Buna-N,Fluorel2141, KeI-F,Viton A plastics
andcertain lubricantsarecompatiblewith H202.
6.3 Liquid/Solid HazardComparison
The inherenthazardsinvolvedinoperationshandling,transportingand storingof solid
andliquid propellantsystemsaresimilar in manycasesandyet verydifferent in othersbecauseof
their physicalcharacteristics.In a liquid propulsionsystemthe fuel and oxidizermust betransferred
from tanksthroughvalves,linesandfittings to a maincombustionchamber. Thedeliveryof the
propellantsfrom the tanksmayrequirea gaspressurizationsystemwhich pressurizesthe storage
tank to approximately300-500psiwhile aturbine pump systemrequiresa low tank pressure.These
type systemsareusuallycomplex,susceptibleto leaks,contaminationand hardwarefailures. By
contrast,the solid propulsionsystemcontainsa solidpropellant,generallyclassifiedascomposite
or doublebase,which ismolded into the combustionchamber/storagechamberduringmanufacturing.
Therefore,no specialground supportequipment/facilitiesor complexfueling/safetyproceduresare
requiredfor field operations.
The primary hazardsthat operations,handlingerrors/malfunctionsor extremeenvironments
causein liquid propellantsystemsarefire, explosions,toxicity andcorrosionwhichoccurbecause
of leakage,spillageor mixing of the oxidizerand/or fuel. The primary solid propellanthazardsare
fire, explosionor detonationwhich maybecausedby electricalsignal,mechanicalor blastshock,
projectile penetration,hightemperaturesor somecombinationof theseenvironments.
In orderto comparethe liquid andsolid hazardsthe resultsof the solidrocket hazardstudy
of Section 6-1wassubjectivelycomparedto the resultsof the liquid rocket hazardstudyof Section
6-2. Thecomparisonis presentedin Table 6-X. As shown,therearemorehazardousincidents
which could leadto catastrophicor critical conditionsusinga liquid systemthanwhenusinga solid
system.Therefore,the solid systemshouldbeconsideredsaferthana liquid systemfrom asystem
viewpoint.
6.4 Conclusions
The simplicity of solid propellant rockethandlingandoperation requirementsmakethis type
systema prime candidatefor utilization on Shuttlepayloads.Although the applicationof these
systemspresentpotential hazardsto the Shuttlesystem,the hazardsare readilyeliminated,minimized
or controlled to anacceptablelevel. Methodswhich assurethat this hasoccurredare requiredaspart
of a systemsafety program. Detail hazardanalysesareusually requiredon major programs.Hazard
analysesoutlined in the NASA SystemSafety Manualincludesthe following:
(a) GeneralSafetyStudies
(b) PreliminaryHazardAnalysis
(c) Fault HazardAnalysis
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TABLE 6-X. - LIQUID AND SOLID HAZARD CLASS COMPARISON
Error, malfunction;
undesired event
Shuttle or Scout
non-propulsion system
fire
Propulsion system
fire
Environmental
heating
Meteoroid impact
Spurious electrical
signals
Vibration
Fragmentation from
shuttle or Scout non-
propu Ision system
rupture or explosion
Environmental shock
Electrical fault
Shock from shuttle
or Scout non-oropul-
sion system rupture
or explosion
Corrosion
Fuel pressure leak
and oxidizer vent
failure
Fuel tank over-
pressurized or punc-
tu red du ring abort or
landing
Inadvertent fuel dump
Oxidizer leak
Fuel leak
Notes:
1.
Liquid
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hazard
class
C-Catastrophic
CR-Critical
C
C
CR
C
Note 1
C
C
C
Note 1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Solid
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No- RCS
system only
No
RCS system
only
Puncture only
No- RCS
system or_ly
No- RCS
system only
No
Most liquid rocket systems require multiple valves to function
'before a critical or catastrophic condition can occur.
Hazard
class
C-Catastrophic
CR-Critical
C
C
CR
CR
C
CR
CR
CR
C
C
CR
173
ITABLE 6-X.
Error, malfunction;
undesired event
Battery explosion
Pressu re vessel
rupture
Propellant tank
ru ptu re
Dump lines wet
during disconnect
in orbit
Unsuccessful deploy-
ment in orbit
Dump initiated with
propellants not settled
and system not
designed to land fully
loaded
Dump system control
failure and system
not designed to land
fully loaded
Propellant spills
during ground vent
and line purge, tank
drain following abort
landing
Collision during
ground handling
Crash landing plus
depressurized fuel tank,
with full propellants
Pressu re regu lator
fails open during
propellant dump
Residuals remain in
fuel dump line
Liquid
-- LIQUID AND SOLID HAZARD CLASS COMPARISON - Concluded
i
Hazard Hazard
class class
C-Catastrophic C-Catastrophic
CR-Critical Solid CR-Critical
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
CR
C
C
C
C
Yes
No- RCS
system only
No- RCS
system only
No
Yes C
No
No
No
RCSsystem
only
Yes
No
RCS system
only
No
RCS system
only
No
CR
CR
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(d) Logic DiagramAnalysis
(e) ProcedureAnalysis
In this study the preliminary hazardanalysisapproachwasusedto analyzethe hazardous
situationsof solidrocket propulsionsystemsandtheir interfacewith the Orbiter vehicle. To
performthe study, the third andfourth stagesof the Scout launchvehiclewereusedasatypical
propulsionsystems. In generalit wasdeterminedthat safetyprocedures,qualification tests,payload
palletdesign,thermal insulationandelectricalsystemdesignconsiderationscanbeusedto provide
hazardreductionor elimination. In referenceto the Scout launchvehicle,the useof systemand
missionfeaturessuchasover-boarddischargeof RCSsystemrelief effluent, ignition delayuntil
sufficient separationfrom the Orbiter is realized,andelectro-mechanicalsafeandarmdeviceson the
solid rocketscanprovidefurther hazardreduction.
Liquid systems,suchasthe Agenabipropellantor the Scoutreactioncontrol monopropellant
system,areconsideredcomplexwhencomparedto the typical solidrocket from the handling,check-
out andoperation standpoints. Liquid systemsnormally contain inherenthazardsin at leastthree
areas:high pressuregassystems,ordnancedevicesand propellants. The liquid propellantsnormally
usedin upperstagevehiclesarenot impactor shocksensitivewhenstored in anuncontaminated
condition, however,whencontaminatedwith other fluids somebecomesensitive.Theseinherent
hazardsbecomeveryvivid When incidents/accidents cause a fire, explosion, contamination reaction
or toxic conditions. The main concern related to liquid systems is to provide an environment such as
temperature, shock, vibration, impact or tank pressures which will prevent the fuel and oxidizer from
mixing in any form inadvertently. Also liquid propellants provide handling hazards to personnel
which range from skin burns, frostbite, and eye damage to toxic inhalation and skin absorption.
Solid propellant systems such as the Scout, Burner II and Delta upper stages, are considered
in general to be simple systems when approached from the handling, checkout and operation view-
point. Solid motors do present hazards from possible ignition, explosion/deflagration or detonation.
However, extensive past usage of both liquid and solid systems has shown that most hazards can be
eliminated or controlled by good system design, trained personnel, safe handling equipment and
detailed safety/handling and checkout procedures. Also, the many inherent hazards involved with
field handling of liquid propellants are mostly eliminated by the use of solid propellants.
It was shown from a comparison of the PHAs of the liquid and solid propellant systems that
liquids inherently have more hazardous situations or conditions which could be catastrophic or
critical to the Shuttle system than the solid propellant systems. From a system's viewpoint the solid
system should be considered much safer than a liquid system and therefore more desirable for use
as a Shuttle payload system.
175
APPENDIX A
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS
LIQUID PROPELLANT HAZARD EFFECTS
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AppendixA
1.0 SAMPLECALCULATIONS: LIQUID PROPELLANTHAZARD EFFECTS
1.1 Introduction
Thefollowing examplesarepresentedsothat the methodof determiningpeakside-on
overpressure,explosiveyield and specificimpulsefor liquid propellantscanbereviewed.These
examplesincludethe three (3) propellant mixingmodes,confinementby missile(CBM),high
velocity impact (HVI), andconfinementby groundsurface(CBGS).
1.2 Example1"
Propellant- Hypergolic
Combinedmassof propellantandoxidizer -- 22,000 Ibm (10,000kg)
Failuremode- CBM
Solution: Examine Table 5-1 for "Part 1" and "Part 2" solution sequences.
Part 1: Table 5-11 implies that for the CBM failure mode,
Y = 0.01 - 0.8%
Using the higher portion for safety reasons,
Y = 0.8%
Part 2: Figure 5-20 implies that for a combined mass of propellant and oxidizer
of 22,000 Ibm (10,000 kg)
Y = (240%) (0.37) = 88.8%
where 240% is the hypergolic multiplier factor,
Y = 0.8%, the smaller value, is the correct choice.
Assume Standoff distance R (assumption) - 164 ft (50 m)
Solution"
(1) Terminal yield y _- 0.8%
(2) W =w Tx 1./_._100%
W = 22,000 Ibm x 0. 8____.%.%
100
W = 176 Ibm (80 kg)
(3) Scaled distance R/W1/3 = 164 ft/176 Ibm 1/3 = 29.31 ft/Ibm 1/3 (11.6 m/kg 1/3)
(4) Table 5-111 indicates:
Acquire P, peak pressure, from Figure 5-28.
Acqu ire I/W 1/3, scaled impu Ise, from Figure 5-30.
(5) From Figure 5-28, P = 11.0 psi (7.58 x 104 N/m 2)
(6) From Figure 5-30, I/W 1/3 = .002 psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 (27 N/m2s/kg 1/3)
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(7) I =_/1/3(W1/3) = 1.112x 10"2 psi/sec(116.2 N/m2/s)
1.3 Example2:
Propellant- Hypergolic
Combinedmassof propellantandoxidizer- 2200 Ibm (1000kg)
Failuremode- HVI
Impactvelocity (assumption)- 459ft/sec (140 m/s)
Type of surfaceimpacted- hard
Solution: Examine Table 5-1 for "Part 1" and "Part 2" solution sequences.
Part 1: Figure 5-21 implies that for an impact velocity of 459 ft/sec (140 m/s)
onto a hard surface, Y = 15%.
Part 2: Figure 5-20 implies that for a combined mass of propellant and oxidizer
of 2200 Ibm (1000 kg)
Y = (240%) (0.6) = 144%
where 240% is the hypergolic multiplier factor
Y = 15%, the smaller value, is the correct choice.
1.4 Example 3:
Propellant and oxidizer - LO2/RP-1
Combined mass of propellant and oxidizer - 22,000 Ibm (10,000 kg)
Failure mode- CBM
Ignition time (assumption) - 0.2 seconds
Solution: Examine Table 5-1 for "Part 1" and "Part 2" solution sequences.
Part 1: Figure 5-22 implies that for an ignition time of 0.2 seconds, Y = 52%
Part 2: Figure 5-20 implies that for a combined mass of propellant and oxidizer
of 22,000 Ibm (10,000 kg)
Y = (125%) (0.37) = 46%
where 125% is the LO2/RP-1 multiplier factor.
Y = 46%, the smaller value, is the correct choice.
1.5 Example 4:
Propellant and oxidizer - LO2/RP-1
Combined mass of propellant and oxidizer- 330,000 Ibm (150,000 kg)
Failure mode- CBGS
Impact velocity (assumption) - 32.8 ft/sec (10 m/s)
Ignition time (assumption) - 0.5 seconds
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Solution:
Part 1" Equation
Examine Table 5-1 for "Part 1" and "Part 2" solution sequences.
5-1 implies that for an impact velocity of 32.8 ft/sec (10 m/s)
Ym = 5% + (6.82%) 32.8 ft/sec
(3.28106 ft/sec)
Ym = 5% + 68.2%
Ym = 73.2%
Figure 5-23 implies that for an ignition time of 0.5 seconds
Y x 100
= 70
Ym
or
y B
(70)
(100) Ym
(70)
Y = (73.2%) = 51.2%(100)
Part 2: Figure 5-20 implies that for a combined mass of propellant and oxidizer
of 330,000 Ibm (150,000 kg)
Y = (125%) (0.05) = 6.25%
where 125% is the LO2/RP-1 multiplier factor.
Y = 6.25%, the smaller value, is the correct choice.
Standoff distance (assumption) - 328 ft (100 m)
Solution:
(1) Terminal yield y ---6.25%
(2) W=WTX Y100%
6.25%
W = 330,000 Ibm x 100
W = 20,625 Ibm (9364 kg)
(3) Scaled distance R/W 1/3 = 328 ft/(20625) 1/3 = 12 ft/Ibm 1/3 (4.8 m/kg 1/3)
(4) Table 5-111 indicates
Acquire P, peak pressure from Figure 5-32
Acquire I/W 1/3, scaled impulse from Figure 5-34
(5) From Figure 5-32, P = 5.5 psL(3.8 x 104 N/m 2)
(6) From Figure 5-34, I/W 1/3 = .0061 psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 (55 N/m2/kg 1/3)
I (W 1/3) = 0.168 psi sec (1160 N/m2s)(7) I- wl/3
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1.6 Example 5:
Propellant and oxidizer - LO2/LH 2
Combined mass of propellant and oxidizer - 22,000 Ibm (10,000 kg)
Failure mode- HVI
Impact velocity (assumption) - 131 ft/sec (40 m/s)
Type of surface impacted - hard
Solution: Examine Table 5-1 for "Part 1" and "Part 2" solution sequences
Part 1:Figure5-21 implies that for an impact velocity of 131 ft/sec (40 m/s)
Part 2: Figure 5-20 implies that for a combined mass of propellant and oxidizer
of 22,000 Ibm!(10,000 kg)
Y = (370%) (.37) = 137%
where 370% is the LO2/LH 2 multiplier factor
Y = 30%, the smaller value, is the correct choice
Standoff distance (assumption) - 328 ft (100 m)
Solution:
(1) Terminal yield y = 30%
(2) W=WTX Y100%
30%
W = 22,000 Ibm x
100
W = 6600 Ibm (3000 kg)
(3) Scaled distance R/W1/3 = 328 ft/(6600 Ibm) 1/3 = 17.5 ft/Ibm 1/3 (6.9 m/kg 1/3)
(4) Table 5-111 indicates:
Acquire P, peak pressure, from Figure 5-36
Acquire I/W 1/3, scaled impulse, from Figure 5-38
(5) From Figure 5-36, P = 3.19 psi (2.2 x 104 N/m 2)
(6) From Figure 5-38, I/W 1/3 = .0051 psi-sec/Ibm 1/3 (45 N/m2/kg 1/3)
(7) I =---J-I (wl/3) = 0.094 psi sec (649 N/m 2)
wl/3
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1.0 MISCELLANEOUS STANDARD HAZARDS TESTING PROCESSES
1.1 Introduction
The following standardized hazards testing processes were abridged from Vol II of reference
6 and are presented so that the reader may have a condensed reference of other hazard testing.
Additional data, including sketches, a description of the testing apparatus and a discussion of appli-
cation of the data, are contained in the given reference.
(a)
(b)
(c)
1.2 Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA)
Objective - To detect exothermic and endothermic reactions in a propellant or
constituent as heat is applied at a given input rate and to determine the relative
magnitude of these exotherms and endotherms.
Operating Principle - The sample and an inert reference material are heated
simultaneously at the same caloric rate. The exotherm or endotherm is measured
by the differing temperature recordings on a common time base.
Test Analysis and Limitations - Differential thermal analyses for elevated
temperature sensitivity have gained the widest acceptance of any thermal test
for propellants, components, and intermediate mixtures. DTA yields not only
decomposition temperatures at various rates of temperature rise but also, by
proper selection of heating rates, thermodynamic constants which are useful
in basic kinetics studies of propellant grain stability in large sizes. The DTA
test has its greatest value in the detection of unsuspected endothermic or
exothermic reactions of new compositions and providing qualitative estimates
of their effect. Quantitative assessment of the effects required measurements
of heat capacities and heat transfer constants.
1.3 Self-heating Test
(a) Objective - To determine the temperature at which a given mass and configuration
of propellant will commence self-heating to destruction from its own decomposition
exotherm.
(b) Operating Principle
(c) Cook-Off Tests- Progressively larger regular-shaped pieces of propellant(for example,
right cylinders), instrumented with internal thermocouples, are maintained at elevated
temperature under a constant heat-transfer environment until deflagration occurs.
(d) DTAs at Differing Heating Rates- The DTA is performed at a number of different
heating rates from 1.0 to 10.0°C per minute, and the data are plotted as log heating
rate vs.1/T, where T is the absolute temperature of the first exotherm.
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(e)
(f)
Self-Heating Determination in an Isothermal Environment - The rate of change in
temperature is measured at the center, the surface, and one point on a radius of
cylindrical propellant charges being heated in a constant temperature bath of
established heat transfer coefficient. For all determinations, it is necessary to acquire
values on the propellant for thermal conductivity, density, and heat of explosion.
Test Analysis and Limitations - The evaluation of kinetic constants on a larger
scale than the DTA test is desirable in order to decrease the amount of extrapolation
needed to predict the hazard for large motors by providing values at lower tempera-
tures. In the case of the method which utilizes an isothermal environment, knowing
the rate of temperature rise at that time when no temperature gradient exists at the
center, allows calculation of activation energy, as does also measurement of the
thermal gradient when equilibrium is established in the bath; provided in this latter
case, that the right bath temperature has been selected.
The self-heating tests described here pertain only to finished, cured, homogenously mixed
propellant. A further limitation is that one exothermic reaction must predominate and that it not
be complexed with a simultaneous endotherm (for example a crystalline form change in the oxidizer).
This is necessary in order to obtain sufficiently clearcut datum points to permit plotting of the curve
for activation energy. The iimitation of these self-heating tests to cured, homogeneous propellants
without voids rules out their use for one of the most serious propellant processing hazards; namely,
the destructive exothermic effect that results from high local concentration of reactive species
during mixing (for example, high.local concentrations of polymerization accelerators or burning
rate catalysts with oxidizer). These high local concentrations can result from such factors as
agglomeration, improper order of addition of components to the mixer, "dead spots" in the mixer
movement, etc. The only known testing method for assessing this high local concentration hazard
is to deliberately put together the anticipated mal-mixture and to test for exothermic effect at
various concentrations by conventional DTA techniques.
(a)
(b)
(c)
1.4 Copper Block Test
Objective - To express the auto-ignition temperature of the substance by an
empirical test method.
Operating Principle - A small sample is heated at a constant rate in a fixed environ-
ment until ignition occurs. The temperature of ignition is observed.
Test Analysis and Limitations - This test is a simple, economical method for express-
ing the comparative stability of substances to heat. However, the auto-ignition
temperatures obtained would differ in most cases if a different rate of heating was
used. Also, it makes no provision for detecting more than one decomposition
reaction, successive endotherms or exotherms, etc. Accordingly, the test is not nearly
as informative as auto-ignition temperatures determined in the DTA.
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1.5 WenogradTest
(a) Objective - To determine the temperature of explosion under conditions of minimal
heat transfer effects.
(b) Operating Principle - A small sample of the explosive is heated by electrical capacitor
discharge. Electronic recording of the temperature at which explosion occurs is
achieved within 20 microseconds by means of an oscilloscope.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations-- Thermal test methods described previously all have
an appreciable heat transfer factor, such that recorded times and temperatures
cannot be regarded as a true integral of the total heat input to the entire mass of
the sample. In an effort to minimize this heat transfer lag, Wenograd devised an ohmic
heating mechanism for a very small sample, with instrumentation for an electronic
response triggering mechanism and temperature recording.
In a critical review and confirmation of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory's test
result with the Wenograd test, workers at Stanford Research Institute affirmed that
the test measures a "true" induction time for the explosive, rather than the time
required for a physical effect, such as heatup of the sample. Explosion times in the
Wenograd test are believed to have the same characteristic times as response in the
impact test. The order of numerous explosives correlates well in the two tests.
1.6 Tallani Test
(a) Objective - To gauge the temperature sensitivity of materials by measurement of the
.gas evolution pressure.
(b) Operating Principle - The sample is placed in an enclosed system and is maintained
at a constant elevated temperature in a heating block. The pressure and pressure-
change-rate are plotted at fixed time intervals.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations- The test is most useful as a sensitivity criterion for
double base propellants and nitrocellulose. It has questionable utility for compounds
containing the nitro or any other phosphoric groups except the nitrate group.
(a)
(b)
1.7 Standard Heat Tests
Objective - To evaluate thermal stability by loss in weight at an arbitrary fixed
temperature.
Operating Principle and Test Description - A number of empirical heat tests can be
used, adapted principal'ly from the high explosives and pyrotechnics industries, e.g.,
the 75°C International Test and the 100°C Heat Test. In the Standard Heat Test,
for example, a 0.6g sample is heated in an open test tube at 100°C for 96 hours. To
qualify, an arbitrary value may be set, such as, the sample must lose less than 2%
weight in 48 hours.
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(c) Test Analysis and Limitations - As with most of these empirical tests, the results
are meaningful only in comparison with substances of established sensitivity that
have been tested in the past. The hazards analysis of manufacture of a new product
could thus be comparatively expressed in this manner.
1.8 Kl-Starch Test
(a) Objective - To evaluate the thermal stability of nitrato compounds by their time
to react with a standard indicator paper.
(b) Operating Principal and Test Description - The potassium iodide-starch indicator
paper test is conducted at 82.2°C for nitroglycerin and at 65.5°C for double base
propellants and nitrocellulose. The test paper is moistened with a glycerin-water
solution and the time to coloration is reported. Standard grades of military nitro-
cellulose are required to have a 65.5°C KI test value of 35 minutes minimum.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations- The test is most useful as a sensitivity criterion for
double base propellants and nitrocellulose. It has questionable utility for compounds
containing nitro or any other phosphoric groups except nitrato.
1.9 Methyl Violet Test
(a) Objective -To evaluate the thermal stability of nitrato compounds by the time to
react with standard indicator paper.
(b) Operating Principle and Test Description - Methyl violet indicator paper testing is
done at 120°C for propellants and at 134.5°C for double base and nitrocellulose
compositions. Samples are heated up to five hours and times are recorded to paper
coloration, evolution of red fumes, and/or explosion of the sample.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations - The test is most useful as a sensitivity criterion for
double base propellants and nitrocellulose. It has questionable utility for compounds
containing nitro or any other phosphoric groups except nitrate.
1.10.1
(a)
(b)
1.10 Electrostatic Discharge
Basic Electrostatic Discharge Test
Objective - To determine whether an electrostatic discharge will initiate an energetic
material.
Operating Principle - Electrostatic energy stored in a charged capacitor is discharged
to the sample material to be tested. Materials initiated below 0.015 joule are con-
sidered hazardous for direct handling since this value is approximately that which
individuals can generate. In this case the Human Spark Discharge test (see 1.10.2) is
employed.
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(c) Test Analysis and Limitation - The electrostatic energy discharge to the test
specimen is calculated from the relationship E = V2CV 2 where E = energy (joules),
C = electrical capacitance (farads), and V = charging potential (volts). Currently,
electrostatic discharge data do not reflect energy losses in conductors, discharge gap,
and resistivity of the test specimen. These factors lower the discharge energy and the
rate at which the energy is delivered. In addition, this type of test method does not
provide for testing at different discharge rates to simulate all possible process
conditions.
1.10.2
(a)
(b)
(c)
Electrostatic Discharge Human Spark Test
Objective - To establish the susceptibility of an energetic material to initiation
when subjected to the electrostatic discharge generated by humans.
Operating Principle - Electrostatic energy accumulated on an electrically isolated
human is discharged to the sample to be tested.
Test Analysis and Limitations - The electrostatic energy discharged to the sample is
calculated by applying the relationship E = 1ACV 2 where E = energy (joules), C =
capacitance (farads), and V = charging potential (volts). An average capacitance for
the human body is 300 picofarads* This technique does not allow for the different
discharge rates that would be available from different individuals because of varying
skin or contact resistances.
1.10.3 Electrostatic Hazards Analysis
(a) Objective - To quantitatively assess electrostatic discharge initiation hazards during
handling and manufacturing activities involving combustibles, explosives and solid
propellant materials.
(b) Operating Principle and Hazard Criteria - The Systems Engineering Approach to
Hazards Analysis is used to make realistic estimates of the electrostatic hazard
associated with handling or processing sensitive material. The response of materials
to electrostatic discharge stimulus is determined initially in suitable tests which yield
the "no initiation" energy (joules). This threshold value is compared to the electro-
static energy possible during manufacture determined by appropriate in-process
measurement and/or theoretical calculations. Operations are considered hazardous
when the electrostatic energy potential during the suspected operation exceeds the
threshold initiation level for the subject material. The human body can precipitate
an electrostatic discharge hazard when the material is initiated by electrical discharges
less than 0.015 joule. Assessment of this situation requires employment of the Human
Spark Discharge tests.
(c) Analysis Limitations - The simulated in-process tests are a more realistic analysis
since the experiments take !nto account "energy losses" attributable to resistance
(material, air gap, lines, etc.) and inductance and duplicate the rate at which energy
is applied to the sample for a particular equipment piece or body. The threshold
electrostatic discharge level obtained using the spark test may be conservative if
* 300 picofarads is consistent with the .015 joules energy of paragraph 1.10.1 at only 10,000 volts.
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inductanceand resistance generally are less than the environment under consideration.
To be totally applicable the electrostatic discharge test equipment circuitry should
duplicate these variables in the discharge path. This more costly and more extensive
test procedure is needed only when the material is known to be borderline or when
analysis shows that a hazard truly exists.
1.11 Thin Film Propagation Test
(a) Objective -- To determine whether a thin film of explosive material, once initiated,
can transmit to a more intense reaction and consume the material at this increased
rate.
(b) Operating Principle - A liquid explosive of varying thicknesses simulating process
conditions is initiated by impact, and the extent and rate of reaction are established
by monitoring the pressure front accompanying the explosive reaction.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations-- Data from this test give the frequency and extent
of propagation of reaction from an impact initiated sample. Also, the instrumenta .
tion employed gives the extent of a propagation as a function of time, thereby
yielding propagation velocity. A typical set of data could be:
Propagation frequency 66%
Propagation extent 2 inches
Propagation velocity 1200-1500 meters/second
This test can be used to determine not only the effects of sample dimensions but also of
energy input and materials of fabrication on the extent and velocities of the propagating reaction.
Use of the test is limited to testing those materials reacting strongly enough to activate the pressure
sensitive probe system.
1.12 Dust Explosibility Test
(a) Objective - To determine whether a finely divided solid material will react explosive-
ly when dispersed in a gaseous medium and ignited.
(b) Operating Principle
(c) Threshold Dust Concentration - Finely divided explosive dusts are dispersed into an
energy source in air to determine the threshold explosive dust concentration.
(d) Threshold Electrostatic Discharge - Dust air mixtures in the explosion range are
subjected to condenser discharge sparks to determine the threshold electrostatic
discharge energy for highly explosive dust-laden atmosphere.
(e) Test Analysis and Limitation -- Data from this test are reported as threshold dust
concentrations (oz/ft3)_ning the concentration of dust must exceed this level to
explode, and the threshold electrostatic discharge energy (joules), if exceeded, will
initiate an explosive reaction in the dust/air mixture.
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Test capabilities permit establishing explosibility characteristics of a material
under different media for evaluating compositional effects, and the relative benefits
of inert gases or additives for eliminating a dust explosion. The test yields relative
values which are influenced by such factors as the chemical and physical properties
of the dust, uniformity of the dust cloud, properties of the atmosphere, ignition
source and environmental conditions.
(a)
(b)
(c)
1.13 Critical Height To Explosion (Transition) Test
Objective - To determine if a material will react explosively when initiated by flame.
Operating Principle - Materials are submerged and surface flame initiation under
environmental process conditions to determine if a material will react explosively for
a specific operation.
Test Analysis and Limitations - Whether a material explodes or detonates is, for
practical purposes, of little consequence since both reactions result in destruction
of facilities and possible personnel injury. Since material explosion heights are
generally lower than detonation heights, the safety of personnel and protection of
plant operations dictate that the no-explosion level be employed in process hazard
evaluation stud ies.
Critical heights to explosion (CH e) data are reported as the material height
(inches) above which an explosive reaction can occur for a given container diameter.
The data are valid within the limits of test container sizes and confinement and
assuming submerged initiation, equal to a 12 gram bag igniter. Application to process
hazard analysis studies assumes the critical height to explosion increases with the
charge diameter. It is expected that the effect of diameter on CH e will diminish as
this dimension increases. These data are representative of a highly transient reaction
and may not be indicative of a situation where the material continues to burn. In the
latter case, cook-off data would be more applicable. The critical height test permits
testing of solids, liquids, and mixtures used in propellant manufacture. The test can
also be used to verify benefits of recommended material modifications to eliminate
or minimize transition hazards. Further, the test can be used to implement investiga-
tions of influencing factors such as initiation energy, density, temperature, design
configuration, and degree and material of confinement.
(a)
(b)
1.14 Critical Diameter for Propagation Test
Objective - To determine if a material will propagate an explosive reaction when
subjected to induced shock-and to establish the critical dimension for nonpropagation.
Operating Principle - Materials are purposely shocked by pressures of a detonating
high-energy donor to determine if a material dimension is capable of propagating an
explosive reaction. The dimensions of the material are varied under specific environ-
mental process conditions to establish the critical non-propagating dimension.
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(c) Test Analysis and Limitation - Critical diameter data are reported as the confined
or unconfined material diameter (inches) at which an explosion reaction will not be
propagated. Application to process hazard analysis studies assumes an initiation has
occurred and has progressed to an explosion reaction equal to or greater than that
characteristic of the Composition C-4 booster material. Degree of confinement can
influence test results and thus must be considered in applying the data.
The critical diameter test permits testing of solids, liquids, and mixtures that
may occur during propellant manufacture. In addition, benefits of recommended
material modification to eliminate potential propagation hazards are easily verified
as are results of studies to investigate density, temperatures, confinement, and high
and low-reaction rate phenomena with liquid and solid explosives.
1.15 Bottle Drop Test
(a)
(b)
(c)
Objective - To assess the hazards associated with the inadvertent dropping of explo-
sive liquids during transport or sampling.
Operating Principle - Containers of explosive liquids, preferably of the same geometry
as those used in the process, are dropped from various heights to determine if the test
liquid can be initiated in this type of environment.
Test Analysis and Limitations - Some explosive liquids have been initiated into low
velocity explosive reactions by relatively small energy inputs; stress concentrations
and cavitation in the liquid being deemed the mechanism of initiation. At the stage
of development of a new explosive liquid when two to five pound quantities are
available, this test has been used to assess the hazard of an inadvertent drop of the
material. The bottle drop test has the limitation, as does all sensitivity testing, of
possibly finding only an unsafe condition while giving no information as to a safe
condition.
1.16 Shear Water Hammer Test
(a) Objective - To determine if a moving bed of an explosive mixture in a slurry form
can be initiated by sudden deceleration.
(b) Operating Principle - Thus far, use-type tests in which the material in question is
dropped or shot onto a steel plate have proved the most useful.
(c) Test Analysis and Limitations- Test results on the slurries investigated thus far
have shown a velocity requirement greatly exceeding that available in the process.
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